Chapter 9

Migration, Security and the Debate on Climate Change

One of the most important migration-related developments in the Age of Migration has been the linking of migration to security, a process of social construction termed *securitization*. This has not occurred everywhere and an important priority for future scholarship is to better elucidate why securitization takes place in some regions, contexts, and eras but not in others. The period between 1945 and roughly 1970 in Western Europe was notable for the prevalent pattern of migration not being viewed as germane to security. International migration into and from most Latin American and Iberian countries generally has not been viewed as an important national security concern, save for the exceptional cases of Haiti–Dominican Republic, Cuba and several cases of Central American refugee flows.

The outpouring of scholarship about migration and security, particularly since 2001, has advanced understanding of how securitization, and its opposite, *desecuritization*, take place. Key actors include government employees, political leaders, reporters, editors, migrants and their allies, and the general public as well. In many instances, the role of media coverage of migration appears crucial to outcomes. It follows that there are varying degrees of securitization and diverse processes of social construction of securitization and desecuritization.

Securitization has a mass psychological dimension. Securitization connects migration to meta-issues that comprise symbolic politics. Migration is well-suited for meta-politics, 'because multitudinous phenomena connect to physical mobility of persons'. 'Demonizing the migrant' as a potential 'terrorist' creates fear and a perception of threat to ontological security far exceeding actual developments' (Faist, 2006: 613).

This chapter will feature an overview of the securitization of migration policies in the OECD area between 1970 and 2012. Since its origins in the Allied cooperation during World War II, this assemblage of the world's richer states has become deeply interdependent through trade and joint membership in security alliances and international organizations. The contemporary states comprising this area confront similar challenges in regulation of international migration.

The following three sections provide an overview of the key dimensions of the migration and security nexus, an assessment of migration and

security in the transatlantic area and an analysis of the War on Terrorism and its aftermath. The focus will be on the putative security threat arising from the growing presence of Muslims, most of whom are of immigrant background or are the offspring of post-1945 migrants to the West. Subsequent sections will examine several significant cases of diasporas influencing the foreign policy of Middle East and North African states (MENA) states embroiled in geo-strategically significant conflicts and the growing concern over the implications of climate change for migration.

Key dimensions of the international migration and security nexus

Traditionally, security has been viewed through the prism of state security. As a result, relatively few scholars have sought to conceptualize what may be termed the migration and security nexus (Miller, 2000; Tirman, 2004). However, the scope of security concerns is much broader than state security, and is inclusive of human security (Poku and Graham, 1998). Human security is defined in a UNDP report as:

> an analytical tool that focuses on ensuring security for the individual, not the state... In line with the expanded definition of human security, the causes of insecurity are subsequently broadened to include threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environmental, community and personal safety … Human security is therefore: people-centred, multidimensional, interconnected, universal. (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 5)

Much migration from poorer countries is driven by the lack of human security that finds expression in impoverishment, inequality, violence, lack of human rights and weak states. Such political, social and economic underdevelopment is linked to histories of colonialism and the present condition of global inequality (see Chapters 2 and 4). Where states are unable to create legal migration systems for necessary labour, many migrants are also forced to move under conditions of considerable insecurity. Smuggling, trafficking, bonded labour and lack of human and worker rights are the fate of millions of migrants. Even legal migrants may have an insecure residence status and be vulnerable to economic exploitation, discrimination and racist violence. Sometimes legal changes can push migrants into irregularity, as happened to the *sans papiers* (undocumented migrants) in France in the 1990s. The frequent insecurity of the people of poorer countries is often forgotten in discussions of state security, yet the two phenomena are closely linked.

Frequently, such migrant insecurity is linked to perceived threats, an aspect of the aforementioned mass psychological dimension, which can be divided into three categories: cultural, socio-economic and political

(Lucassen, 2005). The first perceived threat, the perception of migrant and migrant-background populations as challenging the cultural status quo, may contribute most to migrant insecurity. Such perceptions have been commonplace in Europe since the 1980s. Mexican and other 'Hispanic' migrants to the USA have also been viewed as posing a cultural threat (Huntington, 2004). Often, the religious identity and linguistic practices of migrants loom large in perceived threats. In recent years, Muslims have come to be regarded as a cultural threat in many Western countries.

Examples of the second perceived threat – migrant populations as socio-economic threats – include Italians in Third Republic France, ethnic Chinese diasporas in much of South-East Asia, Syro-Lebanese communities in West Africa, and Chechen and other populations from the Caucasus in the post-Soviet Russian Federation.

