

Copyrighted material_9780230355767.

The Age of Migration

Copyrighted material_9780230355767.

The Age of Migration

**International Population Movements
in the Modern World**

Fifth Edition


Stephen Castles

Hein de Haas

and

Mark J. Miller

**palgrave
macmillan**



© Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller 1993, 1998, 2003, 2009
© Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller 2014

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First edition 1993

Second edition 1998

Third edition 2003

Fourth edition 2009

Fifth edition 2014

Published by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Hounds Mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries

ISBN 978–0–230–35576–7 hardback

ISBN 978–0–230–35577–4 paperback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Castles, Stephen.

The age of migration : international population movements in the modern world / Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller.—Fifth edition.

pages cm

Summary: "The leading text in the field, this authoritative work offers a global perspective on the nature of migration flows, why they occur, and their consequences for both origin and destination societies. Chapters provide up-to-date descriptions and comparative analyses of major migration regions in the North and South. The role of population movements in the formation of ethnic minority groups is examined, as is the impact of growing ethnic diversity on economies, cultures, and political institutions. Useful pedagogical features include accessible boxed examples, tables, maps, and suggestions for further reading. The companion website features an online-only chapter, additional case studies, links to relevant resources, and periodic updates"— Provided by publisher.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978–1–4625–1311–6 (pbk.)

1. Emigration and immigration. I. Haas, Hein de, 1969– II. Miller, Mark J. III. Title.

JV6032.C37 2014

304.8'2—dc23

2013027895

Contents

<i>List of Illustrative Material</i>	ix
<i>Preface to the Fifth Edition</i>	xi
<i>Note on Migration Statistics</i>	xiv
<i>The Age of Migration Website</i>	xv
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xvi
1 Introduction	1
The challenges of global migration	5
Contemporary migrations: general trends	13
International migration in global governance	17
Ethnic diversity, racism and multiculturalism	18
Aims and structure of the book	20
Guide to further reading	22
2 Theories of Migration	25
Explaining the migratory process	27
Functionalist theories: push–pull models and neoclassical theory	28
Historical–structural theories	31
Putting migrants first: agency, identity and the perpetuation of migration	37
Network, transnationalism and migration systems theories	39
Migration transition theories	46
Conclusion	51
Guide to further reading	53
3 How Migration Transforms Societies	55
The transformation of receiving societies: from migration to settlement	56
The formation of ethnic minorities	57
Race and racism	59
Gender and migration	61
Culture, identity and community	63
State and nation	64

Citizenship	66
The transformation of origin societies	69
The migration and development debate	69
The development impacts of migration	75
Reform as a condition for migration and development	78
Policy considerations	79
Conclusions	81
Guide to further reading	82
4 International Migration before 1945	84
Colonialism	86
Industrialization and migration to North America and Oceania before 1914	89
Labour migration within Europe	93
The interwar period	96
Conclusions	99
Guide to further reading	100
5 Migration in Europe since 1945	102
Migration in the post-World War II boom	104
European migrations in the period of economic restructuring (1974–mid-1990s)	111
Southern European migration transitions	113
Migration in Central and Eastern Europe	115
Migration trends of the new millennium	116
Migratory consequences of the global economic crisis	118
Europe's changing population	119
Conclusions	123
Guide to further reading	125
6 Migration in the Americas	126
Migration from 1945 to the 1970s	128
Migration since the 1970s	131
Regional trends and policy developments	141
Conclusions	144
Guide to further reading	146
7 Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region	147
The development of Asian migration	148
Asian migration to Western Europe, North America and Oceania	151
Contract labour migration to the Middle East	153
Labour migration within Asia	153

East Asia	156
South-East Asia	158
Countries of emigration	159
Highly qualified migrants and students	161
Refugees	163
Oceania	166
Conclusions: perspectives for Asian migration	169
Guide to further reading	171
8 Migration in Africa and the Middle East	172
Historical and colonial roots of contemporary migrations	174
Postcolonial migration within Africa	175
Intercontinental migration to Europe and the Gulf States	178
Forced migration in the Middle East	181
Changing intra-African migrations after 1989	184
New African migrations to Europe, the Middle East and China	187
The political salience of migration	189
Conclusions	193
Guide to further reading	196
9 Migration, Security and the Debate on Climate Change	198
Key dimensions of the international migration and security nexus	199
From a non-problem to an obsession: migration and security in the OECD area, 1945–2012	201
Migration and security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	207
A growing concern: environment, climate change and migration	209
Conclusions	213
Guide to further reading	213
10 The State and International Migration: The Quest for Control	215
Employer sanctions	215
Legalization programmes	218
Temporary foreign-worker admission programmes	220
Refugees and asylum	221
Regional integration	230
The ‘migration industry’	235
Human smuggling and trafficking	236
Conclusions: a quixotic or credible quest for control?	238
Guide to further reading	239

11 Migrants and Minorities in the Labour Force	240
Labour demand in advanced economies	240
Migrants in the labour market	242
Migrant workers in the global economic crisis (GEC)	247
The new political economy: making the global labour market	253
The transformation of work	256
Conclusions	260
Guide to further reading	262
12 New Ethnic Minorities and Society	264
Incorporation: how immigrants become part of society	264
Immigration policies and minority formation	270
Labour market position	272
Residential segregation, community formation and the global city	274
Social policy	277
Racism and minorities	282
Racist violence	284
Minorities and citizenship	287
Linguistic and cultural rights	291
Conclusions: the integration challenge	292
Guide to further reading	294
13 Immigrants and Politics	296
Origin countries and expatriates	297
Extra-parliamentary forms of migrant participation and representation	301
Non-citizen voting rights: a global issue	303
Migrants and ethnic voting blocs	305
Anti-immigrant movements and parties	307
The politics of immigration policy-making	312
Conclusions	314
Guide to further reading	316
14 Conclusion: Migration in the Twenty-First Century	317
Future perspectives for global migration and mobility	318
Improving international cooperation and governance	320
Responding to irregular immigration	323
Legal migration and integration	326
Ethnic diversity, social change and the nation-state	328
<i>Bibliography</i>	332
<i>Index</i>	381

List of Illustrative Material

Tables

2.1	Important feedback mechanisms perpetuating migration processes	45
3.1	Top 10 remittance-receiving developing countries (2009) by billions of US dollars and by share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	74
5.1	Minority population in the main Western European countries of immigration (1950–75) (thousands)	108
5.2	Foreign resident population in European OECD countries (thousands)	120
5.3	Foreign-born population in European OECD countries (thousands)	121
10.1	The world's main refugee-origin and refugee-receiving countries, end 2011	224
12.1	Acquisition of nationality in selected OECD countries (1988, 1995, 2005 and 2009)	288

Figures

1.1	World immigrant populations, by levels of development	8
1.2	International immigrants as a percentage of total population, by level of development	9
1.3	Estimated population of international immigrants by continent, 1990–2010	9
1.4	International immigrants as a percentage of the population by continent, 1990–2010	10
1.5	Estimated number of refugees by major area, 1990–2010	12
1.6	Refugees as a percentage of the international migrant population by major area, 1990–2010	13
2.1	The migration transition	48
3.1	Remittances and official development assistance to lower- and middle-income countries	73
5.1	Foreign-born and foreign population in European OECD countries, 2010	122
6.1	Foreign-born populations in selected American countries	140

7.1	Foreign-born populations in selected Asia-Pacific countries	147
8.1	Foreign-born populations in selected sub-Saharan African countries	178
8.2	Foreign-born populations in the Middle East and North Africa	181

Boxes

1.1	How migration shaped US and Mexican politics in the twenty-first century	3
1.2	Migration and revolution: the Arab Spring	14
4.1	Forced foreign labour in the Nazi war economy	98
5.1	The German ‘guest-worker system’	107
6.1	Narco-capitalism and the ‘ni-nis’	136
7.1	Afghanistan’s long refugee emergency	165
8.1	The system of sponsorship (Kafala) in the Gulf	180
9.1	Spillover of insurgency in Algeria to France	203
9.2	The Armenian diaspora and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh	208
11.1	Why migrant unemployment and employment rose at the same time	248
12.1	Minorities in the USA	267
12.2	Minorities in Australia	269
12.3	Minorities in the United Kingdom	272
12.4	Minorities in France	275
12.5	Minorities in Germany	278
12.6	Minorities in Italy	285
13.1	The decade-long path to Mexican absentee voting rights	300
13.2	The unrest in France in 2005 and 2007	301

Maps

1.1	International migratory movements from 1973	11
4.1	Colonial migrations from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries	87
4.2	Labour migrations connected with industrialization, 1850–1920	91
5.1	International migration, 1945–73	105
6.1	Contemporary migrations within and from Latin America	132
7.1	Contemporary migrations within and from the Asia-Pacific region	150
8.1	Contemporary migrations within and from Africa	176
8.2	Migrations within, from and to the Middle East	182

Preface to the Fifth Edition

The Age of Migration was originally published in 1993, with the aim of providing an accessible introduction to the study of global migrations and their consequences for society. It was designed to combine theoretical knowledge with up-to-date information on migration flows and their implications for states as well as people everywhere. International migration has become a major theme for public debate, and *The Age of Migration* is widely used by policy-makers, scholars and journalists. It is recommended as a textbook in politics and social science all over the world.

For this new edition, Hein de Haas has joined Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller as an author. As with previous editions, the fifth edition is essentially a new book. It has been thoroughly revised and updated. Its revised structure now comprises three thematic clusters. After the introductory chapter, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are concerned with theories as well as the history of migration and ethnic diversity. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 then present overviews of migration in specific world regions. Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 are devoted to the effects of migration upon societies, especially in immigration countries.

The fifth edition provides a systematic and comprehensive discussion of migration theories. It also features in-depth analysis of two new issues. A major focus in Chapter 11, but also within each regional chapter, concerns the effects of the global economic crisis since 2008 for international migration. A second major innovation is the analysis of climate change and its effects upon migration and security. Although some have viewed climate change as having dire implications for international migration, we found no evidence of large-scale international migration as a result of climate change. Another key change already came with the fourth edition and the creation of a website. This is designed as a resource for students and other users. It contains internet links, and additional information and examples to complement the text of the book. (For more detail see the guide to further reading at the end of each chapter.)

The fifth edition examines recent events and emerging trends anew. Labour migration to new industrial economies is growing fast, while violent conflicts are leading to vast movements of displaced people, especially in less developed regions. Improvements in transport and communication facilitate temporary, circular and repeated movements. New types of mobility are emerging as increasing numbers of people move for education, marriage or retirement, or in search of new lifestyles.

The fifth edition analyses and updates the migration effects of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union, and the role of migrant

labour in the ‘new economy’ of highly developed countries. Demographic changes in immigration countries are raising awareness of future demand for migrant labour, while, at the same time, public concern about ethnic diversity is leading to measures to increase social cohesion, for instance through ‘integration contracts’ and citizenship tests.

Much has changed in the world since the publication of the first edition, yet the book’s central argument remains the same. International population movements are reforging states and societies around the world in ways that affect bilateral and regional relations, economic restructuring, security, national identity and sovereignty. As a key dynamic within globalization, migration is an intrinsic part of broader economic and social change, and is contributing to a fundamental transformation of the international political order. However, what sovereign states do in the realm of migration policies continues to matter a great deal. The notion of open borders remains elusive even within regional integration frameworks, except for European citizens circulating within the European Union.

The authors thank the following for help in preparing the fifth edition. Several doctoral candidates at the University of Sydney provided expert research assistance to Stephen Castles. Magdalena Arias Cubas made a major contribution to Chapter 6, Migration in the Americas; Chulhyo Kim provided significant input to Chapter 7, Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region; Derya Ozkul, Elsa Koleth and Rebecca Williamson provided crucial assistance with the preparation of country studies for Chapter 12, New Ethnic Minorities and Society. All made important contributions to the *Age of Migration* website.

Hein de Haas is indebted to Mathias Czaika, Agnieszka Kubal, Lucia Kureková, Ronald Skeldon, Simona Vezzoli and María Villares Varela for giving valuable feedback on various drafts of Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 8. He also expresses gratitude to the European Research Council (ERC), which has enabled him to do essential background research on migration theories and recent migration trends in Europe and Africa as part of a Starting Grant to the DEMIG (Determinants of International Migration) project under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013, ERC Grant Agreement 240940).

Mark Miller is deeply indebted to James O’Neill Miller, not only for research and typing assistance, but also for his valuable editorial suggestions. He is also thankful for the assistance he received from Barbara Ford, Lynn Corbett, Cindy Waksmonski and Tony Valentine from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware.

We would like to thank our publisher, Steven Kennedy, above all for his patience, but also for his editorial and substantive advice. Stephen Wenham of Palgrave Macmillan has also given a great deal of support on the fifth edition, as on the fourth.

We are indebted to Oliver Bakewell, Robin Cohen, Jock Collins, Evelyn Ersanilli, Fred Halliday, Gunvor Jónsson, Thomas Lacroix, Sako Musterd,

Christina Rocha, Stuart Rosewarne, Martin Ruhs, Patrick Simon, John Solomos, Carlos Vargas-Silva and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden for their constructive comments. The authors wish to acknowledge the many valuable criticisms of earlier editions from reviewers and colleagues, although it is not possible to respond to them all. We are also grateful to Olinka Caunerova who did essential work on preparation of the bibliography and the final book manuscript.

Stephen Castles would like to thank Ellie Vasta for all her intellectual engagement with the contents of this book and her critique and input, as well as her constant support.

Hein de Haas would like to thank Bouchra Arbaoui for her support and the countless inspiring discussions, as well as Selma and Dalila, for adding so much optimism and energy.

Mark Miller wishes to thank his wife, Jane Blumgarten Miller, for her understanding and support especially during the unexpected and trying circumstances in which the fifth edition was written.

STEPHEN CASTLES
HEIN DE HAAS
MARK J. MILLER

Note on Migration Statistics

When studying migration and minorities it is vital to use statistical data, but it is also important to be aware of the limitations of such data. Statistics are collected in different ways, using different methods and different definitions by authorities of various countries. These can even vary between different agencies within a single country.

A key point is the difference between *flow* and *stock* figures. The *flow* of migrants is the number of migrants who enter a country (*inflow*, *entries* or *immigration*) in a given period (usually a year), or who leave the country (*emigration*, *departures* or *outflow*). The balance between these figures is known as *net migration*. The *stock* of migrants is the number present in a country on a specific date. Flow figures are useful for understanding trends in mobility, while stock figures help us to examine the long-term impact of migration on a given population.

Until recently, figures on immigrants in ‘classical immigration countries’ (the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) were mainly based on the criterion of a person being *foreign-born* (or *overseas-born*), while data for European immigration countries were mainly based on the criterion of a person being a *foreign national* (or *foreign resident*, *foreign citizen*, *foreigner* or *alien*). The foreign-born include persons who have become *naturalized*, that is, who have taken on the nationality (or citizenship) of the receiving country. The category excludes children born to immigrants in the receiving country (the *second generation*) if they are citizens of that country. The term ‘foreign nationals’ excludes those who have taken on the nationality of the receiving country, but includes children born to immigrants who retain their parents’ nationality (see OECD, 2006: 260–1).

The two ways of looking at the concept of immigrants reflect the perceptions and laws of different types of immigration countries. However, with longer settlement and recognition of the need to improve integration of long-term immigrants and their descendants, laws on nationality and ideas on its significance are changing. Many countries now provide figures for *both* the foreign-born and foreign nationals. These figures cannot be aggregated, so we will use both types in the book, as appropriate. In addition, some countries now provide data on children born to immigrant parents, or on ethnicity, or on race, or on combinations of these. For example, when using statistics it is therefore very important to be aware of the definition of terms (which should always be given clearly in presenting data), the significance of different concepts and the purpose of the specific statistics (for detailed discussion see OECD, 2006, Statistical Annex).

The Age of Migration Website

There is an accompanying website – www.age-of-migration.com – for *The Age of Migration*. This is freely accessible and is designed as a resource for students and other users. It contains web links and additional case studies to expand the analysis of the book. It also includes a web-only chapter, The Migratory Process: A Comparison of Australia and Germany. The website will also contain updates to cover important developments that affect the text.

The guides to further reading at the end of most chapters draw attention to the specific case material relevant to each chapter on the AOM5 website. This material is numbered for ease of navigation, i.e. case material for Chapter 4 is called Case 4.1, Case 4.2, and so on.

List of Abbreviations

A10	The ten new member states that gained accession to the EU on 1 May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
A8	The new Central and Eastern European member states (the A10 minus Cyprus and Malta)
ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
ALP	Australian Labor Party
ANC	African National Congress
AOM	Age of Migration
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
DHS	Department of Homeland Security (USA)
DIAC	Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Australia)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EU2	The two new member countries (Bulgaria and Romania) that joined the EU in January 2007
EU10	The 10 new member countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) that joined the EU in May 2004
EU15	The 15 member states of the EU up to April 2004
EU25	The 25 member states of the EU from May 2004 to December 2006
EU27	The 27 member states of the EU since January 2007
FN	Front National (National Front, France)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GEC	global economic crisis
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMI	International Migration Institute (University of Oxford)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986 (USA)

MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Latin American Southern Common Market
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NELM	New Economics of Labour Migration
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIC	newly industrializing country
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMA	Office of Multicultural Affairs
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SGI	Société Générale d'Immigration (France)
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFW	temporary foreign worker
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPD	United Nations Population Division
WTO	World Trade Organization

Copyrighted material_9780230355767.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Migration and the resulting ethnic and racial diversity are amongst the most emotive subjects in contemporary societies. While global migration rates have remained relatively stable over the past half a century, the political salience of migration has strongly increased. For origin societies, the departure of people raises concern about the ‘brain drain’ on the one hand, but it also creates the hope that the money and knowledge migrants gather abroad can foster human and economic development. For receiving societies, the settlement of migrant groups and the formation of ethnic minorities can fundamentally change the social, cultural, economic and political fabric of societies, particularly in the longer run.

This became apparent during the USA presidential election in 2012. The burgeoning minority population of the USA voted overwhelmingly in favour of Obama whereas the Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney won most of the white non-Hispanic vote. According to analysis of exit polls, 71 per cent of Latino voters voted for President Obama compared to 27 per cent for Romney. Latinos comprised 10 per cent of the electorate, up from 9 per cent in 2008 and 8 per cent in 2004. Hispanics make up a growing share of voters in key battleground states such Florida, Nevada and Colorado (Lopez and Taylor, 2012). A recent study estimated that 40 million Latinos will be eligible to vote in 2030, up from 23.7 million in 2010 (Taylor *et al.*, 2012).

The magnitude of Obama’s victory seemed to reflect the increasing estrangement of the Republican Party from the daily lives and concerns of many Latino voters. This particularly relates to the inability of President George W. Bush to secure immigration reforms and, more generally, strong Republican opposition with regard to immigration reform allowing the legalization of the approximately 11 million irregular migrants living in the USA, who are primarily of Mexican and Central American origin (see also Box 1.1).

Similarly in Europe, the political salience of migration has increased, which is reflected in the rise of extreme right-wing, anti-immigrant and anti-Islam parties and a subsequent move to the right of the entire political spectrum on migration and diversity issues (cf. Davis, 2012). Growing hostility towards immigration has sometimes engendered racist attacks. On 22 July 2011, Anders Breivik, a 32-year-old Norwegian far-right radical, attacked government buildings in Oslo, causing eight deaths, and then carried out a mass shooting at a youth camp of the Norwegian Labour Party on the island of Utøya, where he killed 69 people and wounded hundreds,

mostly teenagers. His motive for the atrocities was to draw attention to his Islamophobic and anti-feminist manifesto *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, which he published on the internet on the day of the attack. He regarded Islam as the enemy and advocated the deportation of all Muslims from Europe. He directed his attack against the Labour Party because he accused them of bearing responsibility for the deconstruction of Norwegian culture and the ‘mass import’ of Muslims. On 24 August 2012, Breivik was found guilty of mass murder and terrorism, and will probably remain in prison for life (*New York Times*, 24 August 2012).

A few months earlier, immigration had become a central issue in the French Presidential election. The incumbent centre-right president, Nicolas Sarkozy, called for a halving of immigration, saying that France could no longer integrate the many newcomers. This looked like a desperate ploy to play the ‘race card’ in an election in which the increasingly unpopular Sarkozy was being squeezed between a resurgent Socialist Party and the far right *Front National* (FN) candidate, Marine Le Pen. Then on 11 March 2012, a paratrooper was killed by a gunman in the city of Toulouse. Four days later two more paratroopers were shot dead, and on 19 March three children and a Rabbi were murdered at a Jewish school. The police identified the killer as Mohamed Merah, a French citizen of Algerian descent. Merah had visited Afghanistan and claimed to have received training from a group linked to al-Qaeda. In a siege at his apartment, Merah was shot dead on 21 March (BBC News, 22 March 2012). The presidential elections were thrown into turmoil, and Sarkozy was back in the spotlight, with his calls for tough new laws against terrorism. Throughout his political career, Sarkozy had campaigned for more immigration control and had portrayed the growing diversity of the French population as a security threat. Now he had a cause that he hoped would propel him back into office. Yet he failed: French voters put economic and social issues above fears about diversity and security, and the Socialist candidate François Hollande emerged as victor in the presidential election of May 2012 (France 24, 7 March 2012).

These are stark reminders of the continuing political salience of immigration and ethnic diversity – but also of the political risks of playing the ‘race card’. There are many other such reminders. After Spain and Italy introduced visa requirements for North Africans in the early 1990s, migration did not stop but became increasingly irregular in nature. Each year, tens of thousands of Africans attempt to make the dangerous crossing across the Mediterranean in small fishing boats, speedboats or hidden in vans and trucks on ferries. Although this frequently leads to public outcries about ‘combating illegal migration’, further border controls did not stop migration but rather reinforced its irregular character and diverted flows to other crossing points.

At the time of the onset of Arab Spring in 2011, some European politicians portrayed the flight of people from violence in Libya as an invasion. Most migrant workers in Libya returned to their African or Asian homelands,

and the numbers arriving in Italy remained relatively small. Nevertheless, the Berlusconi Government declared a state of emergency. Italy reached an agreement on temporary residence for Tunisians, sparking a public outcry amongst European leaders and fears that Tunisians could move on to other European Union (EU) countries. Contrary to the Schengen Agreement on free movement in Europe, France even temporarily introduced symbolical controls on its border with Italy.

While the USA remains deeply divided by race, immigration too, especially of Mexicans across the long southern border, remains controversial. The failure of Congress to pass a comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 opened the door for restrictive state legislation, with Arizona taking the lead in introducing strict controls. The USA, with over 11 million irregular immigrants, relies heavily on their labour in agriculture, construction and the services, yet has been unable to move towards legal forms of immigration and employment for this group, even though it also has the largest legal immigration programme in the world. At the same time, post-9/11 restrictions in immigration policies have made it increasingly difficult to obtain visas and residence permits (Green Cards) even for the high-skilled (see Box 1.1).

Divisive issues can be found in new immigration destinations too: In Dubai in March 2006, foreign workers building the Burj Dubai, the world's tallest building, demonstrated against low wages, squalid dormitories and dangerous conditions. Their main grievance was that employers often simply refused to pay wages. Dubai is one of the oil-rich United Arab Emirates, where the migrant workforce – mainly from South and South-East Asia – far outnumbers the local population. Lack of worker rights, prohibition of unions and fear of deportation have forced migrant workers to accept exploitative conditions. Women migrants, who often work as domestic helpers, are especially vulnerable. In Japan and Korea too, politicians often express fears of loss of ethnic homogeneity through immigration. The government of multiracial Malaysia tends to blame immigrants for crime and other social problems, and introduces 'crack downs' against irregular migrants whenever there are economic slowdowns.

Indeed, economic woes often lead to anti-immigration politics. In the global economic crisis (GEC) which started in 2008, many states tightened up immigration control measures and sought to send migrants home. These measures had little impact on migrant stocks, but they did stir up popular resentment of immigrants. In fact, as will be discussed later in this book, the GEC has had only a limited structural effect on migration. Some rather surprising new trends have emerged, such as the new flows of young Europeans to older destination countries: Greeks, Italians and Irish to Germany and Australia; Portuguese to Brazil; Spaniards to Latin America; and all of these groups to the USA.

Quite literally, international migration has changed the face of societies. The commonality of the situations lies in the increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of many immigrant-receiving societies, and the dilemmas

Box 1.1 How migration shaped US and Mexican politics in the twenty-first century

The elections of George W. Bush and Vicente Fox in 2000 appeared to augur well for US–Mexico relations. Both presidents wanted to improve relations, especially through closer cooperation on migration issues. President Bush's first foreign visit was to President Fox's ranch and the US–Mexico immigrant initiative topped the agenda. However, there was significant Congressional opposition. Then, after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the migration initiative was put on the back-burner as securitization of US immigration policy ensued. With the re-election of President Bush in 2004, comprehensive immigration reform became a priority for the second term. But deep divisions between Republicans doomed reform in the Bush presidency with perhaps fateful long-term consequences for the Republican Party.

In 2008, newly elected Mexican President Calderón sought to de-emphasize the centrality of migration in US–Mexican relations whereas newly elected US President Barack Obama continued to support reform, albeit tepidly. In the absence of comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level, pro and anti-immigration activists launched initiatives at the state and municipal levels. Several states adopted restrictive measures which led to an important US Supreme Court ruling in 2012 that upheld the paramount prerogatives of the US federal government in determination of immigration law and policy. Nonetheless, the rules adopted in Arizona and other states led to many deportations of Mexican undocumented workers and contributed to a decline in Mexico–US migration.

President Obama too was unable to secure comprehensive immigration reform in his first term. However, he proclaimed it a principal goal of his second term after his re-election in 2012. The magnitude of his victory appeared to underscore the long-term significance of President Bush's inability to secure reform. The burgeoning minority population of the USA voted overwhelmingly in favour of Obama whereas the Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney won most of the white non-immigrant vote. Gender also played a key role: 55 per cent of all women voters chose Obama over Romney, while for black women the figure was a massive 96 per cent, and for Latino women 76 per cent. A key question for the future is: can the Republican Party increase its appeal to minority populations, especially to Latinos?

Sources: Calmes and Thee-Brenan, 2012; Lopez and Taylor, 2012; Suzanne, 2012.

that arise for states and communities in finding ways to respond to these changes. Young people of immigrant background are protesting against their feeling of being excluded from the societies in which they had grown up (and often been born). By contrast, some politicians and elements of the media claim that immigrants are failing to integrate, deliberately maintaining distinct cultures and religions, and have become a threat to security and social cohesion.

The challenges of global migration

Migration has gained increasing political salience over the past decades. That is why we have called this book *The Age of Migration*. This does not imply that migration is something new – indeed, human beings have always moved in search of new opportunities, or to escape poverty, conflict or environmental degradation. However, migration took on a new character with the beginnings of European expansion from the sixteenth century (see Chapter 4), and the Industrial Revolution from the nineteenth century, which set in motion a massive transfer of population from rural to urban areas within and across borders.

A high point was the mass migrations from Europe to North America from the mid-nineteenth century until World War I. Between 1846 and 1939, some 59 million people left Europe, mainly for areas of settlement in North and South America, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (Stalker, 2000: 9). Some scholars call this the ‘age of mass migration’ (Hatton and Williamson, 1998) and argue that these international movements were even bigger than today’s.

The 1850–1914 period has been perceived (by Western scholars at least) as mainly one of transatlantic migration, while the long-distance movements that started after 1945 and expanded from the 1980s involve all regions of the world. Newer studies show great mobility in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, mobility has become easier as a result of new transport and communication technologies. This has enabled migrants to remain in almost constant touch with family and friends in origin countries and to travel back and forth more often. International migration is thus a central dynamic within globalization.

A defining feature of the age of migration is the challenge that some politicians and analysts believe is posed by international migration to the sovereignty of states, specifically to their ability to regulate movements of people across their borders. The relatively unregulated migration prior to 1914 was generally not seen as a challenge to state sovereignty. This would change over the course of the twentieth century. Many migrants cross borders in an irregular (also called undocumented or illegal) way. Paradoxically, irregularity is often a result of tighter control measures, which have blocked earlier forms of spontaneous mobility. While most governments have abolished the exit controls of the past, efforts by governments to regulate *immigration* are at an all-time high and involve intensive bilateral, regional and international diplomacy. A second challenge is posed by ‘transnationalism’: as people become more mobile, many of them foster social and economic relationships in two or more societies at once. This is often seen as undermining the undivided loyalty some observers think crucial to sovereign nation-states.

While movements of people across borders have shaped states and societies since time immemorial, what is distinctive in recent years is their

global scope, their centrality to domestic and international politics and their considerable economic and social consequences. Migration processes may become so entrenched and resistant to governmental control that new international political forms may emerge, such as the attempts to regulate migration at the regional level by the EU and by regional bodies in other parts of the world. Novel forms of interdependence, transnational societies and international cooperation on migration issues are rapidly transforming the lives of millions of people and inextricably weaving together the fate of states and societies.

For the most part, the growth of diversity and transnationalism is seen as a beneficial process, because it can help overcome the violence and destructiveness that characterized the era of nationalism. But international migration is sometimes directly or indirectly linked to conflict. Events like 9/11 (the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC), and the attacks by Islamic radicals on trains, buses and airports in Spain in 2004 and in the UK in 2005 and 2007 involved immigrants or their offspring. Such events have given rise to perceptions that threats to security of states are somehow linked to international migration and to the problems of living together in one society for culturally and socially diverse ethnic groups. This has increased the political salience of issues like immigration, diversity and multiculturalism, and this partly explains the rise of anti-immigration and anti-Islam parties in Europe – whose main narrative is to represent immigrants as a security and cultural threat. It is in this political climate that extreme-right violence like the July 2011 killings in Norway could occur.

These developments in turn are related to fundamental economic, social and political transformations that shape today's world. Millions of people are seeking work, a new home or simply a safe place to live outside their countries of birth. For many less developed countries, emigration is one aspect of the social crisis which accompanies integration into the world market and modernization. Population growth and the 'green revolution' in rural areas lead to massive 'surplus populations'. People move to burgeoning cities, where employment opportunities are often inadequate and social conditions miserable. Violence, oppressive governments and denial of human rights can lead to forced migrations within states or across their borders. Massive urbanization outstrips the creation of jobs in the early stages of industrialization. Some of the previous rural–urban migrants embark on a second migration, seeking to improve their lives by moving to newly industrializing countries in the South or to highly developed countries in the North.

However, most migration is not driven by poverty and violence: international migration requires significant resources, and most 'South–North' migrants come neither from the poorest countries nor from the poorest social classes. Many migrants benefit from the opportunities of a globalized economy for mobility as highly qualified specialists or entrepreneurs. Class

plays an important role: destination countries compete to attract the highly skilled through privileged rules on entry and residence, while manual workers and refugees often experience exclusion and discrimination. New forms of mobility are emerging: retirement migration, mobility in search of better (or just different) lifestyles, repeated or circular movement. The barrier between migration and tourism is becoming blurred, as some people travel as tourists to check out potential migration destinations. Whether the initial intention is temporary or permanent movement, many migrants become settlers. Family reunion – the entry of dependent spouses, children and other relatives of previous primary migrants – remains the largest single entry category in many places. Migration networks develop, linking areas of origin and destination, and helping to bring about major changes in both. Migrations can change demographic, economic and social structures, and create a new cultural diversity, which often brings into question national identity.

This book is about contemporary international migrations, and the way they are changing societies. The perspective is international: large-scale movements of people arise from the process of global integration. Migrations are not isolated phenomena: movements of commodities, capital and ideas almost always give rise to movements of people, and vice versa. Global cultural interchange, facilitated by improved transport and the proliferation of print and electronic media, can also increase migration aspirations. International migration ranks as one of the most important factors in global change.

There are several reasons to expect the age of migration to endure: persistent inequalities in wealth between rich and poor countries will continue to impel large numbers of people to move in search of better living standards; political or ethnic conflict in a number of regions is likely to lead to future large-scale refugee movements; and the creation of new free trade areas will facilitate movements of labour, whether or not this is intended by the governments concerned. But migration is not just a reaction to difficult conditions at home: it is also motivated by the search for better opportunities and lifestyles elsewhere. Economic development of poorer countries generally leads to greater migration because it gives people the resources to move. Some migrants experience abuse or exploitation, but most benefit and are able to improve their lives through mobility. Conditions may be tough for migrants but are often preferable to poverty, insecurity and lack of opportunities at home – otherwise migration would not continue.


According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the world total stock of international migrants (defined as people living outside their country of birth for at least a year) grew from about 100 million in 1960 to 155 million in 2000 and then to 214 million in 2010. This sounds a lot, but is just 3.1 per cent of the world's 7 billion people (UN Population Division, 2010; see also Figure 1.2). The number of international migrants has grown only slightly more rapidly

than overall global population since 1960. Although international migration has thus not increased in relative terms, falling costs of travel and infrastructure improvements have rapidly increased non-migratory forms of mobility such as tourism, business trips and commuting. Most people remain in their countries of birth, while internal migration (often in the form or rural–urban movement) is far higher than international migration, especially in some of the world’s population giants like China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Nigeria. It is impossible to know exact numbers of internal migrants, although the UN Development Program estimated some 740 million in 2009 (UNDP, 2009). Internal and international migration are closely linked and both are driven by the same transformation processes (DIAC, 2010a). However, this book focuses on international migration.

The illustrations that follow show some main characteristics of international migrant populations. Figure 1.1 traces how total international migration has evolved since 1990. It shows that international migrant populations have increasingly concentrated in wealthy, developed countries. Figure 1.2 shows that in 2010 international migrants represented over 10.3 per cent of highly developed receiving country populations on average, up from 7.2 in 1990. In developing countries, these shares are now well under 3 per cent and have been decreasing. The figure also shows that migrants represent about 3 per cent of the world population, and that this percentage has remained stable over the past decades.


Figure 1.3 shows the evolution of migrant stocks in the various continents from 1990–2010, revealing the large and fast-growing numbers in the industrial regions of Asia, Europe and North America. According to

Figure 1.1 World immigrant populations, by levels of development




Source: World Development Indicators database, based on United Nations Population Division data.

Figure 1.2 International immigrants as a percentage of total population, by level of development



Source: World Development Indicators database, based on United Nations Population Division data.

Figure 1.3 Estimated population of international immigrants by continent, 1990–2010




Source: World Development Indicators database, based on United Nations Population Division data.

these estimates, migrant populations have hardly been growing in Africa, Latin America and Oceania. Figure 1.4 examines migrant stocks as a percentage of the total population of the various continents. The population share of immigrants is highest in Oceania, mainly reflecting high immigration rates in Australia and New Zealand. Oceania is followed by North America and then Europe, where these rates have been increasing fast. By contrast, the population share is much lower and fairly stable in Asia, while it has actually declined in Africa and Latin America. Finally, Map 1.1 gives a very rough idea of the major migratory flows since 1973.


Some of those who move are ‘forced migrants’: people compelled to flee their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. The reasons for flight include political or ethnic violence or persecution, development projects like large dams, or natural disasters like the 2004 Asian Tsunami. According to UNDESA data, the total number of refugees was 16.3 million in 2010, which is an increase from the 15.6 million refugees in 2000, but still lower than the 1990 estimate of 18.4 million refugees worldwide. This figure includes the some 5 million Palestinian refugees worldwide (see Chapter 10). The decline after the early 1990s was partly due to a decline in the number of conflicts, and partly due to states’ unwillingness to admit refugees. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) – forced migrants who remain in their country of origin because they find it impossible to cross an international border to seek refuge – grew to about 27.5 million in 2010 (see Chapter 10).

Figure 1.4 International immigrants as a percentage of the population by continent, 1990–2010




Source: World Development Indicators database, based on United Nations Population Division data.

Map 1.1 *International migratory movements from 1973*



Note: The size of the arrowheads gives an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

Figure 1.5 Estimated number of refugees by major area, 1990–2010


Note: Estimated refugee population as of mid-year, based on data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

Source: United Nations Population Division.

Figure 1.5 represents refugee data by continents. This data also includes the roughly 5 million Palestinian refugees, which are not covered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The distribution of refugees is quite different from that of other migrants: most refugees remain in the poorest areas of the world, while other migrants – especially high-skilled migrants – often go to the rich areas. While the numbers of refugees have considerably gone down in Africa partly due to a decreased level of conflict, they have recently increased in Asia. This partly reflects the consequences of the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the UNDESA data represented in Figure 1.6, refugees represent 13.3 per cent of the total international migrant population in Africa, down from 33.5 per cent in 1990. In Asia, this share is 17.7 per cent and has remained more or less stable. Elsewhere, these shares are much lower. In 2010, refugees now represent an estimated 7.6 per cent of the global migrant population, down from 11.9 per cent in 1990.

The vast majority of people remain in their countries of birth. Yet the impact of international migration is considerably larger than such figures suggest. The departure of migrants has considerable consequences

Figure 1.6 Refugees as a percentage of the international migrant population by major area, 1990–2010



Source: United Nations Population Division.

for areas of origin. Remittances (money sent home) and investments by migrants may improve living standards, encourage economic development and create employment, but can also undermine growth and fuel inflation in remittance-dependent, non-productive and migration-obsessed communities.

In the country of immigration, settlement is closely linked to employment opportunities and is mainly concentrated in industrial and urban areas, where the impact on receiving communities is considerable. Migration thus affects not only the migrants themselves but the sending and receiving societies as a whole. There can be few people in either industrial or less developed countries today who do not have personal experience of migration or its effects.

Contemporary migrations: general trends

International migration is part of a transnational shift that is reshaping societies and politics around the globe. The old dichotomy between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries is being eroded – if this dichotomy was ever valid at all. Most countries experience

both emigration and immigration (although one or the other often predominates). The differing ways in which such trends have affected the worlds' regions is a major theme throughout this book. Areas such as the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or Argentina are considered 'classical countries of immigration'. Their current people are the result of histories of large-scale immigration – to the detriment of indigenous populations. Today, migration continues in new forms. Virtually all of Northern and Western Europe became areas of labour immigration and subsequent settlement after 1945. Since the 1980s, Southern European states like Greece, Italy and Spain, which for a long time were zones of emigration, have also become immigration areas, although in recent years emigration has been increasing in response to the global economic crisis. Today Central and Eastern European states are experiencing both significant emigration and immigration.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the vast area stretching from Morocco to Iran, is affected by complex population movements. Some countries, like Turkey, Jordan and Morocco, have been major sources of migrant labour, while Turkey is now also an immigration country. The Gulf oil states experience large, officially temporary, inflows of workers. Iran has been a major receiving country for refugees from Afghanistan, along with Pakistan. In Africa, colonialism and European settlement led to the establishment of migrant labour systems for plantations and mines. Decolonization since the 1950s has sustained old migratory patterns – such as the flow of mineworkers to South Africa and Maghrebis to France – and started new ones, such as movements to Kenya, Gabon, and Nigeria. Although economic migration predominates, Africa has more refugees and IDPs relative to population size than any other region of the world. Asia and Latin America have complicated migratory patterns within their regions, as well as increasing flows to the rest of the world. An example of recent developments is discussed in Box 1.2 to give an idea of the complex ramifications of migratory movements for both North and South.

Box 1.2 Migration and revolution: the Arab Spring

The wave of political unrest that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread throughout the Arab world has caused the deaths of thousands of people, while millions of others had been forced to leave their homes by mid-2012. While the violence in Tunisia and Egypt remained relatively limited, the violent conflicts in Libya and Syria generated large flows of refugees.

In early 2011, the violence in Libya led to large-scale outflows of Libyan citizens and of more than one million African, Asian and European migrant workers, most of whom moved back home or were hosted in neighbouring



countries. The fate of hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan workers in Libya exposed the scale of intra-African migration to the global public. Many African workers who lacked the means to return and feared attacks because of (largely false) accusations that they were ‘mercenaries’ working for the Gaddafi regime, became trapped in Libya.

The extremely violent conflict in Syria engendered an even bigger refugee crisis. In March 2013, according to the UNHCR, about four million Syrians were internally displaced and one million refugees had been registered in other countries. In the wake of the Arab Spring, European politicians sowed panic that these people would cross the Mediterranean to land on European shores in huge numbers. In 2011, the Italian government warned of an exodus of ‘biblical proportions’ from Libya while in 2012 Greek politicians announced that Greece should fortify itself against a massive wave of irregular migrants from Syria.

Such panic had no basis, as most people stayed within the region or returned home. Only 4 per cent of all people fleeing Libya (27,465 persons out of 790,000) ended up in Italy or Malta (Aghazarm *et al.*, 2012). The large majority of them found refuge in neighbouring Egypt and, particularly, Tunisia. UNHCR and IOM in collaboration with the Tunisian government helped hundreds of thousands of migrant workers to return home. After the death of Gaddafi in October 2011, most Libyans returned and migrant workers started to come back, although Africans migrants in particular continued to experience racist violence. The overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees have found refuge in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, and other North African countries.

Eurocentric accounts of the Arab Spring ignore the profound impact of the crisis on countries of origin. This pertains not only to the role of returnees in political violence in countries like Mali but also to the fact that many families in extremely poor countries such as Chad and Niger were now deprived of vital remittance income since migrant workers returned home.

Nevertheless, the Arab Spring has not radically transformed long-term migration patterns in the Mediterranean. Mass flight has been largely confined to Libya and, particularly, Syria, and there has been no major increase of emigration from other North African or Middle East countries. The increase in Tunisian emigration to Lampedusa, an Italian island 113 km off the Tunisian coast, was stimulated by reduced policing in Tunisia during the revolution but stood in a long-standing tradition of irregular boat migration to Europe that has existed since southern European countries introduced visas for North Africans around 1991.

So, the idea that emigration will stop is as unlikely as the idea of a ‘mass exodus’ towards Europe. At the same time, the processes that created the conditions for revolutionary change are also conducive to emigration. The coming of age of a new, educated and aspiring generation, which is frustrated by mass unemployment, dictatorial rule and corruption, has increased both the emigration and revolutionary potential of Arab societies.

Source: de Haas and Sigona, 2012; Fargues and Fandrich, 2012.

Throughout the world, long-standing migratory patterns are persisting in new forms, while new flows are developing in response to economic, political and cultural change, and violent conflicts. Yet, despite the diversity, it is possible to identify certain general tendencies:

1. The *globalization of migration*: the tendency for more and more countries to be significantly affected by international migration. Moreover, immigration countries tend to receive migrants from an increasingly diverse array of source countries, so that most countries of immigration have entrants from a broad spectrum of economic, social and cultural backgrounds.
2. The *changing direction of dominant migration flows*: while for centuries Europeans have been moving outward to conquer, colonize, and settle foreign lands elsewhere, these patterns were reversed after World War II. From a prime source of emigration, Europe has been transformed into a major global migration destination. As part of the same pattern, Europeans represent a declining share of immigrants in classical immigration countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, along with an increase of 'South–North' migration. This also coincided with the appearance of a new global pole of attraction for migrant workers in the Gulf region.
3. The *differentiation of migration*: most countries are not dominated by one type of migration, such as labour migration, family reunion, refugee movement or permanent settlement, but experience a whole range of types at once. Migratory chains which start with one type of movement often continue with other forms, despite (or often just because of) government efforts to stop or control the movement.
4. The *proliferation of migration transition*: this occurs when traditional lands of emigration become lands of immigration. Growing transit migration is often the prelude to becoming predominantly immigration lands. States as diverse as Poland, Spain, Morocco, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Turkey and South Korea are experiencing various stages and forms of a migration transition. But other countries, for example in Latin America, have experienced reverse migration transitions as they changed from immigration to emigration countries.
5. The *feminization of labour migration*: in the past many labour migrations were male-dominated, and women were often dealt with under the category of family reunion, even if they did take up employment. Since the 1960s, women have not only played an increasing role in labour migration, but also the *awareness* of women's role in migration has grown. Today women workers form the majority in movements as diverse as those of Cape Verdeans to Italy, Filipinas to the Middle East and Thais to Japan.
6. The *growing politicization of migration*: domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policies of states

around the world are increasingly affected by international migration. This growing political salience of this issue is a main reason for our argument that we live in an age of migration.

International migration in global governance

Globalization has challenged the sovereignty of national governments from above and below. The growth of transnational society has given rise to novel challenges and has blurred formerly distinctive spheres of decision-making. Trends are contradictory (see Castles, 2004b): on the one hand, politicians cling to national sovereignty, with such slogans as ‘British jobs for British workers’. On the other hand the complexity and fragmentation of power and authority that have resulted from globalization typically require governments (whether national, regional or local) to cooperate with other organizations and institutions, both public and private, foreign and domestic. An important manifestation of global governance is the significant expansion of regional consultative processes within bodies like the EU or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) focusing on international migration.

Until recently, governments generally did not see international migration as a central political issue. Rather, migrants were divided up into categories, such as permanent settlers, foreign workers or refugees, and dealt with by a variety of special agencies, such as immigration departments, labour offices, aliens police, welfare authorities and education ministries. This situation began to change in the mid-1980s. The Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) convened the first international conference on international migration in 1986 (OECD, 1987). The OECD had found evidence of growing convergence in migration policy concerns and challenges faced by its member states. As most European Community (EC) countries started to remove their internal boundaries with the signature of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and its full implementation in 1995, they became increasingly concerned about controlling external borders. By the 1990s, the mobilization of extreme-right groups in Europe over immigration helped bring these issues to the centre of the political stage. In the USA, the Clinton Administration ordered the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to include international migration in their assessments.

The adoption of the 1990 Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families by the UN General Assembly brought into sharp relief global tensions and differences surrounding international migration. Immigration countries refused to sign the convention, and it did not come into force until 2003. By October 2012 it had been ratified by just 46 of the UN’s 193 states – virtually all of them countries of emigration.