The third perceived threat – migrants as potentially politically disloyal or subversive – includes migrant populations such as Palestinians residing in Kuwait prior to the first Gulf War, Yemenites living in Saudi Arabia at the same juncture, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia suspected of political subversion on behalf of Communist China in the 1960s and ethnic Russian populations stranded in Baltic Republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The perceived threats of international migration to national identity and the maintenance of cultural cohesiveness are important aspects of the challenges posed by international migration to the sovereign state (Adamson, 2006). But sometimes international migration is seen as increasing state power. It can facilitate economic growth and is frequently viewed as indispensable to a state's economic wellbeing. Additionally, many immigrants serve as soldiers, and intelligence services can tap immigrant expertise and knowledge of languages. If effective public policies are pursued, international migration can enhance rather than detract from state power (Adamson, 2006: 185).

A state's immigration policies can also contribute to its 'soft power', its ability to achieve foreign policy and security objectives through political and cultural relations without recourse to military or economic coercion. The large body of foreign students studying in the USA can be seen as an important source of soft power, because they help build positive long-term linkages (Nye, 2004). Similarly, treatment of immigrants can affect a state's reputation abroad, a not inconsequential matter for diplomacy and 'smart power', influence that arises from investing in global goods that better enable states to address global issues (Graham and Poku, 2000; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004)

International migration has also had a significant impact on violent conflicts. Migration flows can interact with other factors to foment violent conflict in several ways such as by providing resources that fuel internal conflicts or by facilitating networks of organized crime (Adamson, 2006: 190–1). Migrant and diasporic communities often provide financial aid and recruits to groups engaged in conflicts in origin states. Kosovar Albanian

communities in Western Europe and North America, for instance, provided much of the financing and many recruits for the Kosovo Liberation Army which, in the late 1990s, engaged in heavy fighting with Serbian forces in the former Serbian republic. Similarly, Tamil Sri Lankans in Europe, Canada, India and elsewhere have aided the Tamil Tigers' insurrection in Sri Lanka, an insurgency crushed in 2009. In some instances, organizations viewed by states as engaging in terrorism, such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), have simultaneously been involved in human trafficking and drugs and arms smuggling.

From a non-problem to an obsession: migration and security in the OECD area, 1945–2012

The end of World War II witnessed mass population movements in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere which generally fell under the rubrics of forced migration and ethnic cleansing (Snyder, 2010: 313–37). It has been estimated that 18.5 million persons were displaced, not including the five million Jews deported to concentration camps (Kulischer, 1948). All of these developments involved massive suffering and loss of life. This underscores the observation that mass human displacements constitute a characteristic outcome of warfare. Nevertheless, the revulsion against Nazi war crimes served to delegitimize extreme right parties and other radical movements that typically view immigration and foreigners as threatening to security.

The Cold War soon ensued and with it a perception of the threat of nuclear warfare. Mainstream study of security largely reflected the tenets of *realism*, a school of thought about international relations that traditionally assumed that only sovereign states were germane to analysis of questions of war and peace. In this perspective, migration seemed of marginal significance for security. In Western Europe, the prevalent assumption characterizing the guest-worker era that post-war migrations would be mainly temporary in nature also contributed to this perception.

The status quo that prevailed after 1945 endured until 1970. A harbinger of change came with the politicization of migration policies that generally took place in the 1970s and 1980s, although in some national contexts earlier. Politicization need not engender securitization, which is the linking of migration to perceptions of existential threats to society. However, politicization brings migration issues into the public arena and thereby increases the likelihood of broader involvement of political agents including those hostile to prevailing policies. The 'hyper-securitization' of migration after 9/11 resulted from incremental processes of increasing securitization of migration that had already evolved in the 1980s and 1990s (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2012: 49–76). A key dynamic involved a blurring of counter-terrorism measures with immigration policy measures.

The construction of an Islamic 'threat'

While there were Islamic fundamentalist movements active in Western Europe in the 1970s, they were not seen as posing much of a threat. The success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 began to change that perception. In many Arab states and Turkey, secular-oriented governments felt threatened by Islamic fundamentalist movements. Such governments came to be viewed by some of the more radical Islamic fundamentalists as the 'near enemy' that had to be overthrown and replaced with truly Islamic governance (Gerges, 2005).