Globalization has coincided with the strengthening of global institutions: the World Trade Organization for trade, the International Monetary Fund

for finance, the World Bank for economic development, and so on. But the will to cooperate has not been as strong in the migration field. There are international bodies with specific tasks – such as the UNHCR for refugees and the International Labour Office (ILO) for migrant workers – but no institution with overall responsibility for global cooperation and for monitoring migrant rights. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) does have wider terms of reference, but it is a non-UN body and lacks the capacity to bring about significant change. The key issue is the unwillingness of labour-importing countries to enforce migrant rights and to adopt more liberal immigration regimes that might improve migrants' lives and outcomes for countries of origin.

In 2003, following consultation with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, a Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), consisting of prominent people advised by migration experts, was set up. Its report (GCIM, 2005) emphasized the potential benefits of migration for development. The UN General Assembly held its first High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006. The Secretary General's report on this meeting recommended a forum for UN member states to discuss migration and development issues. The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GMFD) has met annually since, although its role has been purely advisory and it is hard to see concrete results of the dialogue (see Castles, 2011).

Ethnic diversity, racism and multiculturalism

Governance of international migration is one of the two central issues arising from the population movements of the current epoch. The other is the effect of growing ethnic diversity on the societies of immigration countries. Settlers are often distinct from the receiving populations: they may come from different types of societies (for example, agrarian-rural rather than urban-industrial) with different traditions, religions and political institutions. They often speak a different language and follow different cultural practices. They may be visibly different, through physical appearance (skin colour, features and hair type) or style of dress. Some migrant groups become concentrated in certain types of work (sometimes of low social status) and live segregated lives in low-income residential areas. The position of immigrants is often marked by a specific legal status: that of the foreigner or non-citizen.

The social meaning of ethnic diversity depends to a large extent on the significance attached to it by the populations and states of the receiving countries. The classic immigration countries have generally seen immigrants as permanent settlers who were to be assimilated or integrated. However, not all potential immigrants have been seen as suitable: the USA, Canada and Australia all had policies to keep out non-Europeans

and even some categories of Europeans until the 1960s. Countries which emphasized temporary labour recruitment – Western European countries in the 1960s and early 1970s, more recently the Gulf oil states and some of the fast-growing Asian economies – have tried (often unsuccessfully) to prevent family reunion and permanent settlement. Despite the emergence of permanent settler populations, such countries have declared themselves not to be countries of immigration, and have generally denied citizenship and other rights to settlers. Between these two extremes is a wealth of variations, which will be discussed in later chapters.

Culturally distinct settler groups often maintain their languages and some elements of their homeland cultures, at least for a few generations. Where governments have recognized permanent settlement, there has been a tendency to move from policies of individual assimilation to acceptance of some degree of long-term cultural difference. The result has been the granting of minority cultural and political rights, as embodied in the policies of multiculturalism introduced in Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden since the 1970s. However, the post-9/11 era has witnessed a retreat from multiculturalism in many democracies. Governments which reject the idea of permanent settlement often also oppose pluralism, which they see as a threat to national unity and identity.

Whatever the policies of the governments, immigration often leads to strong reactions from some sections of the population. Immigration sometimes takes place at the same time as economic restructuring and far-reaching social change. People whose conditions of life are already changing in an unpredictable way may see the newcomers as the cause of insecurity. One of the dominant, but empirically unjustified, images in highly developed countries today is that of masses of people flowing in from the poor South and the turbulent East, taking away jobs, pushing up housing prices and overloading social services. Similarly, in other immigration countries, such as Malaysia and South Africa, immigrants are blamed for crime, disease and unemployment. Extreme-right parties have grown and flourished through anti-immigrant campaigns. In fact, migrants are generally a symptom of change rather than its cause. For many people, immigration is the most concrete manifestation of rather intangible processes such as globalization and neoliberal economic policies. It should therefore not come as a surprise that the blame for social and economic problems is often shifted on to the shoulders of immigrants and ethnic minorities.

International migration does not always create diversity. Some migrants, such as Britons in Australia or Austrians in Germany, are virtually indistinguishable from the receiving population. Other groups, like Western Europeans in North America, are quickly assimilated. ‘Professional transients’ – that is, highly skilled personnel who move temporarily within specialized labour markets – are rarely seen as presenting an integration problem, although, ironically enough, such groups often hardly integrate.

More fundamental is the challenge that migration poses for national identity. The nation-state, as it has developed since the eighteenth century, is premised on the idea of cultural as well as political unity. In many countries, ethnic homogeneity, defined in terms of common language, culture, traditions and history, has been seen as the basis of the nation-state. This unity has often been fictitious – a construction of the ruling elite – but it has provided powerful national myths. Immigration and ethnic diversity threaten such ideas of the nation, because they create a people without common ethnic origins. The classical countries of immigration have been able to cope with this situation most easily, since absorption of immigrants has been part of their myth of nation-building. But countries which place common culture at the heart of their nation-building process have found it difficult to resolve the contradiction.

One of the central ways in which the link between the people and the state is expressed is through the rules governing citizenship and naturalization. States which readily grant citizenship to immigrants, without requiring common ethnicity or cultural assimilation, seem most able to cope with ethnic diversity. On the other hand, states which link citizenship to cultural belonging tend to have exclusionary policies which marginalize and disadvantage immigrants. It is one of the central themes of this book that continuing international population movements will increase the ethnic diversity of more and more countries. This has already called into question prevailing notions of the nation-state and citizenship. Debates over new approaches to diversity will shape the politics of many countries in coming decades.

Aims and structure of the book

The Age of Migration sets out to provide an understanding of the emerging global dynamics of migration and of the consequences for migrants and non-migrants everywhere. That is a task too big for a single book. Our accounts of the various migratory movements must inevitably be concise, but a global view of international migration is the precondition for understanding each specific flow. The central aim of this book is therefore to provide an introduction to the subject of international migration and the emergence of increasingly diverse societies, which will help readers to put more detailed accounts of specific migratory processes in context.

Our first specific objective is to describe and explain contemporary international migration. We set out to show its enormous complexity, and to communicate both the variations and the common factors in international population movements as they affect more and more parts of the world.

The second objective is to explain how migrant settlement is bringing about increased ethnic diversity in many societies and how it affects broader

social, cultural and political change in destination *and* origin societies. Understanding these changes is the precondition for political action to deal with problems and conflicts linked to migration and ethnic diversity.

The third objective is to link the two analyses, by examining the complex interactions between migration and broader processes of change in origin and destination societies. There are large bodies of empirical and theoretical work on both themes. However, the two are often inadequately linked. The linkages can best be understood by analysing the migratory process in its totality.

The Age of Migration is structured as follows. A first group of chapters (2–4) provides the theoretical and historical background necessary to understand contemporary global trends. Chapter 2 examines the theories and concepts used to explain migration and emphasizes the need to study the migratory process as a whole and to learn to understand migration as an intrinsic part of broader processes of change rather than a ‘problem to be solved’. Chapter 3 focuses on how migration has fundamentally transformed societies in both destination and origin areas. In destination areas, we examine complex issues arising from ethnic and cultural diversity, in origin areas the debates on migration and development. Chapter 4 describes the history of international migration from early modern times until 1945.

A second group of chapters (5–8) provides descriptive accounts and data on contemporary migrations around the world. In this fifth edition we seek to provide a better overview of emerging migration processes by providing a chapter on movements within, to and from each of the world’s main regions. Chapter 5 is concerned with migration to and from Europe. It examines the patterns of labour migration which developed during the post-1945 boom, and discusses changes in migratory patterns after the ‘Oil Crisis’ of 1973 and the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU as well as the GEC since 2008. Chapter 6 examines the migratory patterns affecting the Americas, which includes both major immigration countries (USA, Canada), emigration areas like much of Central America, the Andean Region, and countries that combine the role of origin-, destination- and transit-areas for migrants, like Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Chapter 7 deals with the Asia–Pacific region – home to 60 per cent of the world’s population. It is hard to even summarize the immensely varied and complex migratory patterns rooted both in history and in the often breathtakingly rapid contemporary transformations taking place in Asia and Oceania. Chapter 8 addresses two other diverse, fast-changing and closely interlinked regions: Africa and the Middle East, where movements of people are linked to rapid transformations in economic and political conditions.

A third group of chapters (9–13) is concerned with the political, economic and social meaning of migration and ethnic diversity, especially for immigration countries. Chapter 9 examines migration and security. Such questions are not new but the 9/11 events in the USA and

subsequent attacks in Europe led to a securitization of migration which has had profound effects. The chapter also includes a section on the relationship between climate change and migration. It is often claimed that this has significant implications for the security of destination countries; we argue instead that climate change has a complex relationship with other factors in the migration process, and that migration may be a valuable adaptation to change. Chapter 10 assesses the capacity of industrial states to regulate international migration. It examines irregular migration, human trafficking and the policies designed to curb them. It also discusses regional integration frameworks (the EU and NAFTA) for control of migration. This chapter also discusses the various types of forced migration and how states respond to them.

Chapter 11 considers the economic position of migrant workers and the meaning of migration for the economies of destination countries. It goes on to discuss the key role of migration in labour market restructuring and the development of a ‘new economy’ based on employment practices such as sub-contracting, temporary employment and informal-sector work. Although the effects of the GEC are discussed in the regional chapters, a section of Chapter 11 provides an overarching analysis. Chapter 12 examines the social position of immigrants within the societies of highly developed immigration countries, looking at such factors as legal status, social policy, formation of ethnic communities, racism, citizenship and national identity. Boxes provide short country case-studies (for space reasons some of these are to be found on the *Age of Migration* website). Chapter 13 examines the political implications of growing ethnic diversity, looking both at the involvement of immigrants and minorities in politics, and at the way mainstream politics are changing in reaction to migrant settlement.

Chapter 14 sums up the arguments of the book, reviews current trends in global migration and speculates on possible migration futures. With new major migration destinations such as Brazil, Turkey and China appearing on the horizon, the global migration map is likely to witness fundamental changes over the next few years. Meanwhile, international mobility of people seems to imply greater ethnic diversity in many receiving countries, and new forms of transnational connectivity. We discuss the dilemmas faced by governments and people in attempting to find appropriate responses to the challenges of an increasingly mobile world, and point to some of the major obstacles blocking the way to better international cooperation.

Guide to further reading

Extra resources at www.age-of-migration.com

There are too many books on international migration to list here. Many important works are referred to in the guide to further reading for other chapters. A wide range of relevant literature is listed in the Bibliography.

Important information on all aspects of international migration is provided by several specialized journals, of which only a selection can be mentioned here. *International Migration Review* (New York: Center for Migration Studies) was established in 1964 and provides excellent comparative information. *International Migration* (IOM, Geneva) is also a valuable comparative source. *Population and Development Review* is a prominent journal on population studies with many contributions on migration. *Social Identities* started publication in 1995 and is concerned with the 'study of race, nation and culture'. A journal concerned with transnational issues is *Global Networks*. *Migration Studies* is a new journal focusing on the determinants, processes and outcomes of migration. Some journals, which formerly concentrated on Europe, are becoming more global in focus. These include the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, the *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, *Race and Class* and *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Important non-European or North American journals include: The *Journal of Intercultural Studies* (Melbourne: Swinburne University), the *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* (Quezon City, Philippines: Scalabrini Migration Center). *Frontera Norte* (Mexico: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte) and *Migración y Desarrollo* (Autonomous University of Zacatecas) include articles in Spanish and English.

Several international organizations provide comparative information on migrations. The most useful is the OECD's annual *International Migration Outlook*. Earlier annual reports on international migration to OECD member states from 1973 to 1990 were known as SOPEMI reports. The IOM published its *World Migration Report* for the first time in 2000, and the latest appeared in 2011.

Many internet sites are concerned with issues of migration and ethnic diversity. A few of the most significant ones are listed here. These and others are also provided as hyperlinks on *The Age of Migration* fifth edition (AOM5) website. Since they are in turn linked with many others, this list should provide a starting point for further exploration:

Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford:

<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/>

Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), Amsterdam:

<http://www.imes.uva.nl>

International Migration Institute, University of Oxford:

<http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/>

International Network on Migration and Development, Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico: <http://www.migracionydesarrollo.org/>

International Organization for Migration: <http://www.iom.int/>

Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute, Washington DC:
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/>

Migration News: <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/>

Migration Observatory, University of Oxford:

<http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/>

Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence:

<http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/>

Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford: <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/>

Southern African Migration Project: <http://www.queensu.ca/samp/>

Sussex Centre for Migration Research:

<http://www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/>

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR):

<http://www.unhcr.org>

Chapter 9

Migration, Security and the Debate on Climate Change

One of the most important migration-related developments in the Age of Migration has been the linking of migration to security, a process of social construction termed *securitization*. This has not occurred everywhere and an important priority for future scholarship is to better elucidate why securitization takes place in some regions, contexts, and eras but not in others. The period between 1945 and roughly 1970 in Western Europe was notable for the prevalent pattern of migration not being viewed as germane to security. International migration into and from most Latin American and Iberian countries generally has not been viewed as an important national security concern, save for the exceptional cases of Haiti–Dominican Republic, Cuba and several cases of Central American refugee flows.

The outpouring of scholarship about migration and security, particularly since 2001, has advanced understanding of how securitization, and its opposite, *desecuritization*, take place. Key actors include government employees, political leaders, reporters, editors, migrants and their allies, and the general public as well. In many instances, the role of media coverage of migration appears crucial to outcomes. It follows that there are varying degrees of securitization and diverse processes of social construction of securitization and desecuritization.

Securitization has a mass psychological dimension. Securitization connects migration to meta-issues that comprise symbolic politics. Migration is well-suited for meta-politics, ‘because multitudinous phenomena connect to physical mobility of persons’. ‘Demonizing the migrant’ as a potential ‘terrorist’ creates fear and a perception of threat to ontological security far exceeding actual developments’ (Faist, 2006: 613).

This chapter will feature an overview of the securitization of migration policies in the OECD area between 1970 and 2012. Since its origins in the Allied cooperation during World War II, this assemblage of the world’s richer states has become deeply interdependent through trade and joint membership in security alliances and international organizations. The contemporary states comprising this area confront similar challenges in regulation of international migration.

The following three sections provide an overview of the key dimensions of the migration and security nexus, an assessment of migration and

security in the transatlantic area and an analysis of the War on Terrorism and its aftermath. The focus will be on the putative security threat arising from the growing presence of Muslims, most of whom are of immigrant background or are the offspring of post-1945 migrants to the West. Subsequent sections will examine several significant cases of diasporas influencing the foreign policy of Middle East and North African states (MENA) states embroiled in geo-strategically significant conflicts and the growing concern over the implications of climate change for migration.

Key dimensions of the international migration and security nexus

Traditionally, security has been viewed through the prism of state security. As a result, relatively few scholars have sought to conceptualize what may be termed the migration and security nexus (Miller, 2000; Tirman, 2004). However, the scope of security concerns is much broader than state security, and is inclusive of human security (Poku and Graham, 1998). Human security is defined in a UNDP report as:

an analytical tool that focuses on ensuring security for the individual, not the state... In line with the expanded definition of human security, the causes of insecurity are subsequently broadened to include threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environmental, community and personal safety ... Human security is therefore: people-centred, multidimensional, interconnected, universal. (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 5)

Much migration from poorer countries is driven by the lack of human security that finds expression in impoverishment, inequality, violence, lack of human rights and weak states. Such political, social and economic underdevelopment is linked to histories of colonialism and the present condition of global inequality (see Chapters 2 and 4). Where states are unable to create legal migration systems for necessary labour, many migrants are also forced to move under conditions of considerable insecurity. Smuggling, trafficking, bonded labour and lack of human and worker rights are the fate of millions of migrants. Even legal migrants may have an insecure residence status and be vulnerable to economic exploitation, discrimination and racist violence. Sometimes legal changes can push migrants into irregularity, as happened to the *sans papiers* (undocumented migrants) in France in the 1990s. The frequent insecurity of the people of poorer countries is often forgotten in discussions of state security, yet the two phenomena are closely linked.

Frequently, such migrant insecurity is linked to perceived threats, an aspect of the aforementioned mass psychological dimension, which can be divided into three categories: cultural, socio-economic and political

(Lucassen, 2005). The first perceived threat, the perception of migrant and migrant-background populations as challenging the cultural status quo, may contribute most to migrant insecurity. Such perceptions have been commonplace in Europe since the 1980s. Mexican and other ‘Hispanic’ migrants to the USA have also been viewed as posing a cultural threat (Huntington, 2004). Often, the religious identity and linguistic practices of migrants loom large in perceived threats. In recent years, Muslims have come to be regarded as a cultural threat in many Western countries.

Examples of the second perceived threat – migrant populations as socio-economic threats – include Italians in Third Republic France, ethnic Chinese diasporas in much of South-East Asia, Syro-Lebanese communities in West Africa, and Chechen and other populations from the Caucasus in the post-Soviet Russian Federation.

The third perceived threat – migrants as potentially politically disloyal or subversive – includes migrant populations such as Palestinians residing in Kuwait prior to the first Gulf War, Yemenites living in Saudi Arabia at the same juncture, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia suspected of political subversion on behalf of Communist China in the 1960s and ethnic Russian populations stranded in Baltic Republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The perceived threats of international migration to national identity and the maintenance of cultural cohesiveness are important aspects of the challenges posed by international migration to the sovereign state (Adamson, 2006). But sometimes international migration is seen as increasing state power. It can facilitate economic growth and is frequently viewed as indispensable to a state’s economic wellbeing. Additionally, many immigrants serve as soldiers, and intelligence services can tap immigrant expertise and knowledge of languages. If effective public policies are pursued, international migration can enhance rather than detract from state power (Adamson, 2006: 185).

A state’s immigration policies can also contribute to its ‘soft power’, its ability to achieve foreign policy and security objectives through political and cultural relations without recourse to military or economic coercion. The large body of foreign students studying in the USA can be seen as an important source of soft power, because they help build positive long-term linkages (Nye, 2004). Similarly, treatment of immigrants can affect a state’s reputation abroad, a not inconsequential matter for diplomacy and ‘smart power’, influence that arises from investing in global goods that better enable states to address global issues (Graham and Poku, 2000; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004).

International migration has also had a significant impact on violent conflicts. Migration flows can interact with other factors to foment violent conflict in several ways such as by providing resources that fuel internal conflicts or by facilitating networks of organized crime (Adamson, 2006: 190–1). Migrant and diasporic communities often provide financial aid and recruits to groups engaged in conflicts in origin states. Kosovar Albanian

communities in Western Europe and North America, for instance, provided much of the financing and many recruits for the Kosovo Liberation Army which, in the late 1990s, engaged in heavy fighting with Serbian forces in the former Serbian republic. Similarly, Tamil Sri Lankans in Europe, Canada, India and elsewhere have aided the Tamil Tigers' insurrection in Sri Lanka, an insurgency crushed in 2009. In some instances, organizations viewed by states as engaging in terrorism, such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), have simultaneously been involved in human trafficking and drugs and arms smuggling.

From a non-problem to an obsession: migration and security in the OECD area, 1945–2012

The end of World War II witnessed mass population movements in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere which generally fell under the rubrics of forced migration and ethnic cleansing (Snyder, 2010: 313–37). It has been estimated that 18.5 million persons were displaced, not including the five million Jews deported to concentration camps (Kulischer, 1948). All of these developments involved massive suffering and loss of life. This underscores the observation that mass human displacements constitute a characteristic outcome of warfare. Nevertheless, the revulsion against Nazi war crimes served to delegitimize extreme right parties and other radical movements that typically view immigration and foreigners as threatening to security.

The Cold War soon ensued and with it a perception of the threat of nuclear warfare. Mainstream study of security largely reflected the tenets of *realism*, a school of thought about international relations that traditionally assumed that only sovereign states were germane to analysis of questions of war and peace. In this perspective, migration seemed of marginal significance for security. In Western Europe, the prevalent assumption characterizing the guest-worker era that post-war migrations would be mainly temporary in nature also contributed to this perception.

The status quo that prevailed after 1945 endured until 1970. A harbinger of change came with the politicization of migration policies that generally took place in the 1970s and 1980s, although in some national contexts earlier. Politicization need not engender securitization, which is the linking of migration to perceptions of existential threats to society. However, politicization brings migration issues into the public arena and thereby increases the likelihood of broader involvement of political agents including those hostile to prevailing policies. The 'hyper-securitization' of migration after 9/11 resulted from incremental processes of increasing securitization of migration that had already evolved in the 1980s and 1990s (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2012: 49–76). A key dynamic involved a blurring of counter-terrorism measures with immigration policy measures.

The construction of an Islamic ‘threat’

While there were Islamic fundamentalist movements active in Western Europe in the 1970s, they were not seen as posing much of a threat. The success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 began to change that perception. In many Arab states and Turkey, secular-oriented governments felt threatened by Islamic fundamentalist movements. Such governments came to be viewed by some of the more radical Islamic fundamentalists as the ‘near enemy’ that had to be overthrown and replaced with truly Islamic governance (Gerges, 2005).

Thus, by the 1980s, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism came to affect the transatlantic area in a variety of ways. A massacre of Syrian army cadets led to the brutal repression of Syrian fundamentalists. Many of the survivors ended up as refugees in Germany. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 prompted Iranian intervention in the conflict and the creation of Hezbollah, the Party of God. American and French troops deployed to the Beirut area as part of the Multinational Force in 1982 suffered grievous losses in suicide bomb attacks thought to have been perpetrated by Hezbollah or its allies. The war in Afghanistan between the Soviet Union and its Afghan allies and the Mujahadeen, Afghans who fought the Soviets, began to attract non-Afghan Muslim volunteers, some of whom came from Europe and North America. This marked the genesis of what would later become Al-Qaeda (Roy, 2003). A US-led coalition of states, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, armed and aided the Mujahideen. Following the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency helped create the Taliban, which recruited heavily amongst the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, another case of refugee-soldiers. By 1996, the Taliban had seized control of most of Afghanistan.

The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City underscored the vulnerability of the United States even as it demonstrated the efficacy of existing law enforcement arrangements in punishing the individuals involved in the attack. The adoption of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act in 1996 were complementary and reflected a significant hardening of US Federal Government anti-terrorism and anti-irregular migration policies as well as the issue linkage between migration and terrorism. Yet such measures were not sufficient to prevent the later escalation of violence through the attacks of 11 September 2001, which led to the Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terrorism’ (see below).

There are strong parallels between migration and security developments on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1985 signature of the Schengen Agreement can be seen as the birthdate of a European policy on migration and security (White, 2011: 66). By the 1990s, there were growing concerns over the political activities of Islamic and other Middle Eastern radicals on West European soil. The spill over of Algerian violence

Box 9.1 Spillover of insurgency in Algeria to France

In 1992, an offshoot of the Islamic Salvation Front, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), pursued an insurgency against the Algerian government. Tens of thousands died in a war of terrorism and counterterrorism. France provided military and economic support to the Algerian government, which led to the extension of GIA operations to French soil. A network of militants waged a bombing campaign, principally in the Paris region in 1995, before being dismantled. Some French journalists and scholars believed that the GIA had been penetrated by Algerian agents who then manipulated GIA militants into attacking targets in France in order to bolster French support for the Algerian government (Aggoun and Rivoire, 2004).