Thus, by the 1980s, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism came to affect the transatlantic area in a variety of ways. A massacre of Syrian army cadets led to the brutal repression of Syrian fundamentalists. Many of the survivors ended up as refugees in Germany. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 prompted Iranian intervention in the conflict and the creation of Hezbollah, the Party of God. American and French troops deployed to the Beirut area as part of the Multinational Force in 1982 suffered grievous losses in suicide bomb attacks thought to have been perpetrated by Hezbollah or its allies. The war in Afghanistan between the Soviet Union and its Afghan allies and the Mujahadeen, Afghans who fought the Soviets, began to attract non-Afghan Muslim volunteers, some of whom came from Europe and North America. This marked the genesis of what would later become Al-Qaeda (Roy, 2003). A US-led coalition of states, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, armed and aided the Mujahideen. Following the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency helped create the Taliban, which recruited heavily amongst the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, another case of refugee-soldiers. By 1996, the Taliban had seized control of most of Afghanistan.

The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City underscored the vulnerability of the United States even as it demonstrated the efficacy of existing law enforcement arrangements in punishing the individuals involved in the attack. The adoption of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act in 1996 were complementary and reflected a significant hardening of US Federal Government anti-terrorism and anti-irregular migration policies as well as the issue linkage between migration and terrorism. Yet such measures were not sufficient to prevent the later escalation of violence through the attacks of 11 September 2001, which led to the Bush Administration's 'War on Terrorism' (see below).

There are strong parallels between migration and security developments on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1985 signature of the Schengen Agreement can be seen as the birthdate of a European policy on migration and security (White, 2011: 66). By the 1990s, there were growing concerns over the political activities of Islamic and other Middle Eastern radicals on West European soil. The spill over of Algerian violence

Box 9.1 Spillover of insurgency in Algeria to France

In 1992, an offshoot of the Islamic Salvation Front, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), pursued an insurgency against the Algerian government. Tens of thousands died in a war of terrorism and counterterrorism. France provided military and economic support to the Algerian government, which led to the extension of GIA operations to French soil. A network of militants waged a bombing campaign, principally in the Paris region in 1995, before being dismantled. Some French journalists and scholars believed that the GIA had been penetrated by Algerian agents who then manipulated GIA militants into attacking targets in France in order to bolster French support for the Algerian government (Aggoun and Rivoire, 2004) .

French authorities undertook numerous steps to prevent bombings and to capture the bombers. Persons of North African appearance were routinely subjected to identity checks. Most French citizens and resident aliens of North African background accepted such checks as a necessary inconvenience. Indeed, information supplied by such individuals greatly aided in the neutralization of the terrorist group, several of whom were killed in shootouts with French police. Nevertheless, French police rounded up scores of suspected GIA sympathizers on several occasions as nervousness over attacks remained high.

Such fears appeared warranted in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Scores of GIA and Al-Qaida-linked individuals, mainly of North African background, were detained for involvement in various plots, including one to attack the US embassy in Paris. Several of those arrested were French citizens of North African background, like Zacarias Moussaoui, who was accused of plotting with the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. Algerians and other individuals of North African Muslim background with links to the GIA figured prominently in the hundreds of arrests in the transatlantic area. The anti-Western resentment of some of those arrested was linked to perceived injustices endured by migrants and their families. Despite increased vigilance, several French citizens were involved in a series of suicide bombings of Western targets in Casablanca in 2003. Several of the bombers had been recruited into a fundamentalist network in the Parisian suburbs and their involvement was deeply disturbing to the French population, including most of the Islamic community.

Despite an amnesty offer from the Algerian government to Islamic militants who laid down their arms in 2006, some continued to fight. In 2007, these militants renamed themselves Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and launched a murderous bombing campaign in Algiers. French and other European intelligence officials continue to worry about the potential for spillovers to Europe (see also Chapter 1). The meagre participation in the 2012 national elections in Algeria reflected widespread disaffection and alienation. Yet, as attested by the Arab Spring of 2011 in nearby states, aspirations for reforms and democratic governance suggest that Al-Qaida-style politics holds scant appeal among the Arab masses.

to mainland France and of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) protests and other political activities to Germany became central national security preoccupations of the respective states. Box 9.1 and AOM Website Text 9.1 provide greater detail.

Following the 1993 attacks in Manhattan, a succession of Federal commissions in the USA investigating terrorism warned that additional countermeasures were needed, but the warnings were largely not heeded (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). By 2001, a number of US officials feared a catastrophic attack by Al-Qaida upon a target or targets in the USA, but failed to prevent the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (Shenon, 2008). Perhaps the focus on 'terrorism' as 'irrational violence' hindered understanding of the deep-rooted resentment of many Muslims, in the light of Western support for authoritarian regimes in their own countries (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia). Moreover, many Muslims perceived Israeli actions (supported by US military aid), such as air raids and arbitrary imprisonment of Palestinians, as forms of state terrorism that could legitimately be resisted. The subsequent difficulties of the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the Western failure to understand the sources of malaise in the Muslim world.

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, some European Muslims volunteered to fight the USA in Iraq and many died or were captured. Thousands of European Muslims received military training in camps in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and subsequently returned to Europe (Scheuer, 2008). The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London and the numerous planned attacks thwarted by European police and security agencies increased public concern about Muslims in Europe.

Assessing the threat posed by Islamic radicals in the West

The profiles and histories of Islamic populations in North America and Europe are quite divergent. Muslims living in North America are generally more prosperous and well educated than Muslims in Europe, many of whom were recruited as unskilled labour (CSIS, 2006). However, even within Western Europe, Muslim populations are highly heterogeneous. For example, among Muslims of Turkish background, there are Sunnis and Alevis (orthodox Muslims and a non-orthodox Shíite offshoot respectively), as well as ethnic Arabs, Kurds and Turks.

It is important to stress that religious extremism has only appealed to a minority of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, and that many are quite secular in orientation. It is true that many Muslim immigrants and their descendants confront incorporation barriers in housing, education and employment and endure prejudice and racism. However, the gist of the huge body of social science research on the incorporation of Muslim immigrants and their offspring suggests that most are slowly but

steadily incorporating, much like previous waves of immigration in the transatlantic space that have been viewed as problematic or threatening in the past (Lucassen, 2005).

In France, for instance, empirical evidence reveals the widespread use of French in migrant households and decreasing use of Arabic and other mother tongues (Tribalat, 1995). Furthermore, the evidence showed a decline in traditional arranged marriages and a rising intermarriage rate with French citizens and adoption of French social practices. The major problem areas were high unemployment, perceived discrimination and educational problems. However, Tribalat (1995) found that some communities did not fit the general pattern. Persons of Algerian background tended to be less religious and more secular than persons of Moroccan background. Furthermore, the Turkish community in France exhibited a lower proclivity to French usage at home, interacted less with French society and rarely intermarried with French citizens.

The key insight of Tribalat's study is that France's Muslims were incorporating and becoming French like earlier waves of immigrants to France. France's top experts on radical Islam, Gilles Kepel (2002; 2005) and Olivier Roy (2003), doubted that extremists would find much support in immigrant-background populations in Europe. Their assessments appear borne out by research on public opinion in the Middle East and North Africa and other predominantly Muslim areas of the world, which evidence scant support for terrorism (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007).

The attacks of 9/11 as well as those in Madrid and London transformed the decades-old, indeed centuries-old, question of migrant incorporation in Western countries into an acute security issue, not only in Europe but also in North America and Australia. In recent years much has been written about the susceptibility of migrant-background Muslims to mobilization into terrorist movements. For the most part, such articles and books appear inadequately based upon social scientific insights on migrant incorporation. Greatly exaggerated perceptions of the threat posed by Muslim immigrants in the West became commonplace.

The utterances and political beliefs of a relatively small coterie of radical Islamists attracted inordinate attention, especially in the media. Hence it was that extremely marginal parties such as Hizb ut-Tahrir in Great Britain could provoke such a moral panic, way out of proportion to the real threat posed (Husain, 2009). The origin society-oriented preoccupations that prevailed amongst the Islamist radicals profoundly reflected their socialization and upbringing in Europe's Islamic periphery. Nevertheless, their political orientations were taken to reflect profound dysfunctions and failures of immigrant incorporation in West Europe. In fact, their presence was largely due to the existence of refugee and asylum-seeking policies that afforded residency and protection.

Pargenter (2008) stresses the widespread revulsion felt by most Muslims, including those in the West, for the wanton violence against innocent civilians exercised by Al-Qaeda itself or confederates like the late

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's group in Iraq and the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria. Numerous credible sources concur that the vast majority of Muslims worldwide view Al-Qaida with contempt and utterly reject its politics and goals (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007; Kepel, 2002; 2004). A study in 2009 found that only 15 per cent of people killed in Al-Qaida attacks between 2004 and 2008 were Westerners and that the vast majority of victims were Muslims (Schmidt and Shanker, 2011: 155).

Public opinion research consistently reveals that European Muslims support and respect European democracies (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 38; Jackson and Doerschler, 2012). Unfortunately, public opinion surveys also reveal growing negative opinion and prejudice against Muslims and Islam, particularly in the US (Gerges, 2011: 20–2). There subsists an egregious disconnect between perceptions of Muslims and Islam and the values, ideals and aspirations of most Muslims. This state of affairs suggests an urgent need for better education about world affairs and Islam.