French authorities undertook numerous steps to prevent bombings and to capture the bombers. Persons of North African appearance were routinely subjected to identity checks. Most French citizens and resident aliens of North African background accepted such checks as a necessary inconvenience. Indeed, information supplied by such individuals greatly aided in the neutralization of the terrorist group, several of whom were killed in shoot-outs with French police. Nevertheless, French police rounded up scores of suspected GIA sympathizers on several occasions as nervousness over attacks remained high.

Such fears appeared warranted in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Scores of GIA and Al-Qaida-linked individuals, mainly of North African background, were detained for involvement in various plots, including one to attack the US embassy in Paris. Several of those arrested were French citizens of North African background, like Zacarias Moussaoui, who was accused of plotting with the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. Algerians and other individuals of North African Muslim background with links to the GIA figured prominently in the hundreds of arrests in the transatlantic area. The anti-Western resentment of some of those arrested was linked to perceived injustices endured by migrants and their families. Despite increased vigilance, several French citizens were involved in a series of suicide bombings of Western targets in Casablanca in 2003. Several of the bombers had been recruited into a fundamentalist network in the Parisian suburbs and their involvement was deeply disturbing to the French population, including most of the Islamic community.

Despite an amnesty offer from the Algerian government to Islamic militants who laid down their arms in 2006, some continued to fight. In 2007, these militants renamed themselves Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and launched a murderous bombing campaign in Algiers. French and other European intelligence officials continue to worry about the potential for spillovers to Europe (see also Chapter 1). The meagre participation in the 2012 national elections in Algeria reflected widespread disaffection and alienation. Yet, as attested by the Arab Spring of 2011 in nearby states, aspirations for reforms and democratic governance suggest that Al-Qaida-style politics holds scant appeal among the Arab masses.

to mainland France and of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) protests and other political activities to Germany became central national security pre-occupations of the respective states. Box 9.1 and AOM Website Text 9.1 provide greater detail.

Following the 1993 attacks in Manhattan, a succession of Federal commissions in the USA investigating terrorism warned that additional countermeasures were needed, but the warnings were largely not heeded (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). By 2001, a number of US officials feared a catastrophic attack by Al-Qaida upon a target or targets in the USA, but failed to prevent the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (Shenon, 2008). Perhaps the focus on 'terrorism' as 'irrational violence' hindered understanding of the deep-rooted resentment of many Muslims, in the light of Western support for authoritarian regimes in their own countries (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia). Moreover, many Muslims perceived Israeli actions (supported by US military aid), such as air raids and arbitrary imprisonment of Palestinians, as forms of state terrorism that could legitimately be resisted. The subsequent difficulties of the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the Western failure to understand the sources of malaise in the Muslim world.

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, some European Muslims volunteered to fight the USA in Iraq and many died or were captured. Thousands of European Muslims received military training in camps in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and subsequently returned to Europe (Scheuer, 2008). The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London and the numerous planned attacks thwarted by European police and security agencies increased public concern about Muslims in Europe.

Assessing the threat posed by Islamic radicals in the West

The profiles and histories of Islamic populations in North America and Europe are quite divergent. Muslims living in North America are generally more prosperous and well educated than Muslims in Europe, many of whom were recruited as unskilled labour (CSIS, 2006). However, even within Western Europe, Muslim populations are highly heterogeneous. For example, among Muslims of Turkish background, there are Sunnis and Alevis (orthodox Muslims and a non-orthodox Shi'ite offshoot respectively), as well as ethnic Arabs, Kurds and Turks.

It is important to stress that religious extremism has only appealed to a minority of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, and that many are quite secular in orientation. It is true that many Muslim immigrants and their descendants confront incorporation barriers in housing, education and employment and endure prejudice and racism. However, the gist of the huge body of social science research on the incorporation of Muslim immigrants and their offspring suggests that most are slowly but

steadily incorporating, much like previous waves of immigration in the transatlantic space that have been viewed as problematic or threatening in the past (Lucassen, 2005).

In France, for instance, empirical evidence reveals the widespread use of French in migrant households and decreasing use of Arabic and other mother tongues (Tribalat, 1995). Furthermore, the evidence showed a decline in traditional arranged marriages and a rising intermarriage rate with French citizens and adoption of French social practices. The major problem areas were high unemployment, perceived discrimination and educational problems. However, Tribalat (1995) found that some communities did not fit the general pattern. Persons of Algerian background tended to be less religious and more secular than persons of Moroccan background. Furthermore, the Turkish community in France exhibited a lower proclivity to French usage at home, interacted less with French society and rarely intermarried with French citizens.

The key insight of Tribalat's study is that France's Muslims were incorporating and becoming French like earlier waves of immigrants to France. France's top experts on radical Islam, Gilles Kepel (2002; 2005) and Olivier Roy (2003), doubted that extremists would find much support in immigrant-background populations in Europe. Their assessments appear borne out by research on public opinion in the Middle East and North Africa and other predominantly Muslim areas of the world, which evidence scant support for terrorism (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007).

The attacks of 9/11 as well as those in Madrid and London transformed the decades-old, indeed centuries-old, question of migrant incorporation in Western countries into an acute security issue, not only in Europe but also in North America and Australia. In recent years much has been written about the susceptibility of migrant-background Muslims to mobilization into terrorist movements. For the most part, such articles and books appear inadequately based upon social scientific insights on migrant incorporation. Greatly exaggerated perceptions of the threat posed by Muslim immigrants in the West became commonplace.

The utterances and political beliefs of a relatively small coterie of radical Islamists attracted inordinate attention, especially in the media. Hence it was that extremely marginal parties such as Hizb ut-Tahrir in Great Britain could provoke such a moral panic, way out of proportion to the real threat posed (Husain, 2009). The origin society-oriented preoccupations that prevailed amongst the Islamist radicals profoundly reflected their socialization and upbringing in Europe's Islamic periphery. Nevertheless, their political orientations were taken to reflect profound dysfunctions and failures of immigrant incorporation in West Europe. In fact, their presence was largely due to the existence of refugee and asylum-seeking policies that afforded residency and protection.

Pargetter (2008) stresses the widespread revulsion felt by most Muslims, including those in the West, for the wanton violence against innocent civilians exercised by Al-Qaeda itself or confederates like the late

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's group in Iraq and the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria. Numerous credible sources concur that the vast majority of Muslims worldwide view Al-Qaida with contempt and utterly reject its politics and goals (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007; Kepel, 2002; 2004). A study in 2009 found that only 15 per cent of people killed in Al-Qaida attacks between 2004 and 2008 were Westerners and that the vast majority of victims were Muslims (Schmidt and Shanker, 2011: 155).

Public opinion research consistently reveals that European Muslims support and respect European democracies (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 38; Jackson and Doerschler, 2012). Unfortunately, public opinion surveys also reveal growing negative opinion and prejudice against Muslims and Islam, particularly in the US (Gerges, 2011: 20–2). There subsists an egregious disconnect between perceptions of Muslims and Islam and the values, ideals and aspirations of most Muslims. This state of affairs suggests an urgent need for better education about world affairs and Islam.

Migration, security and the 'War on Terrorism'

What was termed the 'War on Terrorism' by the George W. Bush Administration involved calculated exaggeration and misleading simplification. After largely ignoring the threat posed by Al-Qaida in its first months in office, the Administration then declared a war and likened it to World War II (Clarke, 2004; Shenon, 2008). In doing so, the Administration exaggerated the threat posed by radical Muslims at a time when overall support for achievement of Islamic fundamentalist goals through political violence had declined significantly and mainstream Islamic fundamentalist movements had rejected violence while embracing incremental reform (Gerges, 2005; Roy, 1994). It then compounded the error by linking the government of Iraq to Al-Qaeda and then using that and an unwarranted claim concerning weapons of mass destruction as a pretext to invade Iraq.

The invasion of Iraq proved counterproductive to the campaign against Al-Qaeda and its allies, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, since it increased support for them among some Muslims (Ricks, 2007). Nevertheless, the US-led attack on Afghanistan, later supported by a NATO deployment, badly damaged Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan without eliminating them (Miller, 2007). With the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, perhaps a remnant of only several hundred militants remained (Schmidt and Shanker, 2011: 242–5).

Al-Qaeda probably played some role in the mounting of the attack in Madrid in 2004 and the attacks in London in 2005 and 2007, although these attacks were initially viewed as home-grown but inspired by Al-Qaeda (Benjamin and Simon, 2005). In early 2008, French and Spanish authorities thwarted a planned series of attacks in Western Europe, apparently timed again to precede general elections in Spain. Most of the suspects were Pakistani migrants, several of whom had recently arrived from

the frontier area of Waziristan in Pakistan. Hence, the US Secretary of Defence claimed that the outcome of the war in Afghanistan directly affected European security (Shanker and Kulish, 2008).

Soon after entering office in 2009, US President Obama declared the end of the War on Terrorism. By 2012, US forces in Iraq had been greatly reduced and those remaining were mostly deployed in non-combat missions. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, US and NATO troop levels were also being drawn down with an endpoint for US and NATO combat missions foreseen for July 2014. Prospects for both Iraq and Afghanistan did not bode well and fears over possible future civil wars appeared warranted. One much discussed scenario foresaw a Taliban role in a future Afghan coalition government (and perhaps) federal state (Green, 2012).

Migration and security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

Comparisons to other areas of the world reveal important contrasts with the dominant pattern of what might be termed hyper-securitization in the transatlantic area since the 1990s. Nevertheless, migration and security represents a salient concern in many areas outside the OECD. Instead of comprehensive examination of all such areas, only a handful of country and regional cases can be considered here.

Geo-strategically, due to its proximity to Europe in the transatlantic space, the MENA assumes enormous significance. The analysis in previous sections revealed important connections between migration and security in the transatlantic area and the MENA. The origin country-orientation of many MENA-background migrants in the West attests to the enduring significance of migration and security-related developments in the MENA for the transatlantic area. A related concern arises from the growing significance of diasporas to understanding of migration and security, particularly in the MENA.

Diaspora refers to a transnational population linked by ethnicity to a traditional, symbolic or historic origin country (see Chapter 2). Diasporas constitute non-state actors although states increasingly promote ties to diasporic populations abroad, especially to spur economic development. Such populations increasingly loom large in all regions of the world, but particularly so in the MENA with its many conflicts. An important analytical question arises about the role of diasporas in conflicts and their settlement or non-resolution. Studies suggest that diasporas can either contribute to democratization and stability or exacerbate or perpetuate conflicts as witnessed in the Azeri–Armenia conflict (Shain and Barth, 2003: 449–50). Box 9.2 analyses the role of the Armenian diaspora in the strife over Nagorno-Karabakh. AOM Website Text 9.2 considers the role played by diaspora Jewry in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Box 9.2 The Armenian diaspora and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh

The Armenian diaspora comprises communities around the world. The two largest ethnic Armenian populations are found in the USA, where an estimated one million Armenians reside, principally in California, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, and in France, where an estimated 500,000 Armenians live, principally in the Marseille and Paris areas (Shain and Barth, 2003: 468).

Soon after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the area of the former semi-autonomous Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, became an independent state in 1991. Similarly, the neighbouring former Soviet area became the internationally recognized state of Azerbaijan. The territory of the new Azeri state encompassed an area with mixed populations of ethnic Armenians and Azeris called Nagorno-Karabakh. A conflict ensued and Armenian forces seized Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azeri territories. Volunteers from the Armenian diaspora played a key role in the fighting which resulted in the creation of hundreds of thousands of Azeri refugees, most of whom lost their homes and livelihoods and subsist as IDPs in areas still controlled by the Azeri government or found safe haven in neighbouring Iran which has a large ethnic Azeri minority population.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azeri territories now under Armenian military occupation has largely remained frozen since the early 1990s. However, the first democratically elected president of the new Armenia, Ter-Petrossian, opposed recognition of the self-declared Karabakh. This put Ter-Petrossian at odds with influential elements of the Armenian diaspora which favoured both recognition and annexation and generally a hard line towards both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Ter-Petrossian's disfavour increased with Armenia's economic collapse. The downturn made Armenians all the more dependent on assistance from the Armenian diaspora. In the USA, the pro-Armenian lobby succeeded in increasing US foreign assistance to Armenia and in instituting a ban on aid to Azerbaijan (Shain and Barth, 2003: 471). The recovery of Armenia's sovereignty and independence led to significant inflows of ethnic Armenians from the diaspora who established political parties in Armenia. Among these was the Dashnak Armenia Revolutionary Federation which fiercely criticized Ter-Petrossian's policies. Eventually, by 1998, Ter-Petrossan was forced to resign and diasporic opposition figured centrally in this outcome. His successor Kocharian embraced an Armenian foreign policy orientation which was much more pleasing to hard-line elements in the Armenian diaspora. According to Shain and Barth (2003: 472), the weight of the diaspora '...manifests itself most powerfully regarding the possibility of a peace settlement with Azerbaijan'.

Both the behaviour of the Armenian and Jewish diasporas may be viewed as a challenge to state-centric analysis and, in a sense, to the state itself. However, comparison of the Israeli and Armenian cases suggests that the abilities of diaspora populations to influence politics and policies in

homelands vary a great deal. The economic plight of Armenia compared to that of Israel, meant that the Armenian diaspora was much more influential than the Jewish diaspora in the formulation of Armenia's and Israel's respective foreign policies (Shain and Barth, 2003). The two cases also differ in that Israel long enjoyed an aura bordering on deference amongst Jews that Armenia lacks among Armenians. However, the Israeli–Jewish diaspora relationship may be evolving as emigration of Israel's Jews, particularly its most affluent and well-educated citizens, increases and prospects for a two-state solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict fade (Lustik, 2011).

A growing concern: environment, climate change and migration

In Chapter 2, we drew attention to push–pull models that assume that population growth and environmental degradation directly cause migration. We showed that such deterministic approaches ignore the interaction between these and the many other factors that influence decisions to migrate or to stay put. We stressed the need for a multi-pronged understanding of migration that takes account of the many aspects of change that affect societies and communities, as well as the role of individual and collective agency in shaping migratory behaviour.

In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the relationship between climate change and migration. This can be seen as a special case of environmental drivers of migration, but as one of growing current significance. Concerns about climate change-induced migration have emerged in the context of debates on global warming and the inability of states to take effective action to mitigate it through regulation of carbon emissions. Environmentalists have claimed that the effects of global warming, especially on sea-levels and rainfall patterns, will lead directly to massive population displacements. They call for action to prevent such migrations as well for the broadening of the definition of refugees to include people displaced by climate change. The underlying assumption seems to be that migration is intrinsically negative and should be stopped where possible.

Migration scholars, by contrast, have pointed out that migration is driven by many interacting factors, and can rarely be reduced to the effects of just one form of change, such as climate change. Moreover, they have argued that migration itself can be one of the most effective ways of responding to change and building better livelihoods.

The state of knowledge on climate change and migration

In the 1980s and 1990s, some environmentalists claimed that predicted climate-change-induced developments (such as sea-level rise, drought or desertification) could be mapped onto settlement patterns to predict future

human displacement. In other words, if climate change models predicted a sea-level rise of (say) 50 centimetres, it would be possible to map all coastal areas affected by this and work out how many people lived in such areas. The assumption then was that all these people would have to move (for an example of this approach see Myers and Kent, 1995). No consideration was given to possible adaptation strategies, such as flood defences, changes in livelihood patterns or short-distance mobility. Others put forward scenarios of mass displacements as a cause of future global insecurity (Homer-Dixon and Percival, 1996), while certain NGOs even escalated forecasts of future population displacements up to one billion by 2050 (Christian Aid, 2007).

By contrast, migration and refugee scholars argued that climate change in itself was not a major cause of migration, and that people's decisions to move were always shaped by multiple factors (Black, 2001; Castles, 2002). They therefore called for micro-level research on actual experiences of how communities coped with modifications in their living conditions and economic opportunities resulting from climate change.

The knowledge base has since developed a great deal. Researchers have begun to carry out studies at the local and regional levels, and the empirical basis for understanding the relationship between climate change and migration is much enhanced. Findings of studies have been published in books which cover a range of conceptual, normative and descriptive topics (for example see McAdam, 2010; Piguet and de Guchteneire, 2011). Information and research centres have issued reports and working papers analysing experiences of climate change and the strategies adopted by affected populations (e.g. Hugo, 2008; Massey *et al.*, 1998; Piore, 1979). Important debates on methodology are taking place (Kniveton *et al.*, 2008), and significant empirical studies are beginning to appear in scientific journals (e.g. Pratikshya and Massey, 2009). A doctoral thesis has analysed the politicization of the climate change displacement debate (Gemenne, 2009).

The current state-of-the-art in understanding the climate-change-migration nexus is summed up in a study published by the Foresight programme of the British Government Office for Science (Foresight, 2011). The *Foresight Report* focuses on the environmental effects of climate change resulting from human activity – notably the global warming caused by increased use of fossil fuels. The Government Chief Scientist commissioned over 80 reports and papers covering drivers of migration, the state of science, case studies of relevant experiences, models for analysing change and policy development. The authors include migration researchers, economists, demographers, geographers, environmentalists and social scientists from 30 countries worldwide. The *Foresight Report* starts by arguing that estimates of the numbers of environmental/climate change migrants are:

Methodologically unsound, as migration is a multi-causal phenomenon and it is problematic to assign a proportion of the actual or predicted

number of migrants as moving as a direct result of environmental change. A deterministic approach that assumes that all or a proportion of people living in an ‘at risk’ zone in a low-income country will migrate neglects the pivotal role that humans take in dealing with environmental change and also ignores other constraining factors which influence migration outcomes. (Foresight, 2011: 11)

It is impossible to summarize the many important findings of the *Foresight Report* here. Attention may be drawn to some key points. First, migration is likely to continue regardless of environmental change, because it is driven by powerful economic, political and social processes. Many people will migrate into areas of greater environmental vulnerability, such as cities built on floodplains in Asia and Africa. Second, environmental change is equally likely to make migration less possible as more probable. Where people are impoverished by such factors as drought or desertification, they may lack the resources to move, and may have to stay in situations of extreme vulnerability. Third, attempts at preventing migration may lead to increased impoverishment, displacement and irregular migration in the long run. Migration can represent a transformational adaptation to environmental change, and may be an effective way to build resilience.

Finally, and perhaps most important, environmental change will influence the volume, directions and characteristics of migration in the future – even if it is not possible to disentangle environmental and other drivers. This means that: ‘Giving urgent policy attention to migration in the context of environmental change now will prevent a much worse and more costly situation in the future’ (Foresight, 2011: 10).

As a result of the Foresight project and the other studies carried out in recent years, it is now possible to go beyond some of the simplistic statements of the past. It is still too early to speak of scientific consensus about the causes, extent and impacts of climate change, but certain ideas seem to be gaining acceptance as pointers for further research and action.

To start with, climate-change-induced migration should not be analysed in isolation from other forms of movement – especially economic migration and forced migration. Forced migration results from conflicts, persecution and the effects of development projects (such as dams, airports, industrial areas and middle-class housing complexes). Such development-induced displacement is actually the largest single form of forced migration, predominantly leading to internal displacement of 10–15 million people per year, and mainly affecting disempowered groups such as indigenous peoples, other ethnic minorities and slum-dwellers (Cernea and McDowell, 2000).

Possible climate-change-related migration is often closely linked to other aspects of environmental change. The effects of changing farming practices (e.g. mechanization, use of fertilizers and pesticides, mono-cultures, irrigation, concentration of land ownership) on the environment may be hard to distinguish from cyclical weather variations

and long-term climate change. Rural–urban migration and the growth of cities are key social-change processes of our times. All too often, this means that people leaving the land end up in urban slums (Davis, 2006) that are highly vulnerable to disasters and climatic factors, such as storms, landslides, water insecurity and flooding. Migration scholars now recognize that environmental factors have been significant in driving migration throughout history and have often been neglected in the past. In other words, we should generally look for *multiple and interacting causes* when studying migration and include climate change as one of the factors to be analysed.

Further, recent research indicates that there is little evidence that climate change will cause massive migration movement. It is very difficult to identify groups of people already displaced by climate change alone. There are certainly groups which have been affected by climatic (or broader environmental) *variability*, but these need to be distinguished from long-term climate change. In addition, other economic, political, social and cultural factors are also at work. Even the cases portrayed in the media as most clear-cut become more complex when looked at closely. For instance, Bangladesh is often seen as an ‘obvious example’ of mass displacement due to sea-level rise, but an analysis by Findlay and Geddes (2011) questions this conventional view, showing that longer-term migration is related to differential patterns of poverty, access to social networks, and household and community structures.

But the absence of the displaced millions predicted by Myers and others just a few years ago should not be taken as a reason for complacency. It seems probable that the forecast acceleration of climate change over the next few decades will have major effects on production, livelihoods and human security. A study of the Asia–Pacific region identifies a number of ‘hot spot areas which will experience the greatest impact’: these include densely settled delta areas, low-lying coastal areas, low-lying atolls and coral islands, some river valleys, and semi-arid low-humidity areas. The largest populations likely to be affected are in mega-cities built on average only a few metres above sea-level, like Shanghai, Tianjin, Tokyo, Osaka and Guangzhou (Hugo, 2010a). It has been estimated that the number of people living in floodplains of urban areas in East Asia may rise from 18 million in 2000 to 45–67 million by 2060 (Foresight, 2011: 13). Such areas are experiencing massive growth through rural–urban migration. Significant changes in peoples’ ability to earn a livelihood in specific locations will lead to a range of adaption strategies, many of which will not involve migration. However, certain families and communities are likely to adapt through temporary or permanent migration of some of their members, while in extreme cases it may become impossible to remain in current home areas, so that forced displacement will ensue.

To sum up: migration is not an inevitable result of climate change, but one possible adaptation strategy out of many. It is crucial to understand the factors that lead to differing strategies and varying degrees of

vulnerability and resilience in individuals and communities. Moreover, migration should not generally be seen as negative: people have always moved in search of better livelihoods, and this can bring benefits both for origin and destination areas (UNDP, 2009). Migrants should not be seen as passive victims; they have some degree of *agency*, even under the most difficult conditions. Strategies that treat them as passive victims are counterproductive, and protection of rights should also be about giving people the chance to deploy their agency. The objective of public policy should not be to prevent migration, but rather to ensure that it can take place in appropriate ways and under conditions of safety, security and legality (Zetter, 2010).

Conclusions

The post-9/11 period witnessed a reinforcement of the securitization of migration policies that had developed from the 1980s, particularly after the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of a new security agenda. Analysis of climate change and its implications for security occupies a key place on that agenda. There has been a parallel proliferation of books about securitization of migration, but mainly about the transatlantic space. A scholarly consensus has emerged that migrant populations were the most adversely affected by the pattern of securitization.

Nevertheless, migrant populations have proven resilient in the face of adversity. Radical Islam has elicited scant support in the transatlantic zone and political incorporation of growing Muslim populations is ongoing. Securitization of migration has not taken place in some regions such as most of Latin America and Iberia. Important priorities for future scholarship are to better understand the implications of non-state actors like diasporas for security matters and to compare securitization processes in the transatlantic region with security in other regions.

Guide to further reading

Extra resources at www.age-of-migration.com

The Age of Migration website includes additional Text 9.1 ‘Spillover of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Insurgency to Germany’ and Text 9.2 ‘The Role of Diaspora Jewry in the Arab–Israeli Conflict’.

There has been a remarkable outpouring of scholarship about migration and security since 1990. To a certain extent, this evolution parallels the expansion of terrorism research, a social science growth industry well analysed by Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning and Smyth (2011) who provide an important critique of what may be termed the terrorism industry that has

propagated undue fear and vastly exaggerated the threat posed by terrorism. A number of books and articles about Muslims in the West appear skewed by related biases and exaggerations (Vaisse, 2010).

Notable more recent contributions about migration and security include Paoletti (2011), Dancygier (2010), Greenhill (2010), Bourbeau (2011) and Chebel d'Appollonia (2012). On Muslims in Europe, see Glazer (2009), Laurence (2012), Pargenter (2008), Gerges (2011), Kurzman (2011) and Jackson and Doerschler (2012). On the complex security and theoretical implications of transnational and diasporic populations, see Adamson and Demetriou (2007) and Shain and Barth (2003).

For climate change, the key reading is the Foresight Report. All the papers along with the main report are available for free download at <http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight>.

Index

- Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi 206
 advanced economies/societies 47, 63, 253, 318–21
 ‘developed countries’ 8, 8f, 9f, 31, 50, 125, 242, 263
 ‘highly developed countries’ 6, 19, 22, 50, 111
 labour demand 240–2
see also industrial economies
 Afghanistan 2, 14, 117, 127, 147, 147f, 163, 167, 172, 202, 226, 228, 376
 refugees 163, 164
 Soviet intervention (1979) 165b, 183
 US-led invasion 12, 165b, 204, 206–7
 Africa 5, 14, 34, 49, 71, 77, 85, 86, 96, 108, 110–11, 114, 119, 134, 149, 160, 211, 221, 226, 246, 249–50, 262, 264, 268, 305, 319, 320
see also ‘migration in Africa and Middle East’
 African-Americans 91–2, 97, 127, 260, 283–4, 378
 Africans 245, 253, 275b, 312
 Afro-Caribbeans 61, 109, 128, 282
 age 30, 31, 39, 356
see also ageing population
 age of migration 328
 general trends 1–24, 193, 203b, 321, 329
 ageing population 117–18, 121–2, 124–5, 154, 156–7, 242, 248b, 279b, 324, 357
 agency 31, 36, 37–9, 45, 46, 51, 75, 78, 99, 146, 209, 213, 221–2
see also free will
 agriculture 3, 48–9, 53, 72, 98, 110, 124, 129–31, 133, 135, 142, 157, 159, 180, 181, 189, 192, 211, 216, 234, 242–3, 254, 256, 259, 273b, 279b, 285b, 309, 320
 ‘farming’/‘farmers’ 34, 39, 90, 92, 95, 97, 241
 ‘subsistence agriculture’ 89, 95
 aid/ODA 71, 74, 149, 323, 371
 al-Qaeda 2, 165b, 202, 203b, 203–5, 206, 349
 Albania 115, 119, 226, 285t, 356
 Algeria 70–1, 95, 97, 109, 112, 175–6, 178–9, 186, 189, 191, 276t, 299, 309
 spillover of insurgency to France 202–4
 American dream 90, 268b
 American Revolution 67, 91, 330, 371
 Americas 85–6, 102, 269b, 276t
 migration 21, 126–46
 migration from 1945 to 1970s 128–31
 migration since 1970s 131–40
 regional trends and policy
 developments 141–4
see also Central America
 Americas: migration from 1945 to 1970s 128–31
 Andean area 130–1
 Mexico and Central America 129–30
 Americas: migration since 1970s 131–40
 Andean area 138–9
 Caribbean 137–8
 Mexico and Central America 135–7
 Southern Cone 139–40
 USA and Canada 133–5
 Americas: regional trends and policy
 developments 141–4
 policy initiatives 142–3
 remittances and development 143–4
 Amin, I. 191
 Amnesty International 146, 159, 171, 333
 Andean countries 21, 128
 migration (1945–1970s) 128, 130–1
 migration (since 1970s) 138–9
 Angola 175, 177, 184, 189, 194, 250
 Angolans 115, 185, 194
 Annan, K. 18
 anthropologists/anthropology 38, 58, 196
 anti-Semitism 60, 97, 294, 365
 Arab Spring (2011) 2–3, 77, 117, 172–3, 186, 194–5, 203b, 229, 250, 343, 346
 migration and revolution 14–15b
 Arab–Israeli conflict 207, 209
 Arabs 42, 173, 204, 253
see also Israeli Arabs
 Argentina 14, 21, 55, 119, 127–8, 131, 139–40, 142, 145, 188, 265, 285b
 Arizona 3, 4b, 136b, 144, 268b
 Armed Islamic Group (GIA, Algeria) 203b, 206
 Armenia 164, 209
 conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh 207, 208b
 influence 208–9
see also Chinese diaspora

- Asia 2, 5, 49, 56, 61, 71, 85–6, 110, 111, 113, 129, 172–3, 194, 211, 221, 225–6, 242, 260, 262, 264, 267b, 268, 269b, 287, 293, 295, 319, 320, 340, 348, 353, 357, 360
 migrant stocks 8, 9f
 Asians 90, 109, 275b, 282, 284
 aspirations 25, 29, 31, 40, 43, 44, 51, 187, 194, 195, 196
 assimilation 45t, 63, 96, 109, 265, 266, 267b, 268, 270, 281, 293, 294, 327–30
 assimilationism 67, 377
 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 17, 353
see also South-East Asia
 asylum 193, 231, 273b, 352
 asylum-seekers 57, 80, 103, 112–13, 115, 117–18, 133–4, 136–7, 165b, 165, 167, 172, 182(map), 192, 205, 223, 230, 235, 238, 269b, 272, 279b, 310–12, 324–5, 355, 376
Australia 167–8
 Western countries 227–9
see also forced migration
 Australia xvi, xvii, 10, 14, 16, 18, 56, 60, 85, 93, 99, 101, 110, 113, 119, 125, 134–5, 139, 147f, 149, 154, 157, 162, 169, 205, 222, 224–5, 227, 246, 249, 263–6, 270, 280, 285b, 286–90, 294–5, 313, 315, 322, 326, 328
 acquisition of nationality (1988–2009) 288t, 289
 asylum issues (politicization) 311–12
 asylum-seekers 167–8
 British migrants 19, 282
 immigration 92, 343
 migration pattern 166–8
 White Australia Policy 92, 96, 152, 166, 269b
see also Oceania
 Australian Aborigines/Aboriginal Peoples 86, 166, 269b, 283
 Austria 232, 245–6, 256, 266, 270, 278t, 281, 287, 289–90, 293
 authoritarianism 33, 173, 300, 309, 318
 Bahrain 153, 173, 181, 298
 Baltic republics 103, 116, 117, 119, 166, 200
 Bangladesh 44, 147–8, 153–5, 159, 164, 212, 249, 252, 312, 347
 remittance receipts (2009) 73, 74t
banlieues 275b, 277–9, 301b, 337
 Begin, M. 305
 Beitenu, I. 306
 Belgium 31, 96, 118, 175, 179, 229, 232, 244, 245–6, 281–2, 285b, 290, 349
 anti-immigration parties 309–10
 Ben Ali, Z. 173
 Berlusconi, S. 3, 229, 286b, 310–11
 Bhutan/Bhutanese 160, 164, 227
bidonvilles (shanty-towns) 54, 277
 birth rates 95, 106, 196, 324
 Bolivia/Bolivians 112, 127–8, 131, 140, 142
 bonded labour 85, 155, 199
see also indentured labour
 border control/s 2, 17, 113, 124, 143, 191, 221, 236–8, 242, 269b, 276b, 299–300, 325
 Borjas, G.J. 29, 30, 54, 146, 243, 262–3, 337
 Bosnia 116, 226, 228, 278t
 Bourdieu, P. 40, 337
Bracero Program (1942–64) 70, 129, 130, 216, 218
 brain drain 1, 52, 69, 71, 161, 170, 183, 193, 209, 332, 373
 debates ‘more nuanced’ 77, 332, 349
 brain gain 69, 77
 brain waste 71–2, 77
 Brazil 8, 21, 22, 49, 55, 88, 111–12, 114, 119, 127–8, 142, 145, 188, 252, 285b, 305, 318, 320–1
 Brazilians 139, 140, 150(map), 156
 Breivik, A. 1–2, 325
 Britain *see* United Kingdom
 British Empire 42, 67, 92
 Brunei [Negara Brunei Darussalam] 147f, 148, 151
 Bulgaria 103, 115, 119, 190, 226–7, 229, 311
 Burma/Myanmar 147f, 151, 154–5, 159, 163, 227
 refugees 163, 164, 224t
 Burundi/Burundians 175, 177, 184
 Bush, G.W. 1, 4b, 202, 206, 217, 234, 307
 Calderón, F. 4b, 136b
 Cambodia 147f, 151, 154, 157, 159, 164, 276t
 Canada xvii, 14, 16, 18–19, 21, 56, 71, 99, 125–7, 149, 183, 201, 222, 225, 263–6, 269b, 270, 274, 280, 282–4, 287, 290, 294–5, 306, 311, 313, 315, 326, 336, 369
 labour migration connected with
 industrialization (1850–1920) 91(map), 91–2
 migration (1945–1970s) 128, 129
 migration (since 1970s) 134–5, 137–8
 Canary Islands 187–8, 192
 capabilities 25, 31, 38, 40, 43, 51, 63, 70, 75, 78, 194
 Cape Verdeans 16, 114–15

- capital 7, 30, 33, 34–5, 37, 39–40, 48, 71, 146, 160, 162–3, 187, 325
 capital accumulation 99, 328
 capital flows 43, 44, 195
 capital mobility 232, 371
 see also human mobility
 capitalism 31, 33, 53, 85, 343–4, 347
 global/world 32, 33, 36, 99
 capitalist development 100–1, 195, 347
 Card, D. 262
 care work 35, 61, 114, 157, 248b, 257–8, 269–2
 care workers 118, 124, 154, 179, 244, 319, 324, 242
 Caribbean countries 44, 77, 88–9, 108, 126, 128, 129, 227, 260, 305, 312, 361
 migration (since 1970s) 137–8
 see also ‘Latin America and Caribbean’
 Caribbean people 245, 249, 259, 275b, 361, 368
 see also Afro-Caribbeans
 Castles, S. xi–xiii, 17, 18, 35–6, 41, 49, 54, 56, 61, 78, 82–3, 93, 107b, 108n, 125, 136n, 144, 222, 228, 230, 239, 241, 243, 256, 259, 263, 265–6, 269n, 280, 312, 316, 322
 publications 338–9, 341, 371, 377–8
 casualization 111, 257, 260
 see also ‘employment/casual’
 catering sector 35, 124, 167, 243, 257, 259, 261
 censuses 27, 90, 108n, 129, 140, 160–1, 166, 168, 267–8n, 377
 Central America 21, 126–8, 136–7, 198, 227, 305
 migration (1945–1970s) 128, 130
 migration (since 1970s) 136–7, 138, 360
 see also Latin America
 Central Americans 1, 133, 249, 259
 Central Asia 48, 102, 148, 164, 183, 191
 Chad 15b, 177, 186, 224t
 challenges of global migration 5–13
 cheap labour 28, 32, 35–6, 53, 90, 92, 99, 160, 257
 see also labour
 Chechens/Chechnya 164, 200
 child-care 243, 258, 272
 children 56, 62, 85, 88, 90, 93–4, 100, 157, 228, 237, 255, 279b, 285b
 Chile 21, 111, 128, 131, 139, 143, 145
 China 8, 22, 47–9, 79, 92, 96, 111, 119, 134, 147–9, 151–8, 167–8, 170, 173, 238, 242, 250, 253, 285t, 297, 319, 320
 migrations (new) from Africa 188–9, 349
 one-child policy 154–5, 160
 Chinese 90, 133, 245
 Chinese diaspora
 South-East Asia 89, 200
 see also diasporas
 ‘circular migration’ 7, 56, 169, 174, 193, 271, 322–3
 cities 6, 30, 93, 186, 196, 212, 277, 281, 308, 309, 315, 334, 369, 379
 see also inner cities
 citizens xvii, 65, 270, 276b, 280
 citizenship 19, 20, 35, 57, 66–8, 81–2, 94, 97, 107b, 109, 129, 156–7, 160, 167, 250–1, 253, 255, 265, 268b, 271, 272–3b, 275b, 278b, 282, 286b, 287–91, 293, 295–6, 304–5, 315–16, 319, 327–31
 national or ethnic understanding 190–1, 193
 citizenship: types 67–8, 266
 citizenship tests xii, 281, 294, 328
 civil rights 107b, 108, 110, 129, 271
 Civil Rights Movement 267b, 280, 284
 civil society 171, 264, 292
 civil wars 164, 172, 175, 185, 207
 class 6–7, 26, 32, 37, 46, 61–2, 64, 67, 77, 138, 140–1, 187, 189, 234, 246, 258, 262, 267b, 281–2, 293, 334, 339, 367
 global relations 254–5
 see also working class
 ‘classical immigration countries’ xvii, 14, 16, 18, 20, 85, 102, 121, 152, 161, 266, 268, 270, 287, 289, 313, 326
 see also immigration
 cleaning 35, 124, 244, 257–9, 261, 272
 climate change/global warming xi, 22, 29, 209–13, 214, 223, 347, 352, 356, 361, 368
 Clinton, W.J. 17, 234
 clothing sector 93, 142, 154, 242
 see also garment industry
 Cohen, Robin xii, 32, 54, 85, 100–1, 316
 Cold War 137, 149, 163, 175, 195, 201, 225, 226
 see also post-Cold War era
 Collyer, Michael 125, 197, 341
 Colombia 128, 131, 138, 224t, 376
 colonial migrants 104, 270, 271
 colonial workers 106, 108–10, 112
 versus guest workers 110–11
 colonialism 14, 31, 40, 44, 59–60, 70, 86–9, 99, 148, 174–5, 199, 294
 see also post-colonialism
 colonization 48, 126, 128
 commodities 7, 322, 325
 communism 71, 124, 225, 226, 297, 311
 community/communities 31, 43, 63–4, 78, 82, 265, 317, 374
 see also ethnic communities
 commuting 8, 34
 comparative approach 281, 345, 356

- complexity 25, 37, 47, 52, 61, 102, 128, 148, 214, 289, 330
conflict 5, 12, 37
Congo DRC 175, 177, 185, 196
Congo DRC: Katanga province 177, 186
constitutions 64–5, 67, 112, 185
construction 3, 35–6, 76, 91, 97, 110, 114, 118, 124, 141, 149, 157–9, 181, 189, 192, 242, 244, 248b, 250, 252, 256–7, 260, 262, 279b, 300, 324
contract labour 66, 151, **153**, 274
‘coolie system’ *see* indentured labour
‘core values’ 269b, 273b, 293
see also national values
core-periphery analysis **32–3**
corruption 15b, 80, 82, 178, 185, 191–2, 195, 310
Côte d’Ivoire 55–6, 172, 177, 185, 194, 303, 312, 363
cotton 86, 90, 130
counter-terrorism 201, 202, 203b
credit 38, 39, 53, 80
crime 3, 142, 221, 352, 377
Croatia 98b, 116, 226, 228, 278t
cross-border flows **33**, 35
Cuba 71, 88, 128, 130, 138, 198, 300
Cubans 225, 227, 307, 368
cultural diversity 7, 21, 331
cultural pluralism **329–30**
culture 18–20, 28, 40, 44, 45t, 57–60, **63–4**, 65, 156, 162, 168, 170, 200, 265, 268, 270, 275, 275b, 280, 282, 287, **291–2**, 328, 346, 351
see also language
‘culture of migration’ 44, 72, 161
cumulative causation **44–5**, 361
custom/tradition 28, 57, 59, 60
Czech Republic 116, 119, 227, 247–8, 288t, 289, 311
data deficiencies 11n, 85, 87n, 91n, 105n, 120–1n, 132n, 150n, 176n, 182n, 193, 237, 281, 287, 288n
debt bondage 142, 238
decolonization 14, 48, 71, 102, 123, 128, 151–2, 163, 169, 172, 177, 265
see also post-colonial era
de Haas, Hein **xi–xiii**, 15n, 45n, 45–6, 48n, 49–51, 62, 69, 72, 75, 78, 80, 83, 117, 172–3, 175, 177, 186, 188, 191–3, 196–7, 210, 239, 281, 322
publications 334, 336–7, 339, 341, **342–3**
democracy 33, 65, 68, 85, 170, 206, 308, 313, 351
‘liberal democracy’ 53, 57, 300, 348
democratic states **313–14**
democratization 127, 173, 184, 207, 305
demographic transition 47, 48, 196, **319**
demography xi–xii, 7, 29, 248b, 251–2, 260–2, 305, 315, 317, 323–4, 353
Denmark 232, 244, 246, 289
dependency theory **32–3**
deportation 3, 61, 95, 107b, 138, 159, 192, 217, 219, 228, 276b, 281, 303, 317
deregulation 33, 34, 60, 325
destination countries *see* receiving countries
determinism 29, 36, 37, 209, 211
developed countries *see* advanced economies
developing countries 8, 30, 34, 38–9, 103, 253, 332, 372
development 71, 80, **223**, 298, 321–2
contested concept **69–70**
migration and debate **69–74**
remittances and **143–4**
see also International Network
development processes 26, 29, 43, 53, 145
development projects 10, 148, 164, 211
diaspora policies
Asia-Pacific region **162–3**
diasporas **42–3**, 45, 80, 135, 160–1, 169, 193, 199–201, 207, 213–14, 291, 297, 322
discrimination 55, 60, 63, 80, 97, 109, 138, 199, 205, 216, 246, 259, 271, 273b, 274, 275b, 279, 282, 286, 291, 294, 301b, 305, 326, 329–30
displaced people xi, **223**
diversity 20, 64, 81, 125
division of labour
international 33, 100–1, 340, 348
domestic work/service 114, 141, 171, 248b, 258, 261, 333
domestic workers 140, 152–4, 157–9, 179–81, 187, 243, 257–8
Dominican Republic 16, 128, 138, 198, 299, 312
dual citizenship 80, 279b, **290–1**, 293, 328, 346
dual labour market theory **35**, 124, 194–5
Düvell, Franck 125, 192, 263, 341
East Africa 31, 84, 89, 96, 174–5, **186–7**
East Asia 57, 65, 134, 148, 153–5, **156–8**, 170, 212, 326–7, 353
economic crises 51, 55, 81, 96, 124, 140
see also ‘global economic crisis’
economic development 1, 7, 13, 18, 47, 50, 92, 195, 207, 366
economic growth 13, 71, 76, 78, 99, 103, 112–14, 116, 119, 123–5, 145, 149, 153, 156–7, 159, 169–70, 173, 177, 196, 200, 225, 243, 247, 253, 253, 261, 322, 364

- economic migrants 110, 113, 130, 135, 149, 169, 236
 economic migration 26, 56, 177, 185, 194, 229, 240, 339
 economic recession 255, 294, 322
 economic restructuring 19, 60, 132, 294
 Europe (1974–95) **111–16**
 economists 243, 254, 259, 262
 Ecuador 112, 127–8, 130–1, 139–40, 249, 285t, 299, 305
 education xi, 25, 29–30, 50, 55–6, 61, 66, 68, 76, 80, 94–5, 111, 136b, 143, 161–2, 190, 204–5, 233, 240, 252, 262, 268b, 273b, 274, 281, 320, 371
 educational attainment 15b, 34–6, 50, 52, 75, 77, 187, 194–6, 209, 245, 258, 261, 267b, 272, 277, 283
 Egypt 14–15b, 44, 48–9, 56, 71, 77–8, 173, 177–9, 183, 204, 229, 312, 332
 Egyptians 180, 191
 El Salvador 137, 143
 Eleventh of September attacks (2001) 3, 4b, 6, 19, 21, 60, 133–4, 165b, 201–5, 213, 217, 226–7, 269b, 293, 346
 elites 65, 78, 187, 225, 275, 313, 329
 emigration 46–50, 68, **93**, 100, 127, 374
 emigration countries/regions 68, 112, 151
 Asia-Pacific **159–61**
 empiricism/empirical studies 21, 37, 46, 72, 74–5, 205, 210, 243, 277, 281, 343
 employer sanctions **215–17**, 238, 325, 339, 360
 employers 40–1, 52–3, 63, 90, 95, 97, 129, 156, 159, 220, 241, 251, 254, 274, 313
 employment 6, 13, 34–5, 39, 46, 68, 75–6, 119, 136b, 141, 187, 204, 245, **247–9**, 273b, 283, 286, 289, 297, 324, 364, 369
 casual 247, 248b, 255, 258, 262, 320; *see also* casualization
 ‘3D jobs’ 154, 159, 170, 241
 gendered and racialized situations **257–8**, 259
 high-skilled 19, 243, 260
 informal 124, 192; *see also* informal sector
 low-skilled 250, 267b
 part-time 111, 248b, 258
 seasonal 106, 218, 220
 temporary 22, 248b, **256–7**, 258–9, 262, 320
 see also labour
 employment: transformation **256–60**
 labour market segmentation **259–60**
 migrant women workers **257–8**
 precarious work **259–60**
 subcontracting, temporary work,
 casualization **256–7**
 Engels, F. 93, 345
 engineering/engineers 153, 161, 244
 environment 5, 29, 51, **209–13**, **223**, 338, 349, 352, 364
 equal opportunities 62, 275b, 280, 287
 equality 265, 270, 290, 356
 equilibrium 27–8, 29
 Eritrea 175, 177, 179, 224t, 312
 Ethiopia 175, 177, 179, 187, 190, 224t
 ethnic cleansing 201, 306, 328
 ethnic communities **67**, **282**
 construction 61–2
 formation 55, 56, **57**, 63–4, **274–5**
 ethnic diversity xii, 1, 2, **18–20**, 21–2, 66, **328–31**
 ethnic entrepreneurs 257, 261, 263, 356, 359, 369, 378
 ethnic groups 36–7, 65, 67, 174, 271, **282**, 328
 ethnic homogeneity 157, 170, 266
 ethnic minorities 1, 19, 60, 63, 164, 211, 226, 242, 255, **282**, 293, 339, 377
 formation 55, 56, **57–9**
 ethnic minorities (by country)
 Australia **269b**
 France **275–6b**
 Germany **278–9b**
 Italy **285–6b**
 UK **272–3b**
 USA **267–8b**
 ethnic minorities and citizenship **287–91**
 acquisition of nationality by
 immigrants **287–9**
 dual citizenship **290–1**
 second generation **289–90**
 ethnic minorities and society xi, xii, 22, 62, 68, 104, 167, 195, **264–95**, 296, 326, 327
 immigration policies and minority formation **270–1**
 incorporation: immigrants becoming part of society **264–70**
 integration challenge **292–4**
 labour market et position **272–4**
 linguistic and cultural rights **291–2**
 racism and minorities **282–4**
 racist violence **284**, **286–7**
 residential segregation, community formation, global city **274–5**, 277
 social policy **277–82**
 ethnic minority formation 109, 111–12, 124, **270–1**, 274, 292, 315, 319, 327
 social policy responses
 (classification) **280–1**
 ethnic voting blocs **305–7**, 315