Migration, security and the 'War on Terrorism'

What was termed the 'War on Terrorism' by the George W. Bush Administration involved calculated exaggeration and misleading simplification. After largely ignoring the threat posed by Al-Qaida in its first months in office, the Administration then declared a war and likened it to World War II (Clarke, 2004; Shenon, 2008). In doing so, the Administration exaggerated the threat posed by radical Muslims at a time when overall support for achievement of Islamic fundamentalist goals through political violence had declined significantly and mainstream Islamic fundamentalist movements had rejected violence while embracing incremental reform (Gerges, 2005; Roy, 1994). It then compounded the error by linking the government of Iraq to Al-Qaeda and then using that and an unwarranted claim concerning weapons of mass destruction as a pretext to invade Iraq.

The invasion of Iraq proved counterproductive to the campaign against Al-Qaeda and its allies, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, since it increased support for them among some Muslims (Ricks, 2007). Nevertheless, the US-led attack on Afghanistan, later supported by a NATO deployment, badly damaged Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan without eliminating them (Miller, 2007). With the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, perhaps a remnant of only several hundred militants remained (Schmidt and Shanker, 2011: 242–5).

Al-Qaeda probably played some role in the mounting of the attack in Madrid in 2004 and the attacks in London in 2005 and 2007, although these attacks were initially viewed as home-grown but inspired by Al-Qaeda (Benjamin and Simon, 2005). In early 2008, French and Spanish authorities thwarted a planned series of attacks in Western Europe, apparently timed again to precede general elections in Spain. Most of the suspects were Pakistani migrants, several of whom had recently arrived from

the frontier area of Waziristan in Pakistan. Hence, the US Secretary of Defence claimed that the outcome of the war in Afghanistan directly affected European security (Shanker and Kulish, 2008).

Soon after entering office in 2009, US President Obama declared the end of the War on Terrorism. By 2012, US forces in Iraq had been greatly reduced and those remaining were mostly deployed in non-combat missions. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, US and NATO troop levels were also being drawn down with an endpoint for US and NATO combat missions foreseen for July 2014. Prospects for both Iraq and Afghanistan did not bode well and fears over possible future civil wars appeared warranted. One much discussed scenario foresaw a Taliban role in a future Afghan coalition government (and perhaps) federal state (Green, 2012).

Migration and security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

Comparisons to other areas of the world reveal important contrasts with the dominant pattern of what might be termed hyper-securitization in the transatlantic area since the 1990s. Nevertheless, migration and security represents a salient concern in many areas outside the OECD. Instead of comprehensive examination of all such areas, only a handful of country and regional cases can be considered here.

Geo-strategically, due to its proximity to Europe in the transatlantic space, the MENA assumes enormous significance. The analysis in previous sections revealed important connections between migration and security in the transatlantic area and the MENA. The origin country-orientation of many MENA-background migrants in the West attests to the enduring significance of migration and security-related developments in the MENA for the transatlantic area. A related concern arises from the growing significance of diasporas to understanding of migration and security, particularly in the MENA.

Diaspora refers to a transnational population linked by ethnicity to a traditional, symbolic or historic origin country (see Chapter 2). Diasporas constitute non-state actors although states increasingly promote ties to diasporic populations abroad, especially to spur economic development. Such populations increasingly loom large in all regions of the world, but particularly so in the MENA with its many conflicts. An important analytical question arises about the role of diasporas in conflicts and their settlement or non-resolution. Studies suggest that diasporas can either contribute to democratization and stability or exacerbate or perpetuate conflicts as witnessed in the Azeri–Armenia conflict (Shain and Barth, 2003: 449–50). Box 9.2 analyses the role of the Armenian diaspora in the strife over Nagorno-Karabakh. AOM Website Text 9.2 considers the role played by diaspora Jewry in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Box 9.2 The Armenian diaspora and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh

The Armenian diaspora comprises communities around the world. The two largest ethnic Armenian populations are found in the USA, where an estimated one million Armenians reside, principally in California, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, and in France, where an estimated 500,000 Armenians live, principally in the Marseille and Paris areas (Shain and Barth, 2003: 468).