- ethnicity xvii, 6, 7, 26, 46, **58–9**, 75–6, 83, 91, 158, 165, 168, 170, 183, 191, 245, 247, 254, 258–9, 262, 320
- Europe 23, 34–5, 42, 56, 66, 79, 82, 88–9, 126, 128, 131, 134, 139, 145, 148, 154, 156, 160–2, 172–3, 186, 191, 193–4, 200–3, 214, 241–2, 246–7, 248b, 262–3, 265, 267b, 269b, 283–4, 294–6, 312, 327–8
'changing population' (1980–2010) **119–23**
 economic-restructuring period (1974–95) **111–16**
foreign resident population **119–20**, 120t, 122f
foreign-born population **119**, **120**, **121t**, 122f
 intercontinental migration from Africa and Middle East **178–81**
 intra-European migration (pre-1945) **93–6**, 340
 migration history 84, 101, 334, 340, 359–60, 363
 migration since 1945 21, **102–25**
 migration to North America (1850–1914) 5, 31, 48, 90, 100
 migrations from Africa **187–8**
 political salience of migration **1–3**
 refugee resettlement **228–9**
see also migration in Europe
- Europe: Central 14, 49, 112–13, 117, 124–5, 378
 Europe: Central and Eastern 103, 201, 220, 232–3, 246, 251, 289
 migration (1974–95) **115–16**
 post-communist migration 53, 357
- Europe: Eastern 14, 29, 48, 49, 92, 96, 112–14, 117–18, 122–4, 129, 168, 226, 260, 268, 269b, 306, 323, 334
- Europe: North-Western 48, 104, 123, 245, 266
- Europe: Northern 14, 313
- Europe: Southern 48–50, 70, 92, 103, 106, 109, 112, 117–18, 124–5, 129, 166, 170, 219–21, 233, 242, 244–6, 250, 259–60, 268, 269b, 275b, 278b, 295, 313, 324, 334, 356, 370
 migration transitions (1974–95) 112–13, **113–15**
- Europe: Western 14, 19, 44, 48, 56, 60, 65, 70, 89, 101, 103–4, 117, 129, 157, 170, 198, 201, 204–6, 220, 224, 226, 259, 264, 268, 282, 301, 304, 310, 315, 326
 Asian migration **151–3**
 persistence and diversification of migration (1974–95) **112–13**
- European Commission (CEC/EC) 216, 233, 240, 242, 286, 339
- European Communities
 freedom of movement **231–3**
- European Community (EC) xii, 17, 108, 114, 230, 232, 234, 271
- European Economic Community (EEC) 108, 124, 179, 323
- European Parliament 68, 233, 304–5, 339
- European Union xii, 3, 22, 35, 48, 52, 68, 102–3, 226–8, 237, 271, 286b, 299–300, 308, 314, 322
 employer sanctions **215**, **216**
 freedom of movement **231–3**
 governance structure **230–1**
- EU-15 (1995–2004) 117, 229, 231–2, 291, 304
- EU-25 (2004–7) 229, 289
 EU enlargement (2004) xi, 21, 116, 124, 229, 232, 273b, 323, 362
- EU-27 (2007–13) 117, 233, 276t
 EU enlargement (2007) xi, 21, 124, 323
 population growth driven by migration 122–3, 357
- expatriates **297–300**
experience/s 57, 58, 63
- exploitation 3, 28, 32, 35–7, 53, 59, 61–3, 74, 86, 98b, 109, 155–6, 159, 180b, 180, 199, 250, 254–5, 259, 274, 297, 298, 320, 327
see also oppression
- factories 31, 61, 89–91, 93, 133, 244
- Faist, Thomas 54, 346
- family 5, 31, 40, 43, 55, 75, 77–8, 82, 90, 93, 247, 275, 298, 317, 321
- family reunion 7, 16, 19, 26, 53, 56–7, 61, 95, 99, 103–4, 106–13, **117**, 118, 123, 129, 131, 133, 149, 152, 157–8, 166–7, 170, 179, 240, 242, 251, 266, 268b, 269b, 270–2, 281, 285b, 308, 313, 315, 324, 326–7
- feedback mechanisms 39, 43, 51
- feminism 2, 62, 367
 feminization of migration 170, 179–81, 257
 labour migration within Asia **154–5**
- fertility (human) 29, 47, 117, 153, 156, 160, 170, 242, 248b, 279b
- Fiji 88, 89, 168, 312
- finance 18, 33, 36, 320
- Findlay, A. 212, 347
- Finland 70, 103, 104, 106, 124, 232, 289–90, 304
- fire/arson 142, 226, 302b, 312
- Flanders 309, 311, 342
- food-processing 53, 244, 273b

- forced migration/forced migrants 10, 22, 26, 32, 42, 50–1, 56–7, 84–5, 169, 176, 185, 201, 229, 338
 definitions **221–3**
 global politics **224–7**
 global trends **223–4**
 Middle East **181–3**
see also refugees
 ‘Foreign Poles’ (in Germany) 94–5, 96
 foreign policy 200, 208b, 209, 231, 350
foreign resident population **xvii, 119–20, 120t, 122f, 124**
 foreign workers **104–6**, 112, 362, 363
foreign-born population **119, 120, 121t, 122f, 129, 178f**
 Foresight Report **210–11**, 214, 347
 Fox, V. 4b, 234
 France **xviii, 31, 56, 63–4, 85–6, 93–4, 99, 112, 118–19, 125–6, 128, 135, 151, 175, 179, 205, 215, 226–7, 229, 232, 243–4, 264, 266, 270–1, 274, 280–2, 285b, 287, 290, 293, 299, 313, 314**
 acquisition of nationality (1988–2009) 288t, 288n, 289
 colonial workers **109, 110**
 immigration (inter-war era) **97–9**
 legalization programmes **218–19**
 migrant labour (before 1914) **95–6**
 migration history 84, 100, 101, 365
 minorities **275–6b**
 presidential election (2012) **2**, 276b, 309
 spillover of insurgency from Algeria **202–4**
 unrest (2005, 2007) **301–2b, 329**
 Freeman, G.P. 313, 316, 347–8
 free migration **52, 90**
 free will/free choice **32, 36, 100, 237, 270**
see also agency
 French Revolution (1789) 67, 265, 297, 330
 friends/friendship 5, 31, 40, 55
Front National (FN) **2, 276b, 308, 309, 311**
 Frontex (EU’s border control agency) 188, 192
 functionalist theories (of migration) 27, **28–31, 35**
 critique of neoclassical migration theory **30–1, 32**
 neoclassical and human capital theories **29–30**
 Gabon 14, 172, 177
 Gaddafi, M. 15b, 186, 193, 299, 300
 Gallagher, A. 236, 348
 garment industry 35, 142, 257, 258, 260
see also Islamic dress
 gender 4b, 30, 31, 36, 39, **61–3, 82–3, 245–7, 248b, 254, 257–60, 262–3, 272, 320**
 generations 39, 58, 62, 95, 282–3, 316, 356
 genocide 85, 86, 328
 geographers 28, 38, 43, 210
 Georgia [Caucasia] 115, 117, 164
 Germany **xvi, 31, 49, 86, 93–4, 100, 115–17, 119, 125, 129, 179, 183, 204, 215, 220, 226–7, 229, 232, 246, 264–6, 270–1, 272b, 274, 277, 281, 285b, 287, 290–4, 324, 330**
 Austrian migrants 19, 282
 migrant labour (before 1914) **94–5**
 minorities **278–9b**
 reunification (1990) 152, 279b, 284
 Germany: West Germany (FRG) 95, 120n, 243
 guest-worker system 106, **107b**
 Ghana **112, 172, 177–8, 185, 194, 196, 250, 312, 360**
 Ghanaians 175, 178, 188
 ghettos/ghettoization 66, 97, 329
 global cities **36, 260, 275, 329, 371**
 Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) **18, 74, 197, 240, 320, 334, 348**
 ‘global commodity chains’ (Gereffi) 241, 256, 262, 349
 global economic crisis (GEC, 2008–) **xi, 14, 22, 50, 62, 103, 127–8, 133, 139, 145, 151–2, 171, 173, 232, 240, 273b, 281, 353, 355, 361, 367**
 migratory consequences **118–19**
see also Great Depression
 global economic crisis: migrant workers
 employment and unemployment: effects of GEC **247–9**
 migrant stocks **251–2**
 new labour migration: decline and recovery **249–50**
 OECD countries **247–9**
 prospects **252–3**
 return migration **250–1**
 global economy/world economy 27, 195, 328
 Global Forum on Migration and Development (GMFD, 2007–) **18, 144, 320–1, 349**
 global governance **17–18**
 global migration
 general trends **1–24, 193**
 global migration regime,
 unlikely to emerge soon (four reasons) **321–2**
 globalization **xii, 5, 17, 19, 26, 41, 47, 54, 63, 70, 82, 111, 116, 170, 172–3, 187, 193, 196, 220, 225, 240, 253, 255–6, 266, 294, 313–14, 318–19, 325**
 globalization theory **33–5, 50, 53**
 gold 86, 92, 126

- goods 43–4, 48, 195
 governments 5, 7, 17, 19, 22, 31, 33, 53, 56, 70, 74, 77–80, 97, 112–13, 116, 145, 153, 155, 158–9, 162, 169–71, 192–3, 195, 202, 222, 239, 251, 297, 302b, 312, 326–7
 failure/unwillingness to control
 migration 41, 124, 220, 236, 241–2, **313–14**, 317, **324–5**
 Great Depression (1930s) 97, 98–9
 see also global economic crisis
 Great Lakes Region (Africa) 172, 175, 184, 186
 Green Card system (USA) 3, **133–4**
 Greece 14, 15b, 96, 107b, 129, 183, 190, 244, 247, 278t, 289, 318, 352, 366
 effect of GEC 103, 119
 migration transition 112–13, **115**
 ‘green revolution’ 6, 34, 149
 Guatemala/Guatemalans 130, 136–7, 143, 144, 303
 guest workers/guest-worker systems 52, 56, 70, 85, 95, 103–4, 105(map), **106–8**, 113, 117, 217, 220, 236, 245–6, 255, 259, 261, 266, 268, 270–1, 278b, **280–1**, 308, 327, 339
 versus colonial workers **110–11**
 Gulf states 14, 16, 29, 44, 56–7, 111, 148–9, 155, 157, 159–60, 165b, 172–3, 184, 187, 191, 193–4, 249–51, 255, 265, 274, 283, 293, 298, 318
 intercontinental migration from Africa and Middle East **178–81**, 370
 Gulf War (1990–1) 179, 181, 183–4, 200
- Haider, J. 310
 Haiti 88, 128, 130, 138, 198, 227
 Harman, H. 237
 Harris, J.R. 30, 351
 Hatton, Timothy J. 48–9, 101, 263, 351
 health 53, 55, 62, 75–6, 80, 93, 143, 281
 health services 35, 68, 77
 Hispanics 200, 216, 267b, 282, 284, 292, 307
 historical–structural theories (of migration) 27, **31–7**, 50, 52, 99, 146, 195
 critique **36–7**
 globalization theory **33–5**
 segmented labour market theory **35–6**
 see also neo-Marxism
 Hollande, F. 2, 276b, 309
 Hollifield, James F. 53, 125, 171, 313, 316, 338–9
 Honduras 74t, 130, 137, 143
 Hong Kong/HKSAR 151, 152–3, 160, 168
 migration 156, **157–8**
 Horn of Africa 172, 175, 177, 186, 191
 hotels 154, 180, 242, 244
- household approaches **38–9**
 households 38, 88, 267n, 332, 361, 374
 housing 46, 55–6, 72, 75–6, 80, 109–10, 204, 211, 243, 252, 273b, 274, 277, 280, 283, 286, 302b, 319, 324
 Howard, J. 167
 human capital 30, 36, 40, 161, 254, 258–60
 human mobility 145, 376
 ‘population mobility’ 47, 372
 see also ‘involuntary immobility’
 human rights 6, 57, 144–5, 148, 165, 170, 199, 222, 225, 228, 256, 262, 297, 313, 339, 377
 human security, UNDP definition 199, 354
 human smuggling/smugglers 53, 191, 199, 235, **236–8**, 348, 352, 360
 human trafficking 22, 85, 155, 159, 201, 220, **236–8**, 239, 348, 353, 357, 377
 Hungary 116, 119, 227
- Iceland 113, 117, 120–1t, 247
 ideas 7, 43–4, 72, 195
 identity **37–9**, **63–4**, 156, 303, 338, 366–7
 see also multiple identities
 ideology 33, 34, 60, 64, 65, 67, 74, 271, 329
 ‘imagined community’ (Anderson) 65, 66, 333
 immigrants and politics xi, 22, 62, 104, 134, 270, 276b, **296–316**, 326, 329
 anti-immigrant movements and parties **307–12**
 France: 2005 and 2007 unrest **301–2b**, 329
 migrant participation and representation (extra-parliamentary) **301–3**, 315–16
 migrants and ethnic voting blocs **305–7**, 315
 non-citizen voting rights **303–5**, 315
 origin countries and expatriates **297–300**, 315
 politics of immigration policy-making **312–14**
 see also ‘classical immigration countries’
 Immigration Acts
 Canada (1976) **152**
 UK (1971) 109, 272–3b
 USA (1965) 129, 152
 USA (1990) 219
 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), USA 217, 218, 353
 immigration control **5**, 351, 358
 see also migration control
 immigration countries xi–xii, 112, 151
 immigration law 28, 325
 immigration policies 337
 and minority formation **270–1**
 restrictive 37, 80, 149

- Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA/
USA, 1986) 216, 217, 218
- imperialism 294, 340, 367
- income 25, 30, 38, 50, 70, 261, 262
- incorporation 55, 281
- immigrants becoming part of society **264–70**
- indentured labour 31, 85, **88–9**, 99, 148, 340
- see also* bonded labour
- India 8, 44, 56, 61, 68, 71, 92, 111, 129, 134, 152–3, 157–8, 162, 167–8, 188, 201, 241, 272b, 285t, 298, 312, 320
- Indian Partition (1947) 149, 164
- Indian sub-continent 88, 89, 108, 152, 189
- Indians 42, 133, 160, 245, 286
- indentured labour 31, 88, 89
- indigenous peoples 14, 66, 85, 86, 126–8, 164, 211, 265
- individuals 27–8, 85, 146, **265**, 317
- Indochina 96, 225, 227
- Indonesia 8, 109, 147–9, 151, 153–4, 157–9, 167
- industrial economies/industrialized countries 25, 33, 59, 149, 173, 196, 368, 376, 378
- first phase: expansion (1945–73) **254–5**
 - second phase: recession (1970s) **255**
 - third phase: precarious employment and exploitative work (by 1990s) **255**
- see also* OECD area
- industrial revolution 5, 37, 70
- industrialization 6, 25, 47, 71, 84, 99, 100, 126, 148–9, 173, 196, 376
- migration to North America and Oceania (pre-1914) **89–93**
- industry 13, 33, 36, 95, 110, 160, 283, 285b
- ‘heavy industry’ 91, 94, 97–8
- see also* manufacturing
- inequality/inequalities 37, 53, 64, 70, 111, 126–7, 133, 145–6, 187, 195, 273b, 277, 294
- inequality/inequalities: types
- geographical 28, 46
 - global 25, 199, 254
 - social 28, 34
- informal sector/informal economy 22, 32, 34, 111, 188, 241, 258, 263, 329
- information 25, 44, 48, 50
- information technology professionals 152, 160, 161
- inner cities 62, 109, 268, 273b, 274, 275b, 277, 301b, 329
- institutional racism **60**, 273b
- institutions 41, 64, 66, 68, 336
- insurance 38, 39, 53, 241
- integration xii, xvii, 4, 19, 42, 45t, 59, 82, 193, 204–5, 265, **268**, 269b, 277, 279–81, **326–8**
- integration challenge **292–4**
- interaction,
- migratory macro- and micro-structures **26–7**
- interdisciplinarity 27, 31, 84, 210, 338, 351, 361
- internally displaced persons (IDPs) 14, 138, 164, 172, 184–5, 208b, 223, 339, 376
- international cooperation and governance **320–3**
- International Labour Office/Organization (ILO) 15b, 18, 68, 72, 142, 237, 313, 353
- International Migration Outlook* (OECD) 23, 125, 146, 263, **365–6**
- international migrations systems (Kritz *et al.*) 43–4, 357
- International Monetary Fund 17–18, 34, 74, 126, 187, 320
- see also* migration and development
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) 18, 23, 125, 143, 166, 171, 192, 239, 286n, 295, 353
- international refugee regime **224–7**
- see also* asylum-seekers
- international relations (IR) 191, **201**, 332, 372
- Intifada* 180–1, 183
- investment 34, 44, 78, 111, 158, 162, 169, 193, 195, 240, 243, 253, 255, 261, 313, 325
- ‘foreign investment’/‘FDI’ 33, 149, 260
- Iran 14, 147f, 165b, 208b, 228, 312
- host to refugees 164, 224t
- Iraq 15b, 164, 167, 172, 181, 206, 227–9, 237, 312, 376
- refugee-origin country (2011) 224t, 224
 - US-led invasion (2003–) 12, 127, 183, 204, 206–7
- Ireland 50, 66, 70, 79, 92, 104, 108, 113, 117–18, 124–5, 232, 235, 244, 246–7, 251, 265, 272b, 305
- migration to America (1850–1914) 90, 91
- irregular migrants 85, 145, 237, 251, 256, 272, 280, 285b, 308, 315
- irregular migration/immigration 5, 35, 112, 116, 123–4, 127–8, 134, 136, **143**, 187–90, 192, 202, **216–17**, 218, 220, 232–5, 238–9, 259, 263, 268b, 271, 286b, 310–12, 321
- and migration agents **155–6**
 - responses **323–6**
- Islam 1–2, 6, 42, 60, 127, 213, 273b, 279b, 293, 315, 355, 370

- Islamic dress 54, 59, 271, 291
see also textiles
- Islamic ‘threat’ **202–4, 204–6**
- Israel 153, 172–3, 177–8, **180–1**, 183, **190**, 197, 204, 209, 246, 299, 312, 314, 335
 ethnic voting blocs **305–6**
- Italians 93, 106, 108, 200, 282, 340
- Italy 2, 14, 15b, 37, 93, 95–7, 98b, 107b, 118, 129, 145, 179, 187, 192, 220, 226, 231, 235, 239, 242, 244, 258, 264, 266, 276t, 278t, 297, 299, 318
 anti-immigration parties **310–11**
 legal foreign residents (1999, 2009) 285t, 353–4
 migration transition 49, 112, **113–14**, 115
 minorities **285–6b**
ius sanguinis (law of blood) 287, 289–90
ius soli (law of soil) 287, 289–90
- Jamaica 128–30, 138
- Japan 3, 16, 47–8, 92, 131, 139–40, 147f, 149, 152–5, 159, 162, 170–1, 188, 227, 236, 255, 266, 274, 283, 290, 318, 325, 330
 acquisition of nationality (1988–2009) 288t, 289
 migration **156–7**
- Jewish diaspora 42, 207, 208
 influence **208–9**
- Jews 66, 97, 115, 116, 173, 182(map), 201, 286, 298, 305–6, 315
 emigration to UK **93–4**
 migration to USA from Eastern Europe 90–1
- jihad 349, 355, 367, 370
- Johannesburg 329, 357
- Jordan 14, 15b, 44, 153, 177–80, 183, 223, 224t
- Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 23, 54
- journals **23**, 171, 210
- kafala* system 179, **180b**, 370
- Kazakhstan 119, 250, 278b
- Kenya 14, 172, 175, 177, 185–7, 224t, 229
- Kepel, G. 205, 293, 355
- kin/kinship 31, 40, 41, 72
- King, Russell 125
- Kocharian, R. 208b
- Korea: Republic of Korea (South Korea) 3, 16, 47–9, 79, 111, 147, 147f, 152–4, 159, 162, 164, 167, 170–1, 236, 242, 255, 264, 266, 283, 288t, 290, 294, 297, 312, 318, 319, 344
 marriage migration 155, 157
 migration 156, **157**
- Korean War 44, 157, 247
- Kosovo 116, 201, 226, 228
- Kurds 66, 183, 191, 237
- Kuwait 153, 181, 200, 298, 312
- labour: types
 agricultural 34, 93, 114, 136b
 high-skilled 111, 112
 industrial 93, 95
 irregular 239, 241, 262, 370
 low-skilled 35, 52, 110, 113, 123–4
 manual 35, 109–11
 ‘special types’ **260–1**
 unfree **89**, 92
 unskilled 90, 109
- labour demand 28, 35, 124, 131, 134, 188, 192, 253, 319, 323, 325
 advanced economies **240–2**
- labour force 55, 171, 261, 262
 dynamics 51, 240, **253–6**, **319–20**
 migrants and minorities **240–63**
- ‘labour frontier’ 48, 103, 124
- labour market 19, 30, 33–6, 48, 80, 85, 95–6, 153, 234, 236, 246, 253–6, 257, 266, 277, 279b, 281
 segmentation 50, 111, 118, **259–60**, 262–3, 267b, 272, 320, 328, 371
see also migrants in labour market
- labour migrants 181, 182(map), 194, 204, 220, 279b
- labour migration xi, 14–16, 21, 27, 53, 70, 102–3, 118, 123–6, 128, 133, 157, 166, 178, 180, 184, 186, 262, 286b, 328
 decline and recovery (GEC era) **249–50**
 within Europe (pre-1945) **93–6**, 340
see also migrant labour
- labour migration within Asia **153–6**
 feminization **154–5**
 migration agents and irregular migration **155–6**
- labour mobility 232, 363, 371
see also mobility
- labour recruitment 31, 40–1, 53, 57, 99, 236
- labour rights 199, 255–6, 362
- labour shortages 55, 112–13, 130, 159, 160
- land 28, 39, 56, 72, 89, 100
- land ownership 32, 96, 211
- language 18–20, 23, 40, 57–9, 62, 66, 200, 205, 258, 264–5, 268, 270, 272, 274–5, 279b, 280, 282–3, 287, 289, 328, 330
see also linguistic and cultural rights
- Laos 151, 155, 159, 164, 276t
- Latin America 5, 10, 32, 34, 56, 103, 110–11, **113–14**, **126–7**, 129, 142, 166, 194, 198, 213, 221, 225–6, 252, 260, 262, 264, 267b, 268, 287, 312, 319, 347, 361
see also North America

- Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)
see also ECLAC
- Latinos (USA) 1, 4b, 260, 284, 307, 359
- Law of Return (Israel) 190, 305
- Lebanese 42, 191, 358
see also Syro-Lebanese
- Lebanon 15b, 153, 178–80, 183, 312
- legal status **63**, 245, 254, 258–60, 262, 272, 282, 320, 350
- legalizations 114, 117, 139, 216–17, **218–20**, 232, 238–9, 285b, 303, 310, 314, 342, 358, 368
- Le Pen, J.M. 309, 311, 360
- Le Pen, M. 2, 309
- liberalization 33, 34, 49, 133, 234
- Liberia 172, 177, 184, 185, 189
- Libya 2, 56, 77, 117, 172–3, 177–9, 184–7, 191, 193–4, 228–9, 299–300, 312, 324, 366
 Arab Spring (migration and revolution) **14–15b**, 343, 346
- lifestyle xi, 7, 43, 50, 79, 135, 138, 189, 240, 275
- linguistic and cultural rights **291–2**
see also culture
- livelihood 53, 60, 175, 212–13
- ‘livelihood approaches’ (to migration) **38**, 52–3
- living conditions 3, 19, 56, 75, 93
- living standards 7, 13, 111, 115, 258
- location **62–3**
- London 93, 94, 329, 371
 terrorism 204–6, 273b, 293
- Los Angeles (LA) 144, 247, 275, 284, 292, 329, 342
- Luso-American Development Foundation 125, 360
- Luxembourg 106, 232, 244, 248, 289, 304, 345
- Mabogunje, A.L. 43, 360
- macro-level **46**, 51, 52, 70
- Malaysia 49, 56, 111, 147f, 151, 158, 162, 170–1, 229, 242, 250–1, 255, 266, 274, 312, 318, 324
 dependence on migrant labour 154, 159
 irregular migrants 155, 159
 scapegoating of immigrants 3, 19
- Mali 15b, 109, 112, 173, 177, 186, 196
- Malta 15b, 117, 187, 192, 229
- manufacturing 35, 86, 111, 141, 157, 159–60, 167, 241, 242, 244, 248b, 255–6, 260–2, 319–20
see also industry
- ‘maquiladoras’ 33, 132–3
- marginalization 59, 111, 329
- marriage/s xi, 258
 bi-national 290–1
 ‘intermarriage’ 98, 205, 282
 marriage migration 61, **154–5**, 157, 160, 169–70, 236, 240, 320
- Martin, P.L. 49, 234, 239, **360–1**
- Massey, Douglas S. 39, 44, 49, 52, 53, 83, 146, 210, 341, 361, 374
- Mauritania 109, 186, 188, 191, 192
- Mecca 174, 179, 194
- media 4, 7, 29, 33, 46, 113, 115, 124, 167, 175, 188, 194, 198, 205, 212, 221, 228–9, 259, 302b
- medical practitioners 152, 153, 160
- men 107b, 109, 135, 157–8, 244
- Merkel, A. 232, 306
- meso level 26, 37, 39–40, 45, 46
- methodology 196, 210–11, 336, 356
- Mexicans (in USA) 1, 3, 31–2, 39, 44, 76, 90–1, 97, 126–9, 133–6, 136b, 141, 146, 200, 216, 221, 234–5, 249–50, 259, 271
 presidential election (Mexico, 2006) 299, **300b**
- Mexico 16, 21, 33, 47–8, 52, 68, 78, 131, 137, 152, 299, 307, 319, 320
 migration (1945–1970s) 128, **129–30**
 migration (since 1970s) **135–6**, 139
 remittance receipts 73, 74t, 144, 252
- micro level 37, 39, 70, 210
- Middle East 16, 65, 84, 134, 151, 164, 187, 221, 225, 284, 319, 327, 334
- Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 172, 178–80, 189, 191–4, 197, 199, 204–5, 249, 269b, 305, 312
 migration and security **207–9**
see also ‘migration in Africa and Middle East’
- migrant deaths 55, 134, 187, 268b
- migrant employment
 effects of GEC **247–9**
- migrant employment patterns **244–5**
- migrant entrepreneurs **246–7**
- migrant generation **244–5**
- migrant labour/migrant workers xi–xii, 3, 22, 42, 125, 131, 172, 236, 347, 358, 368
 contribution to expansion before
 GEC **243–4**
- GEC **247–53**
see also migrants
- migrant labour: types
 agricultural 135, 140
 less-skilled 185, 325
 low-skilled **35–6**, 127, 134, 139, 153–4, 156–7, 220, 238–9, 241–5, 253, 259, 271–2, 275, 279b, 308, 319, 320
- lower-skilled 116, 151, 160, 169, 240, 285b

- migrant labour: types – *continued*
 manual 152, 160
 seasonal 134, 136, 286b, 308
 temporary *see* temporary migration
 undocumented 53, 286n, 301, 368
 unskilled 157–9, 180, 192, 221, 255, 256,
 323–4
- migrant networks 26–7, 49, 51, 53, 250
see also networks
- migrant settlement 20–1, 55, 56–7
see also permanent settlement
- migrant stocks 3, 7–8, 9f, 144, 262, 380
 ‘little or no decline’ (GEC era) 251–2
- ‘migrant syndrome’ (Reichert) 72, 369
- migrant unemployment
 effects of GEC 247–9
see also unemployment
- migrants 56, 356, 364
 ‘bridgehead’ versus ‘gatekeeper’
 function 40, 46, 51, 337
 incorporation (becoming part of
 society) 264–70
- investments in country of origin 13, 78, 80;
see also remittances
- participation and representation (extra-
 parliamentary) 301–3
- put first 37–9
- share of world population 7, 8, 9f, 34
- trends 13–17
see also employment
- migrants: types
 high-skilled 35–6, 39, 118, 131, 193,
 238–9, 244, 253, 261, 269b, 320,
 324
 highly qualified 157, 161–3
 highly skilled 7, 12, 77, 116, 133, 135, 149,
 151, 154, 160–1, 169, 170, 185, 220,
 221, 242, 255–6, 272, 279b, 319, 322,
 325; *see also* brain drain
 illegal 2, 99, 290, 329, 342, 345, 373, 375;
see also ‘irregular migrants’
 professionals 160, 161–2
 skilled 125, 134, 138, 142, 152–3, 158, 167,
 240, 315, 323
see also migrant labour
- migrants in labour market 242–7
 contribution of migrant workers to expansion
 before GEC 243–4
 GEC 247–53
- migrant employment patterns: migrant
 generation 244–5
- migrant entrepreneurs 246–7
- second generation 245–6
see also segmented labour market
 theory
- migrants and minorities in labour force xi, 22,
 55, 61, 104, 118, 125, 141, 151, 192,
 240–63, 272, 279b, 319, 325, 326
- global labour market 253–6
- labour demand in advanced economies 240–2
- migrants in labour market 242–7
- new political economy 253–6
- transformation of work 256–60
- migration
 climate change 209–13
 complexity 20–1, 22, 25, 37, 52
 development impacts 75–7, 81, 83, 343
 environmental drivers 209–13
 in Europe since 1945 102–25
 future perspectives 318–20
 in global governance 17–18
 ‘intrinsic part of development processes’ 47,
 51, 81, 318
- irregular *see* irregular migration
- joint receiving and sending countries 44, 55,
 151, 160, 169
- legal (and integration) 326–8
- new destinations 45, 46
- perpetuation 37–9, 40, 56, 235
- political economic and social
 meaning 21–2, 198, 316
- political salience 1–3, 5, 6, 320
- political salience (Africa and Middle
 East) 189–93
- reform as condition for development 78–9,
 365
- revolution (Arab Spring) 14–15b
- ‘root causes’ 321–2, 323
- rural–urban 5, 6, 8, 26, 29, 30, 32, 34, 43,
 47–8, 89, 95, 100, 131, 148, 154, 177,
 195, 212, 323, 360, 373; *see also*
 urbanization
- selectivity 30, 34–5
- shifts 319–20
- trans-Saharan 186, 343, 371
see also voluntary migration
- migration: before 1945 xi, 5, 21, 51, 84–101,
 148, 265, 283, 297, 309
- colonialism 86–9
- forced labour in Nazi war economy 98b, 99
- industrialization and migration to North
 America and Oceania (pre-
 1914) 89–93
- interwar period 96–9
- labour migration within Europe 93–6
- migration: transformation of societies xi, xii,
 21, 32, 55–83, 110–11, 144–5, 149, 161,
 169–70, 193–5, 225, 252, 255, 257,
 265–6, 274, 284, 287, 294, 297–8,
 318–19, 321

- 'central arguments' **81–2**
 citizenship **66–8**, 81
 culture, identity, community **63–4**, 81
 ethnic minorities: formation **55**, 56, **57–9**,
 81, 99–100
 ethnicity **58–9**
 gender and migration **61–3**
 life-cycle, location, legal status **62–3**
 origin societies: transformation **26**, **69–80**,
 81
 race and racism **59–61**
 receiving societies: from migration to
 settlement **56–7**, 81, 82
 receiving societies: transformation **26**,
 56–7, 81
 social differentiation ('other forms') **62–3**
 state and nation **64–6**, 81
 migration: twenty-first century **22**, **317–31**
 ethnic diversity, social change, nation-
 state **328–31**
 future perspectives for global
 migration **318–20**
 international cooperation and governance
 (improvement) **320–3**
 irregular migration (responses) **323–6**
 legal migration and integration **326–8**
 migration in Africa and Middle East xi, xii,
 21, 51, 57, 79, 102, 116, 148, 153,
 172–97, 247, 250, 312, 317, 319, 326,
 327
 feminization of migration 179, 180, 181
 forced migration in Middle East **181–3**
 historical and colonial roots of contemporary
 migrations **174–5**, 195
 intercontinental migration to Europe and Gulf
 states **178–81**
 intra-African migrations (1989–) **184–7**,
 194, 196
kafala system 179, **180b**, 370
 new African migrations (to Europe,
 China) **187–9**, 194, 195, 342, 349,
 371
 political salience of migration **189–93**
 postcolonial migration within Africa **175–8**
 migration agents 235–6
 and irregular migration **155–6**
 migration in Americas xi, xii, 21, 51, 56, 79,
 102, 110, 124, **126–46**, 238, 247, 250,
 317, 319, 326
 conclusions **144–6**
 'five sub-regions' **127–8**
 migration from 1945 to 1970s **128–31**
 migration since 1970s **131–40**
 regional trends and policy
 developments **141–4**
- migration in Asia-Pacific region (xi, xii, 21, 51,
 57, 61, 79, 102, 110, 139, **147–71**, 172,
 179, 180, 247, 312, 317, 319, 326, 327
 Asian migration to Western Europe, North
 America, Oceania **151–3**
 complexity 148, 151, 155, 160, 164, 166
 countries of emigration **159–61**
 development of Asian migration **148–51**
 diaspora policies **162–3**
 East Asia **156–8**
 highly-qualified migrants and
 students **161–3**
 labour migration within Asia **153–6**
 Oceania **166–8**
 perspectives **169–71**
 refugees **163–5**
 South-East Asia **158–9**
 migration costs 35, 187, 188
 migration and development 21, 83, 339, 343,
 372
 migration and development debate **69–74**
 see also national development
 migration drivers 6–7, 25, 26, **31**, 35, 39, **50**,
 51, 53, 252
 migration in Europe: economic-restructuring
 period (1974–95) **111–16**
 migration in Central and Eastern
 Europe **115–16**
 persistence and diversification of migration to
 Western Europe **112–13**
 Southern European migration
 transitions **113–15**
 migration in Europe: post-war boom
 (1945–73) **104–11**
 colonial workers **108–10**
 comparative perspectives **110–11**
 foreign workers and 'guest-worker'
 systems **104–8**
 migration in Europe: trends (C21) **116–23**
 Europe's changing population **119–23**
 GEC (2008–): migratory
 consequences **118–19**, 125
 migration in Europe since 1945 (xi, xii, 21, 51,
 56, 79, **102–25**, 173, 179, 188, 189, 219,
 226, 232, 241, 242, 247, 250, 272b, 304,
 317, 319, 326
 economic-restructuring period
 (1974–95) **111–16**, 123–4
 phases **102–3**
 post-war boom (1945–73) **104–11**, 123
 trends (C21) **116–23**, 125
 'migration industry' 26, 41, 45t, 155, **235–6**,
 238, 317
 Migration Information Source 23, 125, 295,
 362

- migration network theory **39–41**, 53, 357
 migration networks 7, 45, 52, 149, 192, 347,
 350
 migration optimists **70–1**, 74–5, 78
 see also ‘remittance euphoria’
 migration outlook **370–1**
 migration pessimists **71–2**, 74–5
 migration politics 125, 348, 351
 migration processes
 ‘intrinsic part of broader processes’ **26**, 53
 see also migratory process
 migration, security, climate change xi, 21–2,
 29, 38, 113, 133, **198–214**, 223, 270
 Armenian diaspora and conflict over
 Nagorno-Karabakh **207**, **208b**
 environment, climate change, and
 migration **209–13**
 key dimensions **199–201**
 MENA: migration and security **207–9**
 ‘non-problem’ to ‘obsession’ (1945–
 2012) **201–7**
 OECD area: migration and security
 (1945–2012) **201–7**
 simplistic approaches rejected 209, 210,
 211
 migration statistics **xvii–xviii**, 104, 120–1n,
 264
 see also statistics
 migration systems breakdown **45–6**
 migration systems theory **43–4**, 53–4, 124,
 195, 360
 migration theories xi, xii, 21, **25–54**, 55,
 56, 70, 75, 99, 103, 124, 145, 149,
 155, 161, 169, 187, 194–5, 207, 209,
 221, 234, 235, 250, 253, 255, 259, 275,
 318–19
 agency, identity, and perpetuation of
 migration **37–9**
 conclusion **51–3**
 cumulative causation **44–5**
 functionalist theories 27, **28–31**, 46
 historical-structural theories 27, **31–7**, 46,
 69, 71
 migration network theory **39–41**
 migration system breakdown **45–6**
 migration systems theory **43–4**
 migration transition theories **46–51**
 new economics and household
 approaches **38–9**
 push–pull models and neoclassical
 theory **28–31**, 32
 putting migrants first **37–9**
 structure, capabilities, aspirations,
 migration **50–1**
 transnational and diaspora theories **41–3**, 68
 see also identity
 migration transition/s 47, 48f, 123, 170, 194,
 219, 239, 319, 323, 343, 352
 Italy **285–6b**
 reversal 49–50, 125
 migration transition theory **46–51**, 53, 124,
 151, 194
 migration trends **16–17**
 growing politicization of migration **16–17**
 migratory process 21, 264, 271–2, 317–18
 explanations **27–8**
 self-perpetuating 37, 39, 45
 see also migration processes
 military regimes 126, 127, 131, 139
 Miller, M.J. xi–xiii, 125, 239, 316, 360, 368
 publications 360, **362–3**, 368
 mines/mining 14, 31, 85, 88, 94–5, 97–8, 110,
 126, 167, 174, 177, 185
 mobile telephones 41, 187, 371
 modernization 6, 63, 70–1, 84
 Mohamed Merah 2
 Moldova 74t, 117, 285t
 Moroccans 31, 46, 114, 205, 235, 309
 Morocco 14, 16, 47–9, 52, 70, 75–8, 106,
 107b, 109, 112, 176, 178–9, 189, 191,
 196, 276t, 285t, 291, 308, 312, 336,
 342–3, 351
 mortality 37, 47, 86
 Moussaoui, Z. 203b
 Mozambique 160, 175, 177, 184, 185, 194, 250
 multiculturalism **18–20**, 57, 156–7, 167, 170,
 193, 269b, **270**, 279b, 281, 286b, 292
 backlash **67**, **293–4**
 multinational corporations 32–5, 41, 126, 133,
 162
 multipolar world **320**, 321
 Muslims 60, 97, 149, 189–90, 199–200, 213–14,
 283–4, 286–7, 302b, 308, 349, 354, 357
 Nagorno-Karabakh **207**, **208b**
 nation 61–2, **64–6**, 83, 100, 165, 333, 372
 nation-building 20, 60, 84, 92, 169, 269b, 315,
 363
 nation-state/s 5, 20, 33, 35, 42, **64–5**, 68, 81,
 102, 156, 170, 172, 190, 238, 254, 265,
 287, 290, **312–13**, **328–31**, 338, 351, 354
 consolidation attempts **65–6**
 national development 82, 192–3, 343, 374
 reform as condition for migration and
 78–9
 see also development
 national identity 7, 19, **20**, 41, 57, 63, 64, 86,
 155, 167–8, 170, 190, 195, 200, 265–6,
 270, 289, 291, 294, 319, 329–30, 332,
 352, 372
 see also identity

- national myths 20, 84–5, 289, 330
 national preference policies **190–1**
 national security 6, 16–17, 60, 158, 167, 204,
 217, 269b, 270, 308, 332
 national values 270, 289, 328
 see also values
 nationalism 6, 60, 65–6, 83, 297, **328**, 331,
 334, 349, 360, 375
 nationality xvii, 222, 335
 acquisition by immigrants **287–9**
 NATO 206–7, 300
 natural disasters 10, 51, 137, 148, 164, 212
 naturalization **xvii**, 20, 67–8, 108n, 184, 270,
 287, 296, 301, 303, 305–7, 315, 327–8,
 344
 Nauru 168, 228, 269b
 neo-classical theory **28–31**, 35, 37, 38, 50, 52,
 54, 56, 69, 70, 85, 99–100, 169
 critique **30–1**
 micro- versus macro-level **29–30**
 neo-liberalism 19, 34, 36, 60, 74, 79, 80, 82,
 103, 111, 123, 126–7, 133, 145, 234, 247,
 253–6, 258–9, 261, 294, 319–20, 367
 neo-Marxism 27–8, 52
 see also historical-structural theories
 Nepal 74t, 147, 147f, 151, 160, 164, 369
 Netanyahu, B. 306, 312
 Netherlands 31, 56, 64, 86, 112, 125, 128–30,
 151, 168, 179, 220, 224, 232, 244, 264,
 266, 270–1, 274, 277, 278t, 280–2, 284,
 290, 294, 301, 308, 311, 327
 acquisition of nationality (1988–2009) 288t,
 289
 colonial workers **109–10**
 networks 51, 338, 352
 see also migrant networks
 new economics of labour migration
 (NELM) **38**, 52–3, 75, 83, 169, 374
 New Orleans 47, 299
 making global labour market **253–6**
 New York City 97, 260, 299, 315, 329, 371,
 378
 terrorist attack (1993) 202, 204
 New Zealand xvii, 5, 10, 14, 16, 147f, 169,
 222, 227, 266, 290, 326
 immigration **92–3**
 see also Oceania
 Nicaragua 130, 136, 137, 143
 ‘ni-nis’ (*ni escuela, ni trabajo*) **136b**, 249
 niches 44–5, 258, 371
 Niger 15b, 177, 178, 186, 189
 Nigeria 8, 14, 56, 74t, 112, 172, 174, 177–8,
 185, 189, 194, 196, 312, 324, 343
 Nigerians 76, 175, 188
 Noiriell, G. 84, 95, 96, 101, 365
 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 170–
 1, 210, 225, 281
 North Africa 43, 66, 96, 103, 113–14, 266,
 283, 308, 319, 343
 ‘Maghreb’ 42, 175, 343
 see also ‘Middle East and North Africa’
 North Africans 2, 98, 275b, 282, 301b
 North America 5, 35, 44, 48, 65, 88, 100, 113,
 126, 131, 156–7, 160–2, 173, 175,
 187–8, 194, 201–2, 204–5, 224, 226,
 264, 283, 295–6, 305, 312, 326–7
 Asian migration **151–3**
 industrialization and migration (pre-
 1914) **89–93**
 see also South America
 North American Free Trade Agreement
 (NAFTA) 22, 49, 132, 136b, 230,
 233–5, 360, 363
 Norway 1–2, 6, 113, 117, 120–1t, 228–9, 246,
 325
 nurses 77, 153, 244, 261
 oases 75–6, 186, 342
 Obama, B.H., Jr 1, 4b, 207, 217, 219, 307, 315
 Oceania 10, 21, 85–6, 100, 102, 148, 156,
 161–2, 264, 269b, 276t, 327
 Asian migration **151–3**
 industrialization and migration (pre-
 1914) **89–93**
 OECD xvii–xviii, 17, 23, 146, 152, 244, 256,
 263, 268n, 278–9n, 286n, 295, **365–6**,
 371
 OECD area/OECD countries 115–18,
 119–23, 133, 198, 224, 243, 257, 313,
 321
 GEC: effect on migrant
 employment **247–9**
 see also advanced economies
 OECD area: migration and security
 (1945–2012) **201–7**
 construction of Islamic ‘threat’ **202–4**
 threat posed by Islamic radicals in West
 (assessment) **204–6**
 ‘War on Terrorism’ **206–7**
 oil 131, 139, 172, 178, 180b, 181, 249
 Oil Crisis (1973) 21, 71, 103, 107b, 118, 153,
 179, 250–1
 open borders xii, 52, 254
 oppression/repression 26, 28, 52, 85, 89, 112,
 172, 181, 184, 195
 see also persecution
 origin countries/societies 5, 28, 32, 43, 45t,
 55, 64, 67, 100, 123, 147, 152, 159, 207,
 318, 355
 and expatriates **297–300**