Soon after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the area of the former semi-autonomous Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, became an independent state in 1991. Similarly, the neighbouring former Soviet area became the internationally recognized state of Azerbaijan. The territory of the new Azeri state encompassed an area with mixed populations of ethnic Armenians and Azeris called Nagorno-Karabakh. A conflict ensued and Armenian forces seized Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azeri territories. Volunteers from the Armenian diaspora played a key role in the fighting which resulted in the creation of hundreds of thousands of Azeri refugees, most of whom lost their homes and livelihoods and subsist as IDPs in areas still controlled by the Azeri government or found safe haven in neighbouring Iran which has a large ethnic Azeri minority population.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azeri territories now under Armenian military occupation has largely remained frozen since the early 1990s. However, the first democratically elected president of the new Armenia, Ter-Petrossian, opposed recognition of the self-declared Karabakh. This put Ter-Petrossian at odds with influential elements of the Armenian diaspora which favoured both recognition and annexation and generally a hard line towards both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Ter-Petrossian's disfavour increased with Armenia's economic collapse. The downturn made Armenians all the more dependent on assistance from the Armenian diaspora. In the USA, the pro-Armenian lobby succeeded in increasing US foreign assistance to Armenia and in instituting a ban on aid to Azerbaijan (Shain and Barth, 2003: 471). The recovery of Armenia's sovereignty and independence led to significant inflows of ethnic Armenians from the diaspora who established political parties in Armenia. Among these was the Dashnak Armenia Revolutionary Federation which fiercely criticized Ter-Petrossian's policies. Eventually, by 1998, Ter-Petrossan was forced to resign and diasporic opposition figured centrally in this outcome. His successor Kocharian embraced an Armenian foreign policy orientation which was much more pleasing to hard-line elements in the Armenian diaspora. According to Shain and Barth (2003: 472), the weight of the diaspora '…manifests itself most powerfully regarding the possibility of a peace settlement with Azerbaijan'.

Both the behaviour of the Armenian and Jewish diasporas may be viewed as a challenge to state-centric analysis and, in a sense, to the state itself. However, comparison of the Israeli and Armenian cases suggests that the abilities of diaspora populations to influence politics and policies in

homelands vary a great deal. The economic plight of Armenia compared to that of Israel, meant that the Armenian diaspora was much more influential than the Jewish diaspora in the formulation of Armenia's and Israel's respective foreign policies (Shain and Barth, 2003). The two cases also differ in that Israel long enjoyed an aura bordering on deference amongst Jews that Armenia lacks among Armenians. However, the Israeli–Jewish diaspora relationship may be evolving as emigration of Israel's Jews, particularly its most affluent and well-educated citizens, increases and prospects for a two-state solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict fade (Lustik, 2011).

A growing concern: environment, climate change and migration

In Chapter 2, we drew attention to push–pull models that assume that population growth and environmental degradation directly cause migration. We showed that such deterministic approaches ignore the interaction between these and the many other factors that influence decisions to migrate or to stay put. We stressed the need for a multi-pronged understanding of migration that takes account of the many aspects of change that affect societies and communities, as well as the role of individual and collective agency in shaping migratory behaviour.

In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the relationship between climate change and migration. This can be seen as a special case of environmental drivers of migration, but as one of growing current significance. Concerns about climate change-induced migration have emerged in the context of debates on global warming and the inability of states to take effective action to mitigate it through regulation of carbon emissions. Environmentalists have claimed that the effects of global warming, especially on sea-levels and rainfall patterns, will lead directly to massive population displacements. They call for action to prevent such migrations as well for the broadening of the definition of refugees to include people displaced by climate change. The underlying assumption seems to be that migration is intrinsically negative and should be stopped where possible.

Migration scholars, by contrast, have pointed out that migration is driven by many interacting factors, and can rarely be reduced to the effects of just one form of change, such as climate change. Moreover, they have argued that migration itself can be one of the most effective ways of responding to change and building better livelihoods.

The state of knowledge on climate change and migration

In the 1980s and 1990s, some environmentalists claimed that predicted climate-change-induced developments (such as sea-level rise, drought or desertification) could be mapped onto settlement patterns to predict future

human displacement. In other words, if climate change models predicted a sea-level rise of (say) 50 centimetres, it would be possible to map all coastal areas affected by this and work out how many people lived in such areas. The assumption then was that all these people would have to move (for an example of this approach see Myers and Kent, 1995). No consideration was given to possible adaptation strategies, such as flood defences, changes in livelihood patterns or short-distance mobility. Others put forward scenarios of mass displacements as a cause of future global insecurity (Homer-Dixon and Percival, 1996), while certain NGOs even escalated forecasts of future population displacements up to one billion by 2050 (Christian Aid, 2007).

By contrast, migration and refugee scholars argued that climate change in itself was not a major cause of migration, and that people's decisions to move were always shaped by multiple factors (Black, 2001; Castles, 2002). They therefore called for micro-level research on actual experiences of how communities coped with modifications in their living conditions and economic opportunities resulting from climate change.

The knowledge base has since developed a great deal. Researchers have begun to carry out studies at the local and regional levels, and the empirical basis for understanding the relationship between climate change and migration is much enhanced. Findings of studies have been published in books which cover a range of conceptual, normative and descriptive topics (for example see McAdam, 2010; Piguet and de Guchteneire, 2011). Information and research centres have issued reports and working papers analysing experiences of climate change and the strategies adopted by affected populations (e.g. Hugo, 2008; Massey *et al.*, 1998; Piore, 1979). Important debates on methodology are taking place (Kniveton *et al.*, 2008), and significant empirical studies are beginning to appear in scientific journals (e.g. Pratikshya and Massey, 2009). A doctoral thesis has analysed the politicization of the climate change displacement debate (Gemenne, 2009).

The current state-of-the-art in understanding the climate-change-migration nexus is summed up in a study published by the Foresight programme of the British Government Office for Science (Foresight, 2011) The *Foresight Report* focuses on the environmental effects of climate change resulting from human activity – notably the global warming caused by increased use of fossil fuels. The Government Chief Scientist commissioned over 80 reports and papers covering drivers of migration, the state of science, case studies of relevant experiences, models for analysing change and policy development. The authors include migration researchers, economists, demographers, geographers, environmentalists and social scientists from 30 countries worldwide. The *Foresight Report* starts by arguing that estimates of the numbers of environmental/climate change migrants are:

> Methodologically unsound, as migration is a multi-causal phenomenon and it is problematic to assign a proportion of the actual or predicted

> number of migrants as moving as a direct result of environmental change. A deterministic approach that assumes that all or a proportion of people living in an 'at risk' zone in a low-income country will migrate neglects the pivotal role that humans take in dealing with environmental change and also ignores other constraining factors which influence migration outcomes. (Foresight, 2011: 11)

It is impossible to summarize the many important findings of the *Foresight Report* here. Attention may be drawn to some key points. First, migration is likely to continue regardless of environmental change, because it is driven by powerful economic, political and social processes. Many people will migrate into areas of greater environmental vulnerability, such as cities built on floodplains in Asia and Africa. Second, environmental change is equally likely to make migration less possible as more probable. Where people are impoverished by such factors as drought or desertification, they may lack the resources to move, and may have to stay in situations of extreme vulnerability. Third, attempts at preventing migration may lead to increased impoverishment, displacement and irregular migration in the long run. Migration can represent a transformational adaptation to environmental change, and may be an effective way to build resilience.

Finally, and perhaps most important, environmental change will influence the volume, directions and characteristics of migration in the future – even if it is not possible to disentangle environmental and other drivers. This means that: 'Giving urgent policy attention to migration in the context of environmental change now will prevent a much worse and more costly situation in the future' (Foresight, 2011: 10).

As a result of the Foresight project and the other studies carried out in recent years, it is now possible to go beyond some of the simplistic statements of the past. It is still too early to speak of scientific consensus about the causes, extent and impacts of climate change, but certain ideas seem to be gaining acceptance as pointers for further research and action.

To start with, climate-change-induced migration should not be analysed in isolation from other forms of movement – especially economic migration and forced migration. Forced migration results from conflicts, persecution and the effects of development projects (such as dams, airports, industrial areas and middle-class housing complexes). Such development-induced displacement is actually the largest single form of forced migration, predominantly leading to internal displacement of 10–15 million people per year, and mainly affecting disempowered groups such as indigenous peoples, other ethnic minorities and slum-dwellers (Cernea and McDowell, 2000).

Possible climate-change-related migration is often closely linked to other aspects of environmental change. The effects of changing farming practices (e.g. mechanization, use of fertilizers and pesticides, mono-cultures, irrigation, concentration of land ownership) on the environment may be hard to distinguish from cyclical weather variations

and long-term climate change. Rural–urban migration and the growth of cities are key social-change processes of our times. All too often, this means that people leaving the land end up in urban slums (Davis, 2006) that are highly vulnerable to disasters and climatic factors, such as storms, landslides, water insecurity and flooding. Migration scholars now recognize that environmental factors have been significant in driving migration throughout history and have often been neglected in the past. In other words, we should generally look for *multiple and interacting causes* when studying migration and include climate change as one of the factors to be analysed.