- origin societies: transformation **69–80**, 81
 development impacts of migration **75–7**,
 343
 migration and development debate **69–74**
 policy considerations **79–80**
 reform as condition for migration and
 development **78–9**, 365
- Osama Bin Laden 206
 ‘other-definition’ versus ‘self-definition’ **58**,
 274
- Ottoman Empire 67, 189–90
- Our Lady of Guadeloupe 303
- outsourcing 34, 35, 241, 319
- Pakistan 14, 44, 108–9, 116, 147f, 149, 151–3,
 165b, 252, 272b
- Palestinian Territories (Gaza/West Bank) 178,
 180, 183, 306
- Palestinians 172, 179, **180–1**, **183**, 191, 200,
 204, 223, 306, 312
 refugees/migrants 10, 194, 224
- Papua New Guinea 168, 228, 269b
- Paraguay/Paraguayans 128, 131, 140, 142,
 227
- Paris 203b, 208b, 299, 301b, 329, 370
- passports 100, 106, 235
- patriarchy 61, 62, 154
- peasantry 32, 38, 64, 65
 ‘immobile peasant’ myth 36–7, 84, 378
- perception 31, 37, 46, 60, 66, 157, **199–200**,
 201, 203b, 204–6, 273b, 324
- Perez Jiménez, M. 131
- permanent settlement 16, 19, **56–7**, 68–9, 80,
 82, 95, 99–100, 106–8, 112, 149, 151,
 156, 158, 161, 167, 169–70, 175, 193–5,
 219, 242, 250–1, 266, 269b, 270, 279b,
 281, 285b, 292–3, 315, 318–19, 326–7,
 356
see also temporary migration
- persecution 10, 35, 57, 127, 190, 211, 226,
 240
see also exploitation
- Peru 88, 128, 139, 140
- phenotype 57–9, 283
- Philippines 47, 49, 78, 129, 134, 147–8,
 152–5, 157–9, 168, 171, 181, 249, 285t,
 298, 334
- physical appearance 18, 57, 58, 264
- plantations 14, 88, 159, 174, 177
- pluralism 19, 67, 328, 335
- Poland 16, 93, 97, 98b, 103, 112, 116, 226,
 272–3b, 278t, 285t, 368
- Poles 115, 117, 251
- police/policing 15b, 63, 99, 159, 180b, 273b,
 301–2b, 325, 370
- policy considerations
 transformation of origin societies **79–80**
- policy initiatives **142–3**
- policy-makers/policy-making 56–7, 76, 82,
 125
- political economy 26–8, 32, 54, 100, 146, 263,
 314, 335, 341, 347, 362, 367, 371
- political parties 299
 anti-immigration 6, **307–12**
 extreme right 1, 17, 19, 60, 201, 311
 left-wing 33, 52, 287, 306, 307–8
 radical right 308–9
 right-wing 221, 285b, 305, 308, 310, 311,
 315
- political reform 49, 195–6
- political rights 68, 110, 327
- politics 4, 22, 26, 28, 51, 78, 125, 137, 172,
 222, 351, 358
 immigration policy-making **312–14**
- population growth 6, 28–9, 47, 55, 111, 127,
 174, 196
- Portes, A. **41**, 46, 54, 55, 101, 146, 246, 255,
 263, 268n, 281–2, 350, **368–9**
- Portugal 86, 95–6, 107b, 108, 126, 129, 145,
 152, 227, 232–3, 235, 276t, 299, 313
 migration dynamics **113**, **114–15**
- post-Cold War era 123, 125, 142, 184, 213,
 220, 224–5, 230, 266, 297
- post-colonial era 32, 59–60, 89, 111, 149,
 194–5, 335
 migration within Africa **175–8**
see also decolonization
- post-industrial economies/societies 241, 255,
 283, 328
- post-war era (1945–) 5, 14, 16, 21, 34, 56, 69,
 84–5, 93, 100, 126, 166, 172, 198–9,
 225, 243, 261, 264, 266, 271, 278b,
 285b, 297, 309, 318–19, 321
- migration in Americas **128–31**
- migration in Europe **102–25**
- OECD area: migration and security **201–7**
- poverty 7, 29, 31–2, 39, 52, 78, 85, 94,
 110–11, 133, 136b, 188, 194, 199,
 224–5, 234, 255, 262, 294, 322–3, 344,
 347
see also relative deprivation
- poverty alleviation 75, 80, 192, 253
- poverty escape 5, 89, 100
- power 31, 86
 economic and political 28, 32, 59, 85
- precarious work **259–60**
- Prodi, R. 286b
- production 34, 149, 253
- productivity 29, 39, 49, 70, 254
- professionals 19, 77, 94, 153, 168, 253, 258

- 'protracted refugee situations' (UNHCR) 184, **229–30**
 psychology 40, 51, 198, 199, 282, 330
 public opinion 170, 205, 206, 324
 public order 35, 62, 89, 226
 push-pull models **28–31**, 50, 56, 209
- Quebec 306, 311
 quotas 129, 133, 158–9, 192, 277, 326
- race xvii, 1, 2, 4b, 36, 57–8, **59–61**, 83, 222, 254, 258–60, 262, 272, 293, 301b, 320
 race relations approach **273b**, 280
 racialization **60**, 124, 255, 284, 294
 racism **18–20**, 36–7, 55, **58**, **59–61**, 62, 80, 86, 90, 92–4, 185, 188, 204, 226, 253, 261, 269b, 273b, 274, 292, 294, 310, 316, 329–31
 and minorities **282–4**
 racist attacks/violence 1–2, 15b, 199, 279b, 282, 312, 315, 334
see also violence
 railways 31, 88, 90–1, 93, 130
 Ravenstein, E.G. 28, 369
 Reagan, R.W. 33, 216, 255
 receiving countries/destination countries 28, 45t, 55, 64, 123, 173, 297
 from migration to settlement **56–7**
 transformation **56–7**
 'receiving-country bias' 26, 55
 recruitment *see* labour recruitment
 reform
 as condition for migration and development **78–9**, 365
 refugee movement 7, 16, 54
 refugees 14, 26, 46, 57, 61, 97, 104, 106, 112, 115, 130, 133–4, 136, 149, 151, 159, 166–7, 169, 172, 175, **176–7**, **183**, 184–6, 191, 193–5, 205, 208b, 236–8, 271–2, 312, 324–7
 Asia-Pacific region **163–5**
see also slaves
 refugees and asylum **221–30**
 forced migration (definitions) **221–3**
 forced migration (global trends) **223–4**
 global politics **224–7**
 protracted refugee situations **229–30**
 Western countries **227–9**
 regional integration **230–5**, 363
 EU's governance structure **230–1**
 freedom of movement within European Communities and EU **231–3**
 NAFTA **233–5**
 relative deprivation 29, **38**, 44, 45t, 53
 religion 4, 28, 46, 57–9, 63, 165, 222, 265, 270, 283, 291, 305
 remittances 13, 15b, 38, 41, 44, 45t, 51–2, 69, **70**, 75, 80–2, 137–8, 141, 160, 162, 169, 175, 192–3, 232, 240, 251, 297–8, 323
 and development **143–4**, 379
 development pessimists **71–2**, 370
 'irrational' expenditure 76, 79
 Republican Party (USA) 1, 4b, 307
 residence permits 3, 107b, **133–4**
 residential segregation 267b, 268, **274–5**, **277**, 294
 resistance 62–4, 329, 377
 restaurants 154, 180, 242, 244, 246
 retirement xi, 7, 240, 320
 return migration 29, 71, 72, 85, 100, 104, 118–19, 127, 138, 153, 160, 162, 164–5, 190, 193, 247, 249, 298, 309, 323, 343
 GEC era **250–1**
 revolution/s 70, 343
 migration (Arab Spring) **14–15b**
 rhetoric 117, 281, 325, 328
 riots/rioting 63, 273b, 276b, 294, 303–4, 329
 Robinson [initial/n/a] 308
 Roma 66, 116, 226, 276b, 283, 286b, 286, 311
 Romania 103, 112, 115–16, 119, 181, 226–9, 278b, 285t
 Romney, M. 1, 4b, 307
 Roy, O. 205, 370
 rule of law 64, 170, 220
 rural areas 6, 72, 136b, 154, 160, 283, 373
 Russia (Tsarist) 93, 94, 96
 Russian Federation 49, 56, 115–17, 119, 188, 200, 250, 278t
 Rwanda/Rwandans 175, 177
 Sadat, M.A. al- 71, 191
 Saddam Hussein 183
 'safety valves' (political) 78, 110, 136b, 161, 192, 298
 Salinas, C. 234
 Sarkozy, N. 2
 Minister of Interior 219, 302b, 309
 President 276b, 302b, 309
 Sauckel, F. 98b
 Saudi Arabia 179, 200, 202, 204, 312, 318, 375
 Scandinavia 118, 222, 227, 311
 Schengen Agreement (signed 1985, enforced 1995) 3, 17, 103, 113, 124, 202, 226, 231–4
 Scotland 66, 93, 265
 second generation xvii, 94, 112, 139, 240, **245–6**, 261–2, 278b, 281–2, **289–90**, 291, 307, 315–16, 345, 368

- securitization of migration (C21), 133, 134, **198**, 201, 213, 337
 security 231, 260
 key dimensions **199–201**
 see also national security
 ‘segmented assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou) 281, 368
 segmented labour market theory **35–6**, **50**, 53, 124, 194–5
 segregation 18, 109, 277
 self-employment 246, 247, 320
 ‘self-help’ 74, 80, 82
 Sen, A. 50, 69–70, 372
 sending societies *see* origin countries
 Senegal 109, 112, 173, 175, 177, 188–9, 192, 358
 Serbia 201, 278t, 285t
 services sector/services 3, 33, 35–6, 53, 61, 103, 111, 133, 141, 160, 167, 192, 244, 248b, 252, 256–7, 260–1, 285b, 320
 settler societies 66, 85, 265–6
 sexual exploitation 85, 88, 237
 Shanghai 34, 148, 168, 212
 Sharansky, N. 306
 Sierra Leone 172, 177, 184–5, 191, 377
 Singapore 56, 111, 147f, 151, 159, 162, 168, 251, 258, 312, 325
 dependence on migrant labour 154, 158
 Single European Act (SEA, 1986) 231, 232, 234
 Sjaastad, A.H. 30, 372
 Skeldon, R. xii, 28, 37, 46, **47–8**, 53, 124, 171, 356, **372**
 skills 30, 32, 35, 141, 146, 167, 281
 skin colour 59, 60, 271
 see also phenotype
 slavery 84–5, **86–7**, 90, 92, 98b, 101, 128, 174, 336, 347, 371
 slaves 37, 66, 88, 89, 99, 126–8, 267b
 see also asylum-seekers
 slums 127, 211–12, 329, 342
 small business 142, 272, 275, 341
 social capital 25, 35, 43, 368
 definition (Bourdieu) **40**, 337
 drawbacks (Portes) **46**, 368
 social change **328–31**, 336, 339, 368
 social cohesion xii, 4, 269b, 270, 273b, 280, 293, 328
 social differentiation
 ‘other forms’ **62–3**
 social exclusion 37, 39, 58–60, 62–3, 255, 268, 271, 273b, 274, 275b, 281–4, 294
 social mobility 75–6, 90, 94, 261, 272, 273b, 277, 280, 292, 301b
 see also capital mobility
 social networks 51, 57, 235, 274, 317, 347
 social policy 167, **277–82**
 ‘social remittances’ (Levitt) 43, 79, 358
 social sciences 26, 27, 161, 213, 259, 314
 social security 39, 53, 68
 social services 19, 138, 243, 248b
 social structure 7, 40, 149, 361
 social transformation 26, **34**, 43, 47, 53–4, 60, 145, 165, 169, 172, 240, 255, 318–19
 social welfare 35, 325–6
 sociology/sociologists 38, 59, 314, 340
 Somalia 77, 172, 175, 177, 179, 184, 189, 224t
 Somalis 46, 177, 229
 South Africa 5, 14, 55, 168, 172, 175, 177, 189, 194, 229, 250, 312, 320, 324–5, 357
 South America 5, 49–50, 88, 113, 126, 305
 see also United States
 South Asia 3, 96, 102, 134, 148, 164, 179–80, 249
 ‘labour reserve area’ for Asia 159–60
 South Asians 149, 256, 298
 South Pacific 44, 92, 96
 South Sudan (2011–) 172, 184, 312
 South-East Asia 3, 17, 42, 57, 89, 148, 153–4, 170, 179, 249, 283, 327, 353
 Chinese migration 148–9
 migration patterns **158–9**
 Southern Africa 48, 85, 174
 Southern Cone 44, **128**
 migration (1945–1970s) 128, **131**
 Spain 2, 14, 16, 66, 77, 79, 86, 95–6, 98b, 107b, 126, 128, 131, 137–9, 145, 179, 187, 192, 227, 232–3, 235, 239, 242, 247, 249–50, 266, 276t, 288t, 290, 318, 323, 368
 effect of GEC **118–19**
 Madrid attacks (2004) 6, 204–6, 293
 migration transition 49, 112–13, **114**, 115
 Sri Lanka 77, 147f, 151, 153, 158, 160–1, 163–4, 167, 228
 Stark, O. 38, 83, **373**
 state 26, 48, 59, **64–6**, 100, 165, 174, 180b, 207, 264–5, 269b, 279
 state: types
 authoritarian 33, 78, 173, 300, 318
 democratic versus non-democratic 298, 299
 sovereign xii, 5, 201, 220, 254, 313
 state and migration xi, 10, 22, 41, 53, 68, 113, 124, 155, 163, 184, **215–39**, 271, 285b, 298, 304, 317, 326
 employer sanctions **215–17**
 human smuggling and trafficking **236–8**
 legalization programmes **218–20**
 ‘migration industry’ **235–6**

- quest for control (credible versus quixotic) **238–9**
- refugees and asylum **221–30**
- regional integration **230–5**
- temporary foreign-worker admission programmes **220–1**
- state of residence *see* receiving countries
- statistics 144, 258, 295, 353, 372, 376
see also migration statistics
- status 18, 42, 59, 75–6, 154, 241, 244, 247, 261, 274, 275b
- socio-economic 38, 282, 283
- structural adjustment programmes 34, 126, 187
- structuralism *see* historical-structural theories
- students 71, 112, 118, 125, **161–3**, 167–9, 188, 200, 221, 269b, 277, 286, 315
- sub-contracting 22, **256**, 259, 262, 320
- sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 48, 77, 172–4, 178, 179, 184–7, 191, 193–4, 196, 250, 266, 269b, 283, 312, 332, 341
- Sudan 44, 160, 172, 175–7, 179, 186, 189, 224t, 376, 312
- Sudanese 177, 183, 184
- suffrage 67, 68, 108, 233, 273b
- sugar 86, 88, 89, 96, 126
- suicide bombings 202, 203b
- Suriname 110, 128, 271, 305
- Sweden 19, 106, 117, 125, 139, 183, 224, 228–9, 232, 244, 264, 270, 274, 280, 284, 294, 327, 347
- acquisition of nationality (1988–2009) 288t, 289
- Switzerland 93, 95, 113, 117, 120–1t, 125, 220, 229, 244, 246–7, 256, 266, 270–1, 274, 277, 281, 285b, 290, 293, 309, 362
- acquisition of nationality (1988–2009) 288t, 289
- Syria 117, 172–3, 177–9, 183, 202, 223
- Arab Spring (migration and revolution) **14–15b**
- Syrians 180, 191, 312
- Syro-Lebanese 174, 189, 200
- Taiwan 49, 79, 111, 151, 154, 159–60, 162, 170, 236, 255, 312
- migration 156, **158**
- Tajikistan 74t, 119, 164, 250
- Taliban 165b, 202, 206–7, 226
- Tanzania 177, 184, 376
- taxation 35, 53, 301
- technology 33, 47, 62
- temporary foreign-worker (TFW) 368
- admission programmes **220–1**
- temporary migration/temporary migrants 80, 110, 112, 116, 118, 129–30, 134–5, 149, **156**, 167–9, 174, 201, 265, 269b, 271, 279b, 292, 312, 323, 326, 379
- ‘almost always leads to permanent settlement’ 19, 71, 195; *see also* permanent settlement
- see also* ‘employment/temporary’
- terms of trade 31, 32, 49
- Ter-Petrossian, L. 208b
- terrorism 2, 21–2, 201, 204, 213, 226, 232, 276b, 293, 354
- Thailand 56, 111, 147f, 151–3, 157–8, 164, 170, 181, 229
- Thatcher, M.H. 33, 255, 311
- third generation xvii, 94, 112, 139, 278b, 290
- third-country nationals 233, 304–5
- Tibet/Tibetans 160, 164
- Todaro, M.P. 30, 351, 375
- Tokyo 212, 329, 371
- Toronto 134, 260, 329, 350
- Torres Strait Islanders 166, 269b
- tourism 7, 8, 34, 44, 48, 162, 241, 256, 320
- trade 33, 34, 44, 55, 149, 191, 195, 253, 320, 323, 371
- trade reform/liberalization 49, 234, 322
- trade unions 3, 33, 36, 52, 61, 97, 129, 159, 218, 243, 255, 261, 281, 287, 308, 325
- ‘labour movement’ 60, 93, 99, 260
- trafficking **142**, 199, 360
- training/vocational training 36, 68, 80, 156, 160, 162, 233, 261, 274, 283
- transit migration 112, 115, 116, 125, 127, 136–7, 151, 169, 173, 197, 186–7, 191–2, 194, 296, 299, 341, 345, 352
- transnational communities **41**, 54, 170
- transnationalism 5–6, 17, 22, **41–3**, 45t, 45, 51, 75, 80–2, 196, 207, 214, 238, 307, 330–1
- ‘from above’ versus ‘from below’ (Portes *et al.*) **41–2**
- see also* dual citizenship
- transport/transportation 7, 8, 91, 95, 158, 260
- transport and communication xi, 5, 25, 34, 41, 50, 169, 170
- Treaty on European Union (TEU, 1992) 231, 233, **304–5**
- ‘Maastricht Treaty’ 68, 231
- Tunisia 14–15b, 70, 77–8, 107b, 109, 112, 178–9, 189, 204, 276t, 285t, 308
- Tunisians 3, 191, 276b
- Turkey 14, 15b, 16, 22, 48–9, 56, 66, 68, 70, 76, 79, 106, 107b, 111–12, 115, 119, 148, 172, 178, 183, 188, 190–1, 196–7, 202, 208b, 228, 233, 237, 276t, 278t, 299, 318, 320

- Turks 31, 42, 115, 204, 279b, 281–2, 284, 301b, 311
- Uganda/Ugandans 175, 177, 186, 191
- Ukraine 103, 112, 116–17, 119, 226, 228, 285t
- Ukrainians 94, 114, 115
- under-development 136b, 145–6, 199, 225
- unemployment 30, 36, 48–9, 70, 78, 110, 118, 124, 135, 141, 145, 160, 170, 173, 187–8, 195–6, 205, 244–6, **247–9**, 255–7, 261–2, 273b, 275–6b, 277, 279b, 281, 298, 329, 334, 351, 375
- see also* migrant unemployment
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR/
Soviet Union) 67, 115, 152, 181, 190, 278b
- collapse 103, 113, 116, 123, 164, 200, 208b, 226
- United Arab Emirates 3, 153, 161, 179–80, 183
- United Kingdom 44, 47, 56, 63, 64, 66–7, 76, 86, 95, 101, 104, 112–13, 117–19, 125, 128, 130, 135, 151–2, 166, 168, 175, 183, 191, 205, 228–9, 232, 236, 243–6, 251, 259, 264–6, 269b, 270–4, 276t, 280, 287, 290, 305–6, 308–9, 311, 315, 322
- acquisition of nationality (1988–2009) 288t, 289
- colonial workers **108–9**, 110
- minorities **272–3b**
- United Nations 68, 176, 185
- UN Convention on Rights of Migrant Workers (1990) 17, 142, 321
- UN Convention relating to Status of Refugees (1951) 142, 193, 222, 225, 226, 313–14, 376
- UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 7, 10, 12, 319, 375–6
- UN Development Programme (UNDP) 8, 74, 199, 83, 354, 376
- UN General Assembly 17, 18, 236, 321
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 12n, 12, 15b, 18, 24, 163, 165b, 175, 183–4, 193, 222–5, 227–9, **376**
- UNRWA 12n, 183, 224
- United States xvii, 14, 16, 18–19, 21–2, 48, 52, 56, 60, 76, 79, 82, 85–6, 93, 99–100, 119, 127, 130–1, 149, 157, 160–2, 165b, 168, 172, 183, 187, 200, 206, 222, 241–6, 252, 258, 263–4, 269b, 270–1, 278b, 280, 282–3, 285b, 287, 290, 295, 300, 311–14, 321–2, 324, 326–7
- acquisition of nationality (1988–2009) 288t, 289
- employer sanctions **215, 216–17**
- ethnic voting blocs **306–7**
- immigration history 101, 334, 359, 368
- immigration reform 1, 219, 239, 250, 268b, 364, 375
- irregular migrants **134, 135–6**
- legalization programmes **218–19**
- migration (1945–1970s) 128, **129**
- migration (since 1970s) **133–5, 136b**, 136–40
- minorities **267–8b**
- refugee admissions 224t, 226, **227**
- see also* Americas
- US Congress 3, 4b, 96–7, 219, 303
- US presidential elections
(2000) 299, 307
(2008) 219, 307
(2012) 1, 4b, 307, 315, 329, 338, 359, 374
- US regions
- Mexican border 124, 268b, 312
- Midwest 91, 97
- South 88, 97
- US Supreme Court 4b, 90
- urbanization 6, 32, 111, 127, 148, 162, 175, 177, 195
- see also* ‘migration/rural–urban’
- Uruguay 128, 131, 139, 142, 227
- Utøya massacre (2011) 1–2, 6
- values 58, 79, 162, 269b, 270, 273b, 280, 283, 289, 293, 308, 328
- van Gogh, T. 293
- Van, Hear, Nicholas 54, 222, 322, 339
- Venezuela 55, 127, 128, 131, 138–9, 142, 145, 299
- Vietnam 147–8, 151–2, 154–5, 157, 162, 165b, 276b
- refugees 164, 224t
- violence 6, 55, 57, 94, 100, 109, 112, 130, 136b, 137–8, 148–9, 159, 165, 169, 172, 175, 181, 185–6, 194, 199, 206, 222, 225–6, 277, 302b, 308, 327, 329, 352
- see also* racist attacks
- violent conflict xi, 51, 200–1
- visa overstaying 114, 124, 155, 188, 194, 219, 324
- visas 2, 3, 15b, 35, 110, 116, 134, 157–8, 167, 220, 226, 231, 238
- Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Bloc) **309–10**
- vocational training *see* training
- voluntary migration 26, 31, 50, 84, 85, **221**
- see also* forced migration

- voting rights 191, 296, **303–5**
wage labour 89, 90, 94
wage levels 31, 52, 93, 262
wages 3, 47, 56, 61, 92, 95–7, 129, 141, 154, 158, 180b, 181, 241, 243–4, 247, 252, 255, 258
 differentials 29, 30, **38**
Wales 66, 265
war/warfare 32, 40, 70, 149, 174, 240
'War on Terrorism' (2001–) 60, 202, **206–7**, 224
Weber, M. 59, 379
welfare 113, 252, 268b, 281
welfare state 33, 170, 253, 255, 261, 294–5, 347, 356, 371
welfare systems 115, 221, 357
West Africa 42, 44, 86–8, 96, 103, 174, 177, 191–2, 200, 343, 360
Western Sahara 172, 176
Wilberforce, W. 88
women 3, 4b, **16**, 36–7, 76, 85, 88, 90, 92–3, 107b, 109, 114, 135, 140, **141**, 145, 153, 157–8, 171, 179, 187, 237, 244, 248b, 262, 333, 367, 377
 migrant workers **257–8**, 364
 see also feminization of migration
worker rights 3, 170, 262
 workers see labour
working class 60, 67, 91, 93, 95–6, 328, 342, 345, 358
working conditions 77, 93–4, 141, 154, 158, 180b, 181, 241, 244, 250, 255, 257–8, 261, 298
World Bank 18, 34, 49, 73–4, 126, 143, 187, 223, 320, 379
World Development Indicators
 database 8–10n, 12–13n, 122n, 140n, 178n, 181n
 see also data
world market 6, 26, 99
World Migration Report (IOM) 23, 125, 146, 353
World Trade Organization (WTO) 17, 34, 68, 320
world wars 130
 World War I 5, 96, 97, 100
 inter-war period **96–9**, 131
 World War II **98b**, 99, 130, 198, 206, 225
 see also post-war era
world-systems theory **32–3**, 53, 195
xenophobia 36, **58**, 60, 100, 185–6, 286, 325, 346, 352
Yemen 44, 56, 173, 175, 177, 179, 187, 191
youth/young people 4, 48, 56, 63, 90, 99–100, 136b, 240, 242, 257, 277, 301–2b
youth unemployment 62, 245, **248–9**, 273b, 275b, 301b, 312, 353
Yugoslavia 107b, 115, 166, 226, 228
Zambia 160, 177, 185, 194, 334
Zelinsky, Z. **47**, 380
zero immigration policies 241–2, 313
Zimbabwe 160, 175, 184, 185
Zolberg, Aristide R. 146, 314