Further, recent research indicates that there is little evidence that climate change will cause massive migration movement. It is very difficult to identify groups of people already displaced by climate change alone. There are certainly groups which have been affected by climatic (or broader environmental) *variability*, but these need to be distinguished from long-term climate change. In addition, other economic, political, social and cultural factors are also at work. Even the cases portrayed in the media as most clear-cut become more complex when looked at closely. For instance, Bangladesh is often seen as an 'obvious example' of mass displacement due to sea-level rise, but an analysis by Findlay and Geddes (2011) questions this conventional view, showing that longer-term migration is related to differential patterns of poverty, access to social networks, and household and community structures.

But the absence of the displaced millions predicted by Myers and others just a few years ago should not be taken as a reason for complacency. It seems probable that the forecast acceleration of climate change over the next few decades will have major effects on production, livelihoods and human security. A study of the Asia–Pacific region identifies a number of 'hot spot areas which will experience the greatest impact': these include densely settled delta areas, low-lying coastal areas, low-lying atolls and coral islands, some river valleys, and semi-arid low-humidity areas. The largest populations likely to be affected are in mega-cities built on average only a few metres above sea-level, like Shanghai, Tianjin, Tokyo, Osaka and Guangzhou (Hugo, 2010a). It has been estimated that the number of people living in floodplains of urban areas in East Asia may rise from 18 million in 2000 to 45–67 million by 2060 (Foresight, 2011: 13). Such areas are experiencing massive growth through rural–urban migration. Significant changes in peoples' ability to earn a livelihood in specific locations will lead to a range of adaption strategies, many of which will not involve migration. However, certain families and communities are likely to adapt through temporary or permanent migration of some of their members, while in extreme cases it may become impossible to remain in current home areas, so that forced displacement will ensue.

To sum up: migration is not an inevitable result of climate change, but one possible adaptation strategy out of many. It is crucial to understand the factors that lead to differing strategies and varying degrees of

vulnerability and resilience in individuals and communities. Moreover, migration should not generally be seen as negative: people have always moved in search of better livelihoods, and this can bring benefits both for origin and destination areas (UNDP, 2009). Migrants should not be seen as passive victims; they have some degree of *agency*, even under the most difficult conditions. Strategies that treat them as passive victims are counterproductive, and protection of rights should also be about giving people the chance to deploy their agency. The objective of public policy should not be to prevent migration, but rather to ensure that it can take place in appropriate ways and under conditions of safety, security and legality (Zetter, 2010).

Conclusions

The post-9/11 period witnessed a reinforcement of the securitization of migration policies that had developed from the 1980s, particularly after the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of a new security agenda. Analysis of climate change and its implications for security occupies a key place on that agenda. There has been a parallel proliferation of books about securitization of migration, but mainly about the transatlantic space. A scholarly consensus has emerged that migrant populations were the most adversely affected by the pattern of securitization.

Nevertheless, migrant populations have proven resilient in the face of adversity. Radical Islam has elicited scant support in the transatlantic zone and political incorporation of growing Muslim populations is ongoing. Securitization of migration has not taken place in some regions such as most of Latin America and Iberia. Important priorities for future scholarship are to better understand the implications of non-state actors like diasporas for security matters and to compare securitization processes in the transatlantic region with security in other regions.

Guide to further reading

Extra resources at www.age-of-migration.com

The Age of Migration website includes additional Text 9.1 ‘Spillover of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Insurgency to Germany’ and Text 9.2 ‘The Role of Diaspora Jewry in the Arab–Israeli Conflict’.

There has been a remarkable outpouring of scholarship about migration and security since 1990. To a certain extent, this evolution parallels the expansion of terrorism research, a social science growth industry well analysed by Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning and Smyth (2011) who provide an important critique of what may be termed the terrorism industry that has

propagated undue fear and vastly exaggerated the threat posed by terrorism. A number of books and articles about Muslims in the West appear skewed by related biases and exaggerations (Vaisse, 2010).

Notable more recent contributions about migration and security include Paoletti (2011), Dancygier (2010), Greenhill (2010), Bourbeau (2011) and Chebel d'Appollonia (2012). On Muslims in Europe, see Glazer (2009), Laurence (2012), Pargenter (2008), Gerges (2011), Kurzman (2011) and Jackson and Doerschler (2012). On the complex security and theoretical implications of transnational and diasporic populations, see Adamson and Demetriou (2007) and Shain and Barth (2003).

For climate change, the key reading is the Foresight Report. All the papers along with the main report are available for free download at http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight.